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ABSTRACT 
ALL IS FAIR IN WAR - VIOLENT CONFLICT AND THE SECURITIZATION OF 
RAPE 
Sabine Hirschauer 
Old Dominion University, 2012 
Director: Dr. Regina Karp 
Systematic mass rape during conflict has for centuries met with global ignorance 
and political complacency despite its atrocious character. The conflicts in Bosnia and 
Rwanda in the 1990s altered the silence surrounding this long tolerated, dark underbelly 
of war. Applying Barry Buzan's and Ole Waever's Securitization Theory to the cases of 
Bosnia and Rwanda, this dissertation finds that rape during both wars was successfully 
securitized. Securitization Theory as a model and indicator of an effective shifting of rape 
from an apolitical or political perspective into the security realm was appropriate. Bosnia 
initiated the first convictions of rape as a crime against humanity. The Tribunal of 
Rwanda for the first time prosecuted rape as a distinct feature of genocide. Bosnia and 
Rwanda, however, also represent pivotal turning points, which not only caused this 
securitization - but appear to demand the continued securitization of rape lest it returns to 
the margins of politics. Through the speech act, the theory's key identifying mechanism, 
this dissertation traces specific rhetorical markers, which throughout the interplay of a 
multitude of actors (institutions; non-governmental organizations; states; media) 
securitized rape during both conflicts - and beyond. In 1998, the Rome Statute not only 
established the International Criminal Court but, similar to the tribunals in Bosnia and 
Rwanda, defined rape as a war crime. In 2000 and in 2009 the U.N. Security Council 
passed landmark resolutions, underscoring for the first time the inherent link between 
systematic rape, war and global security. The successful securitization of rape, however, 
also introduces wide-ranging complexities - due to the uniquely distinct character of 
rape. This dissertation articulates these complexities and explores a research agenda that 
addresses the incentives and disincentives for the continued securitization of rape in 
violent conflict. 
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During the dreadful early days of the Rwandan rainy season in April 1994, when 
rain came down in sheets in the heart of Africa, when water clumps turned the red earth 
into unforgiving mud, a pregnant woman named Monique and her six-year-old daughter 
escaped the mass slaughter - just to fall victim to a different kind of death: rape, a death 
known to last a lifetime. The Interahamwe, a notorious Rwandan militia group, raped the 
pregnant mother and her young daughter. Repeatedly.1 
During the fastest genocide in modern history, somewhere another woman, named 
Donatilla, was sexually mutilated with rusty scissors,2 then raped, over and over again, 
then left crippled. The Interahamwe thought her to be dead because one cannot survive 
such un-survivable suffering and pain. The perpetrators, including a journalist were later 
charged with rape utilized has a tool of genocide and convicted in an unprecedented 
international ruling. 
During these haunting 100 days an estimated 250,000 to 500,000 Rwandan 
women were systematically raped, sexually abused, tortured and mutilated. And many of 
them gruesomely killed only after already enduring the most atrocious terror. 
When it comes to the failure of humanity, there are many stories to be told. Most 
of them are shameful, dire, gruesome and ghastly accounts of the darkest corners of our 
collective souls as an international community. 
1 Coomaraswamy, Radhika, Special Rapporteur 1999, 8. 
2 Ibid., 8. 
2 
Bosnia 1992: Hotels, barracks and abandoned sheds turned into rape camps. 
Screams and wails lingering in the air, coming from a police station. Mothers and sisters, 
daughters and children systematically raped. Bosnian Muslim women chanting Serbian 
war songs, gone mad, after being beaten and raped. For days. Rwanda 1994: Street 
blockades used as temporary detention areas. Human placeholders on the crossroads 
between life and death. Women weighed how valuable they were. How a woman could 
pay for her life. Then "the guards as a group or the leader among them decided whether 
the person was to be killed on the spot, raped, kept for sex service or future execution, or 
perhaps released."3 A nun "battered to death with a hammer."4 Women forced to bury 
their husbands before being raped and mutilated, then ordered to "walk naked like a 
group of cattle for miles to Kabgayi."5 
All is fair in war. 
When it comes to the failure of humanity, there are many stories to be told. Most 
of them are of the deepest disregard for human life, the complete abandonment of a moral 
compass, testimonies of the most barbaric atrocities committed by people to people. Tales 
of the end of all human dignity. And only on occasion these stories involve the notion of 
hope. 
Such hopefulness - within the overarching framework of international relations -
began at the end of the 20th century, infamously with the return of genocide to Europe 
and of unconceivable slaughter to a tiny central African country - and mass rapes of 
women to both. And it came from an unlikely and ideologically embattled place: the 
United Nations with the legal mechanisms of international law at hand. 
3 Des Forges, Alison 1999, 163. 
4 Ibid., 190. 
5 Ibid., 164. 
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Not all horror in war is created equal. Systematic mass rape has always carried 
itself well as a silent collaborator and casual bystander in times of conflict. However, 
while rape during war throughout history has consistently been utilized as a weapon of 
war, it has never been recognized as such. Rape during war was not able to convey its 
horror to a wider international audience. As some scholars put it "for a crime to be 
international, it was thought that it had to be more than a garden-variety domestic 
crime."6 Wartime rape did not evoke the same degree and sense of terror on an 
internationally political scale compared to what it created individually. Equally, many 
discounted the consistent systematic nature of wartime rape and only recently saw "rape 
elevated into a clear strategy of war."7 
The conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda have thrust such systematic utilization into 
the international security forefront. The term called "security equality," as coined by 
feminist scholars such as Louise Olsson in 2009, address such persistent disparity 
between the security of men and women during war.8 However, Bosnia and Rwanda have 
set legal precedents unseen before in international law. Bosnia accounts for the first 
convictions of state officials of rape as a crime against humanity - systematically 
implemented for specific strategic goals. Judges on the Tribunal of Rwanda expanded 
these international legal parameters even further. They issued the first conviction of rape 
as a distinct feature and mechanism of genocide. At the advent of the 21st century in the 
wake of the atrocities in Bosnia and Rwanda, the international community witnessed a 
consistent rise of norms, facilitated through international institutions such the United 
Nations and its international legal structures. Most importantly, however, the U.N. 
6 May, Larry 2005, 98. 
7 Ibid., 98 
8 Kuehnast, Kathleen, de Jonge Oudraat, Chantal, and Helga Hemes, ed. 2011, 13. 
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Security Council through the establishment of the international tribunals of Bosnia and 
Rwanda has acknowledged that the atrocities during the two conflicts, including mass 
rapes, have presented "a threat to national and international peace and security."9 Rape 
has elevated itself to a global security concern. It has finally arrived at last as a security 
actor and security threat within 21st century global crisis management. 
And the application of Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver's Securitization Theory will 
help us to explain this phenomenon. For decades, International Security Studies have, for 
the most part, ignored rape as a systematic weapon of warfare.10 Until Bosnia and 
Rwanda wartime rape consistently suffered from gendered perspectives toward 
state/national and international security. According to Barry Buzan, states "have 
constituted wartime rape as an expectable by-product of conquering soldiers."11 
However, the horrific scope and scale of mass rapes in Bosnia and Rwanda have created 
a fundamental shift. It decisively altered these assumptions. The application of 
Securitization Theory will help us to explain this shift. 
The theoretical and conceptual shackles of traditional International Relations 
theory such as realism and liberalism have for decades bypassed, underplayed, marred 
and marked the normative assumptions surrounding rape as a weapon of war. By utilizing 
the theoretical parameters of the Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory, by 
developing a securitization matrix and scale and applying those to the case studies of the 
conflicts in Bosnia (1992-1995) and Rwanda (1994), this dissertation examines the 
development of securitization of wartime rape. It will discuss the roots of the initial 
9 United Nations Security Council 1994, land United Nations Security Council Resolution 752 United 
Nations Security Council 1992, 1. 
10 Buzan, Barry and Hansen, Lene 2009, 56. 
11 Ibid., 140. 
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inability and gradual development of such securitization. It will point to the shifting of 
the assumptions of wartime rape from the natural to the strategic, from the individual to 
the collective, from the subjective to the objective, the insular/singular and incidental to 
the national, regional and international. 
This dissertation will also discuss the effectiveness of securitization of wartime 
rape. With the conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda, wartime rape, practiced and utilized as a 
systematic tool of war for centuries, changed. The interaction of a multitude of actors 
(global institutions; the EU; human rights and non-governmental organizations; the U.S. 
as the international hegemon and an increasingly globalized media) gradually securitized 
rape and, hence, shifted international norms and assumptions - e.g. International law. The 
mass rapes in Bosnia and Rwanda emerged as seismic watershed moments and ushered in 
these new assumptions and norms about wartime rape. It made its systematic structure 
and security impact visible, globally recognizable and recognized. 
To critically analyze the development of securitization of wartime rape and to 
examine its security underpinning warrants the analyses of different aspects of mass rape. 
In Chapter II, this dissertation will examine how rape throughout history was consistently 
used as a weapon of war. It will trace the development of rape as a systematic method 
throughout history and examine the collective international failure to interpret its 
utilization as a crime. Chapter III will delve into the development of Securitization 
Theory; its theoretical underpinning and its historical and intellectual roots, political 
backdrop and global context. As its case studies, chapters IV and V will analyze how 
rape during the conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda was securitized and finally recognized as 
a systematic (and punishable) weapon of war. Both case studies will address the 
6 
application and processes of Securitization Theory of mass rapes in Bosnia and Rwanda. 
The case studies will also interpret what securitization resembles in both conflicts and 
identify its securitizing actors. It also addresses questions such as: What were the steps 
that elevated rape to the level of "existential threat"? What were the extraordinaire 
measures taken by the audience such as international institutions and states? In its 
analysis, Chapter VI will evaluate if one securitizing actor was more influential than 
another and if and whether or not securitization was in fact effective and functioning as it 
was supposed to function. It will delve into: What were the securitization processes that 
transformed rape progressively from a fluid/abstract/by-standing assumption to the 
tangible/real and consequential and existential? And what events marked the evolution of 
securitization and what were its normative consequences, if any? In its analytical core, it 
will examine if and how effective securitization of wartime rape has become and if and 
how its implications mattered, on the political and/or academic peripheries. 
As a point of departure, this dissertation understands mass rape during conflict as 
a systematic weapon of warfare as practiced as such throughout history. Further by 
applying the theoretical parameters of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever's Securitization 
Theory, this dissertation is testing the concept of securitization as a viable/pragmatic 
theoretical framework. Securitization Theory as an overarching concept turns a concern 
or problem - e.g. the environment, immigration, HIV-Aids infection, sexual violence -
into a danger and labels it accordingly - as a security issue. It redefines its significance 
and its degree of importance. It moves and elevates an issue from a basic, benign, non-
threatening to a threat level and turns it into a security issue. The act of securitization 
itself shifts an issue - e.g. environment or economic issues - into the realm of security. 
7 
When we apply securitization to wartime rape, the securitization of rape advances the act 
of rape not only from a "natural/common/opportunistic" occurrence to a systematic tool, 
but it assumes a constructive threat component and, hence, it becomes a national and 
international security issue. By doing so, it also de-genderizes rape, removes women as 
"depoliticized" entities and re-establishes them as "active agents."12 It elevates an issue 
* i 
from the political and policy level to the "existentially threatening" stage. 
As actors securitize an issue (turn it into an existential threat) norms and values 
about this issue change and extraordinary measures are being deployed to confront and 
combat this threat. A securitizing actor is someone (an entity or mechanism or influential 
leadership) who is declaring that something is a threat to the object's survival. A 
securitizing actor is also an entity or mechanism that is articulating a threat. Such 
articulation expresses itself through "the speech act." The speech act is a mechanism that 
is attaching the word "security" to an issue. Actors say/speak the word "security" to 
indicate the prominence of a threat. Such securitizing actors - in general - could include 
the state, individual political leaders; individuals within different forms of bureaucracies 
and agencies; governments; lobbyists; civil society. These actors speak on behalf of 
something/someone whose survival as an entity or body and existence is threatened. 
Securitizing actors during the Bosnia are divided into external and internal 
securitizing actors. These actors either securitized or significantly influenced 
securitization from the outside (externally) or inside (internally) of the former 
Yugoslavian territory. As external actors of securitizing rape during the Bosnian conflict, 
for example, I am examining the involvement of International Institutions or international 
12 Buzan, Barry and Hansen, Lene 2009, 247. 
13 Ibid., 214. 
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media. The speech act emerges as a key tool of identifying securitization. I examine how 
these actors securitized rape as a systematic tool of war through the securitization 
mechanism/method of the speech act (someone says/speaks the word "security) and 
through other rhetorical measures/images, which also effectively articulate the speech act. 
While focusing on the speech act from the actors' perspective, I will then outline how 
securitization has been implemented by the audience through the deployment of 
commitments, legal measurers and resources. An audience is an entity or a body of 
authoritative and legitimate units (institutions, NGOs, alliance, hegemonic leadership) 
that not only accept securitization from the securitizing actor, but initiates and deploys 
actions. In conclusion of each case study, for example, an actor/audience matrix will help 
to summarize the different mechanisms/methods and deployed measurers. 
The global recognition of mass rape as genocide and crime against humanity through 
the Bosnia and Rwanda tribunal rulings has emerged as a milestone in reframing wartime 
rape as a security issue. It not only resembles a legal watershed moment within 
international law, but it constitutes securitization of rape as a weapon of war. For 
generations, the definition of rape during conflict enjoyed simplicity and unchallenged 
intellectual discourse. Usually, rape during war has been denoted either as opportunistic, 
"revenge and triumph for the winning side," or "humiliation and defeat for the 
conquered."14 Rape's gendered character, regardless of its systematic function as a 
weapon of war, has largely created the ideological underpinning of misinterpreting rape 
during warfare throughout history. It "depoliticizes sexual abuse in conflict" and has 
rendered rape, even on its massive scale, "as sexual or personal in nature."15 Framing 
14 Vikman, Ancient Orginis: Sexual Violence in Warfare, Part I. 2005, 30 
,5 Kumar 2002, 101 
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rape today as a systematic weapon of warfare divorces the sheer act from its initially 
gendered, domestic and, hence, "inferior" and/or "softer" context to a conscious and 
effective method to advance specific strategic objectives. The sexual violence against 
Bosnian Muslim and Tutsi women during both conflicts, for instance, was orchestrated 
through Serbian and Hutu authority to achieve very specific and strategic goals such as 
genocide, ethnic cleansing and territorial and socio-political gains, including the 
dismantling of the societal fabric of communities. Genocide, as confirmed by the 
Rwandan Tribunal, was a key strategy and objective of Hutu leaders in their rape 
campaign against Tutsi women. 
The Bosnian Tribunal unleashed with its first rape convictions of state officials an 
unprecedented reversal of the definition of wartime rape. It upset the centuries-old 
assumption and political undercurrent that rape was permissible during war. It for the first 
time introduced the notion of legal and international accountability. The Tribunal of 
Rwanda additionally not only convicted head of states and ministers for rape, but defined 
systematic rape as a function of genocide. 
The term "genocide" was first coined by the Polish-Jewish attorney Raphael Lemkin 
in a report to the Legal Council of the League of Nations about the mass slaughter of 
Armenian Christians during World War I. Later Lemkin published a book that traced 
Germany's rule in other countries throughout World War II. Lemkin's definition of 
genocide created the basis for the Nurnberg Trials and the 1948 Genocide Convention. In 
1948, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the convention and its internationally 
recognized legal definition. According to the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article 2, genocide is defined as "the act of 
10 
committing certain crimes, including the killing of members of the group or causing 
serious physical or mental harm to members of the group with the intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, racial or religious groups, as such."16 The United States 
failed, in fact, to ratify the Convention until 198817, and it wasn't until the 1990s that 
crimes of genocide began to be enforced. Article II of the 1948 Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines genocide as "the intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious groups through killing, 
causing serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately inflicting the physical destruction, or 
imposing measures to prevent births within a group or forcibly transferring children of 
18 the group to another." 
During the Nuremberg Trials following World War II, rape was cited as a form of 
torture, but never prosecuted. Acts of rape define themselves as crimes, according to 
international law, prohibited under the Geneva Convention and punishable by death or 
imprisonment under Article 120 of the American Uniform Code of Military Justice. The 
Geneva Convention IV of 1949 Article 27 states that "women shall be especially 
protected against any attack on their honor, in particular against rape, enforced 
prostitution, or any form of indecent assault."19 
However, rape cases including the reported mass rapes by German soldiers during 
the 1941 Soviet invasion or the rapes of ten thousand German women by the Soviet 
Union army in the immediate World War II aftermath were never prosecuted. According 
16 United Nations 1948, 277. 
17 United Nations 2012. 
18 United Nations 1948. 
19 United Nations 1949, 307. 
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to the U.N. officials, the "absence of implementing mechanisms and an overall lack of 
accountability" has rendered the initial intention by the Geneva Convention ineffective. 
However, the 1994 Tribunal of Rwanda reevaluated the link between rape and 
genocide. Since the Convention defined genocide as the act of destroying or the intention 
to destroy a particular ethnic group, international law and international institutions have 
increasingly qualified sexual violence and rape as genocide, if committed with such 
intentions.20 Likewise, scholars such as Kelly Dawn Askin assert that raping a person in 
order to erase and destroy one's ethnicity, can constitute genocide "if at least one of the 
additional elements, such as causing serious bodily or mental harm can be established."21 
Forced impregnation, systematically implemented through rape camps, most prominently 
during the Bosnia conflict, emerged as a key tool in this context. Beverely Allen explores 
the issue of forced impregnation and its implication further. During the Bosnia conflict, 
an estimated 35,000 women were impregnated and held captive in numerous camps 
spread throughout the region until an abortion was impossible. Women were raped by 
Serbian soldiers "to give birth to little Chetniks/Serb soldiers."22 
The link between genocide and systematic rape was explored further by many 
feminist scholars. Allen and Askin created new terminology such as "genocidal rape," 
"ethnorape" or "femicide" in connection with the central objective of forced 
impregnation/eradication of the victim's cultural and ethnic identity. While this notion is 
biologically/genetically flawed (the child will have the genetic mix/build-up of the 
Bosnian mother and the Serb father), nevertheless, this illogic fueled the cleansing 
process, according to Allen. Focusing on Rwanda, other scholars such as Christopher 
20 Bijleveld, Catrien. Morssinkhof, Aafke and Smeuler, Alette. 2009,213. 
21 Askin, Kelly 1997, 393. 
22 Allen, Beverly 1996,96. 
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Mullins in 2009 similarly define genocidal rape as "a systematically organized military 
tactic of terror and genocide" that not only terrorizes the population, but aims to create 
the spoilage of identity through the birth of mixed ethnic children. Further, Mullins writes 
that genocidal rape "elevates assaults to a tactic of terrorism."23 
Rape during the conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda has also taken center stage as a 
calculated mechanism to psychologically destroy the structural fabric of a society, to 
damage and erase its patriarchal culture and structure/fabric as Tutsi or Muslim husbands, 
brothers, and fathers within Tutsi or Muslim communities, for example, were often 
forced to witness the rapes of their wives, sisters, and daughters. As men were 
emasculated and forced into watching the sexual assault of the female population, they 
were stripped of their masculinity and their masculine "instinct" to protect. Further, in 
general, the influx of children originating from genocidal rape in Bosnia and Rwanda 
injected yet another underlying component of social disruption as they caused "social 
chaos to the extent of destroying the culture and institutions of a society."24 Mass rape 
and enforced pregnancy due to the imposed trauma and terror on communal entities such 
as villages could reduce or even erase an entire generation and "might actually lead to 
physical destruction of the community." 
During the Bosnian conflict, for example, such communal destruction was fueled 
not only by the imposed psychological terror of the act of rape and the sexual strategic 
oppression of the female population, but in general by the multi-ethnic identity and the 
inclusive, rather than exclusive (heterogeneous, not homogeneous), nature of Bosnian 
Muslims. This identity was not only based on "ethnicity, but upon a multi-ethnic way of 
23 Mullins, Christopher W. 2009, 722. 
24 Cudd, Ann E. 2008, 193. 
25 Ibid., 193. 
13 
life."26 After ethnic cleansing, this inherent identity trait was often completely erased and 
almost impossible to recover. 
Sexual violence was utilized as the facilitator of terror. Sexual violence, including 
public rapes and forced display of public nudity was used to humiliate and "add socio-
cultural insult to physical injury for the victim and the ethnic group itself."27 
Psychologically, sexual violence began to systematically erode and eventually destroy 
inter-communal fabrics. "Not only is the population itself eliminated, but the final 
memories of the people's existence are tarnished."28 In Rwanda, however, the sexual 
derogation and identity spoilage of rape survivors had far more devastating social and 
economic ramifications. Most rape survivors were shunned by their community including 
their husbands because of the sexual abuse. Rape survivors were considered unfit as 
potential wives and marriage in many African states remains a critical social institution to 
ensure a woman's economic survival. Additionally, many rape survivors have been 
infected by and are suffering from HIV/AIDS because of the mass rapes. These 
conditions marginalized many rape survivors and forced them into the social and 
economic periphery of their community. Some scholars deem such conditions as a 
function of genocide since they assist in the elimination of a population, physically and 
socially."29 
The strategic nature of mass rapes during the Bosnia and Rwandan conflicts has 
created legal frameworks that acknowledged wartime rape as a systematic weapon of 
war. It, for the first time, defined rape as a security issue. Hence, it securitized rape as a 
26 Weine 1999, 15. 
27 Mullins, Christopher W. 2009,731. 
28 Ibid., 732. 
29 Ibid., 722. 
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weapon of war. It moved rape from condemning it as a moral hazard to a clearly spelled 
out international illegality and crime - and punished its utilization. The securitization of 
rape after the conflicts of Bosnia and Rwanda has aggravated and continued to initiate 
unparalleled developments and landmark decisions. Since Bosnia and Rwanda, the 
concept of rape as a systematic tool of war has globally gained judicial and political 
traction. 
The International outcry over rape camps and mass rapes in Bosnia forced the 
United Nations' hand. It thrust various U.N. sub-entities, tasked with ensuring human and 
in particular women's Rights, into action. A flurry of measures to investigate systematic 
rape as a weapon of war and to implement mechanisms to prevent rape was launched. In 
March 1994, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights appointed a Special 
Rapporteur for Sexual Violence during Conflict for a three-year period. The appointment 
of Special Rapporteur Gay J. McDougall followed the final declaration of the 
International Conference for the Protection of War Victims held in Geneva Aug. 30 -
Sept. 1, 1993. The rapporteur, as tasked by the Commission, would on an annual basis 
not only report to the Commission, but to make recommendations at national and 
international levels how to combat the "endemic violence against women." In a first 1994 
report, the rapporteur expressed being "alarmed by the marked increase in acts of sexual 
violence directed notably against women and children"30 and by the fact that systematic 
rape during war "remains the least condemned war crime."31 One month after the 
appointment of the special rapporteur in April 1994 the mass rapes of Tutsi women began 
and would account for an estimated 250,000 to 500,000 rape survivors. 
30 U.N.High Commissioner for Human Rights 1993, 1. 
31 Ibid., 493-499. 
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Against this political backdrop, in 1995 the World Conference on Women in 
Beijing for the first time shifted its focus from women and economic development to war 
and its effect on women.32 U.S. first lady Hillary Clinton in her conference address 
specifically identified systematic mass rape as a violation of international law and a 
violation of human rights. Then Secretary of State Madeline Albright, Human Rights 
specialist on the U.S. National Security Council, Eric Schwartz, and Winston Lord, 
assistant secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, advised and urged Clinton 
to do so. They suggested to "beefing up passages about the effects of war on women, 
particularly the devastating proliferation of rape as a tactic of war."33 In her address 
Clinton linked systematic rape to the violation of international law. She said it is a human 
rights violation "when individual women are raped in their own communities and when 
thousands of women are subjected to rape as a tactic or price of war."34 
The conference's platform for action distinctly addressed not only the link of rape 
as a strategic instrument of war, but also pushed for the increased involvement of women 
"in conflict resolution at decision-making levels."35 The platform underscored this link, 
correlating rape to security when it addressed rape as a weapon of terrorism. The 
conference asserted that women have been disproportionally victims of war since 
increasingly various factions during a conflict are "using systematic rape as a tactic of 
war and terrorism."36 The platform consistently suggests a correlation between sexual 
violence, rape, violence against women and security. For example, it further reads that 
conflict resolution depends critically on the women's input to "peace and security" and 
32 Kuehnast, Kathleen, de Jonge Oudraat, Chantal, and Helga Hemes, ed. 2011, 1. 
33 Clinton, Hillary Rodham 2003, 303. 
34 Ibid., 305. 
35 United Nations Women 1995. 
36 Ibid., 1995. 
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women's "equal access and full participation ....in all efforts for the prevention and 
resolution of conflicts are essential for the maintenance and promotion of peace and 
security."37 The platform also urged the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for 
Rwanda and the International Court of Justice "to integrate a gender perspective" when 
appointing judges to these international courts and to provide specialized training to 
addresses systematic rape forced pregnancy during war. 
In 1997, Clinton visited the Rwandan Criminal Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania, 
according to tribunal records, and met in Kampala, Uganda, a delegation of Rwandan 
women. In her 2003 memories, Clinton describes the tribunal's legal ramifications as not 
only critical for Rwandans "but vitally important for all Africans, but especially for 
women and children."39 Clinton addressed the systematic nature of rape during the 
Rwandan conflict in her memories as she writes that "rape and sexual assault were 
committed on a mass scale, tactical weapons in the genocidal violence."40 
In 1998, the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities received a final report by Special Rapporteur Gay J. McDougall 
addressing the systematic rape during war. The study concluded that systematic rape 
during war, including internal conflicts, are violations of international criminal law. Such 
violations need to be documented and its perpetrators brought to justice.41 The report also 
connects rape with genocide. Acts of systematic rape including slavery and other sexual 
assaults during an external or internal armed conflict may constitute acts of genocide and 
other crimes against humanity, the report reads further. McDougall called on the 
37 United Nations Women 1995. 
38 Ibid., 1995. 
39 Clinton, Hillary Rodham 2003,403. 
40 Ibid., 404. 
41 McDougall, Gay J., Special Rapporteur 2000, 3. 
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international and national actions to condemn and actively help to combat the increasing 
practice of using rape as a systematic weapon of war. In 1999, the U.N.'s Commission on 
Human Rights extended McDougall's Special Rapporteur mandate for another year.42 
In 1998, the Rome Statute, which was signed by 120 states, not only established the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), but served also as yet as another decisive step toward 
the legal underpinning that recognizes wartime mass rape as a violation of international 
law. Following the Rwandan example, the Statute's section 3 defines rape and sexual 
violence specifically as a war crime, crime against humanity that could resemble acts of 
genocide. The ICC can also institute reparations related to such crimes against humanity 
and "judges at the ICC are also required to have gender expertise."43 Article 7 of the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court for the first time defines forced pregnancy. It 
is the "unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of 
affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations 
of international law." 44 The ICC Statue also provides specific provisions that judges 
should have legal expertise in gender-based violence including violence against women 
or children and "shall appoint advisers" with such expertise. Court's victims and 
Witnesses need to include staff "with expertise in trauma, including trauma related to 
crimes of sexual violence." 45 
In February 1999, the United Nations with the General Assembly resolution 
53/160 asserted its "concerns at the deterioration of the situation of human rights in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo" and "in particular cases of summary and arbitrary 
42 McDougall, Gay J., Special Rapporteur 2000, 3. 
43 Kuehnast, Kathleen, de Jonge Oudraat, Chantal, and Helga Hemes, ed. 2011, 23. 
44 McDougall, Gay J., Special Rapporteur 2000, 26. 
45 Ibid., 27. 
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execution, disappearances, torture, beatings, arbitrary and detentions without trial, sexual 
violence against women and children and the use of child soldiers."46 It was, however, 
also in 1999 when the gradual emergence and realization of the correlation between 
sexual violence and national and international security exemplified itself most 
dramatically and tangibly, for example, in the Kosovo conflict. The systematic genocidal 
rapes in Bosnia and the increasing securitization of rape added to the growing pressure on 
NATO to intervene in Kosovo, according to scholars. The fear of mass rape and reports 
of Serbian rape camps in Kosovo, which were later found as unsubstantiated, contributed 
to the legitimatization of NATO's intervention during the crisis.47 
In 2000, the United Nations security body, the Security Council moved forward 
with an historic resolution to better address the intersection of rape and security equality. 
On Oct. 31, 2000, the U.N. Security Council passed with resolution 1325 for the first 
time in its history an U.N. document emphasizing the link between systematic sexual 
violence and war and the inherent international responsibility to protect women and 
children from systematic rape during warfare. "It was a demand for establishing women 
as equal voices in making decisions pertaining to peace, security, and ultimately 
power."48 It also emphasized the implementation of critical mechanisms to increase 
women's "role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution."49 
One could interpret the mere fact that the U.N. Security Council, the U.N. body tasked 
"under the [U.N.] Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security"50 
passed this resolution as an indication to attach gender, sexual violence and rape during 
46 McDougall, Gay J., Special Rapporteur 2000, 23-4. 
47 Hansen, Gender, Nation, Rape. Bosnia and the Construction of Security 2001, 69. 
48 Kuehnast, Kathleen, de Jonge Oudraat, Chantal, and Helga Hemes, ed. 2011, 21. 
49 United Nations Security Council 2000, 1. 
50 Ibid., 2000, 1. 
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war to global security. However, the resolution per se did not specifically spell out such 
connection. It remained rather hesitant in linking rape to global security and similarly 
timid in providing real and tangible legal mechanisms. The resolution did not explicitly 
state that rape and sexual violence are threats to international peace and security. Such 
determination per se would have "invoked the authority and duty of the Security council 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UNS to evaluate and address them."51 The 
resolution points to the impact of increasingly targeting women and children during war 
on "durable peace and reconciliation."52 It calls for the integration of a gender perspective 
in peacekeeping and peace-building missions and U.N. field operations and for all states 
to prohibit the exclusion of systematic sexual violence against women during war from 
amnesty.53 But the resolution fails in linking rape to international security. 
The U.N.'s call for more processes to protect women and children from 
systematic rape and sexual violence and to integrate gender into decision-making 
processes of peace within the larger framework of international institutions has remained 
slow and rather cautious, on occasion even unrealized. In 2008, the women on accounted 
for only two percent of all international U.N. peacekeeping, three percent of military 
observers, and seven percent of the U.N. police division, according to a 2009 report about 
global peace operations.54 Only ten percent - 19 out of 192 countries - have so far have 
implemented a national action plan to protect women from sexual abuse.55 After 
Resolution 1325, the U.N. addressed rape as a systematic weapon war, but fell short to 
implement specific actions or to be effective in its rhetoric. In a July 2004 speech, then 
51 United Nations 1945. 
52 United Nations Security Council 2000, 1. 
53 Ibid., 2. 
54 Center on International Cooperation 2009. 
55 Kuehnast, Kathleen, de Jonge Oudraat, Chantal, and Helga Hemes, ed. 2011, 14. 
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U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan asked the governments of the Sudan and Democratic 
Republic of Congo "to stop using violence against women as a weapon of war."56 The 
DRC today accounts for the largest mass rapes in recent history. At least 200,000 women 
were raped in the DRC as of 2009.57 
Four years after Annan's speech, in 2008 (and 16 and 14 years, respectively, after 
the mass rapes in Bosnia and Rwanda), the U.N. Security Council took yet another 
momentous step forward to address rape and international security. The adoption of 
resolution 1820, which was officially implemented in June 30,2009, was unique. It set 
itself apart from the official U.N. rape and sexual violence narrative in its implementation 
specificity - and its increasing affirmation of the link of mass rape as a weapon of war 
and national/regional and international security. The resolution's rhetoric points in six 
different sections of the resolution to rape's link to international peace and security. It 
reiterates that "rape and other forms of sexual violence can constitute war crimes, crimes 
ro 
against humanity or a constitutive act with respect to genocide." It asserts that the 
systematic nature of rape "may impede the restoration of international peace and 
security"59 and suggests that measurers against systematic sexual violence will aid 
international peace and security. It points to the "equal participation and full 
involvement"60 of women in peace and security measures and demands the "immediate 
and complete cessation by all parties to armed conflict of all acts of sexual violence."61 
While the resolution, similar to UNSC resolution 1325 does not per se spell out that rape 
56 Cudd, Ann E. 2008, 192. 
57 United Nations Population Fund 2009. 
58 United Nations Security Council 2009, 3. 
59 Ibid., 2. 
60 Ibid., 2. 
61 Ibid., 3. 
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and sexual violence were threats to international peace and security (which then would 
invoke Chapter VII of the U.N. charter), it does indicate "the Council's readiness when 
considering situations on its agenda to, where necessary, adopt appropriate steps to 
address widespread or systematic sexual violence."62 These steps can include "military 
disciplinary measures and upholding the principle of command responsibility,"63 
economic sanctions, specific sexual violence training for UN troops and higher percent of 
the deployment numbers of female UN peacekeeping forces. The resolution also 
addressed impunity for sexual violence perpetrators and the demand to exclude sexual 
violence from amnesty provisions. 
Resolution 1820, for one, has the effect that "no Security Council peacekeeping 
mandate can be passed now without a paragraph requiring forceful civilian protection, 
especially for women."64 In 2008 the Council of the European Union, the African Union 
and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has adopted similar 
resolutions addressing sexual violence as a weapon of war. In 2010, the Spanish 
European Union presidency "made gender considerations in the context of armed conflict 
prevention one of its priorities."65 
Further, the resolution asked for the Secretary-General to submit by June 30, 
2009, a report that would track the proper implementation of the resolution. Some of the 
implementation milestones include "information on conflict situations in which sexual 
violence was widely or systematically employed against civilians; and proposals aimed at 
62 1820 Strategy Session International Women's Tribune Centre 2009. 
63 United Nations Security Council 2009, 3. 
64 Kuehnast, Kathleen, de Jonge Oudraat, Chantal, and Helga Hemes, ed. 2011, 116. 
65 Ibid., 116. 
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minimizing the susceptibility of women and girls to such violence"66 and to develop 
effective guidelines and strategies to avoid widespread sexual violence. In 2010, the 
U.N. Civil Society Advisory Group on Women, Peace and Security is now tasked to 
f\7 
evaluate how effective Resolution 1325 has been since its inception in 2000. 
Some scholars have accredited the rise of a new generation of war for the 
increasing prevalence of mass rapes during conflict. "The violence in DRC embodies a 
St 
new kind of war emerging in the 21 century - one that occurs in villages more than 
battlefields and affects more civilians than armed combatants," states a recent report 
about the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo.68 But Bosnia and Rwanda have 
redefined a new generation of wartime rape. And have for the first time thrust mass 
wartime rape into the collective human consciousness. Rape during the Bosnia war 
created a firestorm of global outrage and a public outcry in light of the ghastly details that 
emerged through an increasingly globalized media. "The construction of formalized rape 
camps to perpetrate ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia" fundamentally distinguished 
the Yugoslav conflict from other wars.69 Rwanda became another seismic development in 
the increasing visibility of rape during war. It acknowledged rape's genocidal capacity. 
By connecting rape to genocide, Rwanda inherently linked rape to security and 
securitized rape. 
When it comes to the discourse about the intersection of rape and war, there is, 
however, also room for evidentiary discussion about opportunistic rape versus rape as a 
systematic tool of war. Not every rape and act of sexual violence during conflict is 
66 United Nations Security Council 2009,4. 
67 Kuehnast, Kathleen, de Jonge Oudraat, Chantal, and HeJga Hemes, ed. 2011, 119. 
68 Harvard Humanitarian Institute 2009, 5. 
69 Askin 1997,295. 
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committed with specific strategic goals and war objectives in mind. Rape is not always a 
weapon of war. Throughout history, women were often the spoils of war, rape the 
mechanism of terror and the facilitator for the purpose of sheer sexual satisfaction. Rape 
is seen as men "having a good time."70 Also, some rape victims also include men. 
However, sexually abused men and boys have been marginalized as rape victims, often 
because stereotypes that do not align masculinity with sexual victimhood. A 2008 UN 
OCHA report about sexual violence in Armed Conflict concludes that "there is an 
extremely limited awareness of, and knowledge about, sexual violence against men and 
boys in conflict."71 Such marginalization often stems from the core concept of Human 
Security, which has a very specific gendered perception as to who, for example, by 
international institutions or non-governmental or transnational organizations needs to be 
secured.72 
Bosnia and Rwanda have thrust the utilization of rape as a weapon of war onto the 
international security forefront. Bosnia and Rwanda have set legal precedents unseen 
before in international law - and securitized wartime rape. 
When it comes to the failure of humanity, there are many stories to be told. 
Usually these stories include various shades of grey, a mixed bag of international 
reluctance, global complacency, disparaging indecision making and good intentions 
lacking political will and a moral urgency. 
This is one of these stories. 
70 Aranburu, Xabier Agirre 2010,614. 
71 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2008,2. 
72 Ibid., 3. 
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CHAPTER II 
RAPE - A MATTER OF HISTORY 
Throughout history war has always been an ugly endeavor, steeped in political 
rivalry, unimaginable brutality, torture and terror. The streets of Jerusalem were known to 
be running "with blood", first after the Christian crusaders and later after the Romans 
captured the city in A.D. 70.' Sexual violence, rape and sexual slavery were common 
components of conflict. In Homer's epic poem Iliad, Greek warriors are promised women 
as reward if Troy falls. "If the goods permit us to sack the great city of Priam, let him 
A 
pick out twenty Trojan women for himself." And writers and artists were commonly the 
only ones envisioning - and documenting - the many tales of this dark underbelly of war. 
Shakespeare most famously filled stacks of linen paper, spilled and spent lots of ink, 
recounting very visually the gruesome mediaeval miseries of war - and the atrocities 
suffered by women, wives and mothers, daughters and children. Here, for example in 
Henry V, 
The blind and the bloody soldier with foul hand 
Defile the locks of your shrill-shrieking daughters 
Your fathers taken by the silver beards 
And their most reverend heads dash'd to the walls; 
Your naked infants spitted upon piked 
Whiles the mad mothers with their howls confus'd 
Do break the clouds, as did the wives of Jewry 
At Herod's bloody-hunting slaughtermen.3 
1 Kern, Paul Bentley 1999,353. 
2 Vikman, Elisabeth 2005, 24. 
3 Shakespeare, William 2005. 
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Throughout history, massacres and bloodshed were common and plenty, the 
human tolerance for inhumane misery and pain immense. The degree of suffering, torture 
and terror, however, were not only commonly understood as a given and accepted as 
such, but had their own distorted, finite and constructed interplay: the suffering was 
gendered. Men were usually killed during battle while women and children became the 
spoils of war, a subhuman commodity usually sold off to serfdom and slavery. Sexual 
violence, rape, sex trafficking and sex slavery were common sets of behaviors and an 
accepted norm within this gendered divisions of war. The rape and war nexus, however, 
throughout history has displayed an interesting arc. One key characteristic and aspect of 
the sexual violence and wartime rape intersection includes its pure opportunistic nature, 
based on and driven by instant and immediate sexual gratification. However, more 
prominently, rape throughout history was also utilized as a systematic weapon of war, but 
for centuries effectively ignored as such. Only most recently, demonstrated through the 
conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda, rape and sexual violence was not only utilized as a 
successful and effective instrument of war - with very specific strategic socio-political 
and economic objectives - but finally through international institutions and international 
law recognized as such. This chapter will trace this development. 
A. WOMEN AND CHILDREN - THE CONVENIENT SPOILS OF WAR 
Ancient and modern tales of wartime rape, sex slavery and sexual torture have 
remained a lesser known subset of history. These anecdotes provide for an intriguing 
narrative of a largely untold and silenced backstory of war. Throughout history war was 
brutal. And women and children most prominently were exposed and most vulnerable to 
the many atrocious acts of conflicts. Hebrew prophets, for example, around 2000 or 1800 
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B.C. portrayed a particularly grim scenario of the fate of women, infants and children of 
captured cities, 
The infants will be dashed into pieces 
Before their eyes 
Their houses will be plundered 
And their wives ravished.4 
Quite commonly, these Hebrew prophets would very graphically elaborate on attacks on 
pregnant women and violence against infants. Such depictions in prophesies and curses, 
according to some scholars, were "reflecting a vision of a world without limits or 
structure or morality, in which men violated deep-seated taboos about sex, pregnancy, 
and survival."5 The violation of these commonly understood taboos remained vast in 
scope and scale. Rape and sexual enslavement remained throughout ancient and modern 
history a key feature of war. During centuries of brutal warfare cities were sieged, looted 
and destroyed; men usually killed because they were thought to be harder to control, 6 but 
women and children transported off, held captive and later usually sold off into slavery. 
During the Bur-Sin regime of Ur 2052-2043 B.C. a unique historical accounts notes a 
rare list of prisoners of war, which exclusively shows women and children7 as captives. 
Rape was utilized indiscriminately by historical and religious figures alike and by 
leaders thought of as moral authorities of their times. Mosses ordered the rape of 
thousands of young girls during the war against the Midianites when he told his men "all 
the young girls who have not known man by lying with him keep alive for yourselves."8 
Rape similarly played a significant role in Greek war history. In Iliad, for example, the 
4 Kern, Paul Bentley 1999, 82. 
5 Ibid., 85. 
6 Ibid., 23. 
7 Ibid., 23. 
8 Ibid., 23. 
Greek have specific visions how to avenge equally horrific atrocities committed against 
them, 
"Therefore let no man be urgent to take the way homeward 
Until he has lain in bed with the wife of a Trojan 
To avenge Helen's longing to escape and her lamentations.. ."9 
Around 500 B.C. the Persians threatened the Ionian leaders "we will make 
eunuchs of their boys, and carry their maidens captive to Bactra."10 Beautiful girls were 
thrust into sex slavery as part of a harem; men impaled on stakes and their wives' breasts 
cut off and displayed alongside their husbands' severed bodies.11 Most infamously, the 
Roman Empire was legendarily founded after the rape of the Sabine women. While this 
account remains a rather mythical tale and a questionable interpretation of reality, for 
some scholars it is, however, at least a strong indication of "one contemporary (positive) 
attitude towards sexual violence and its association with warfare."12 
For centuries the fate of women during conflict centered on being raped -
sexually abused and violated - as part of a strategy. Religious texts and the anecdotes of 
ancient and modern warfare attest very sporadically as a telling paper trail, how rape 
evolved into a cruel, cheap and effective weapon of choice. Capturing women during 
conflict, for example, was a key mechanism and strategy to additionally humiliate one's 
enemy. Public humiliation as a key characteristic and objective of forced nudity, rape, 
sexual violation and abuse can be traced back to the Old Testament, 
"Behold, I am against you, declares the LORD the 
hosts, and will lift your skirts over your face; and I 
9 Kern, Paul Bentley 1999, 158. 
10 Ibid., 78. 
" Ibid., 80. 
12 Vikman, Elisabeth 2005, 27. 
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will make the nations look at your nakedness and 
kingdoms at your shame."13 
Rape was throughout history systematically utilized to humiliate the defeated. It 
was often the final insult and finishing touch to force one's enemy into complete 
surrender. Nakedness and stripping off women's clothes was used to disgrace not only 
the captured women and girls, to exploit and aggravate their vulnerability even further. 
But the violent nakedness of women was symbolic of the "nakedness" and the 
powerlessness of the defeated state as a whole. Nudity then symbolized the ultimate 
capitulation after war and displayed the breakdown of all norms of statehood. "There was 
a logical progression from stripping away the protective walls of a city to stripping the 
clothes off its inhabitants."14 In particular siege warfare, total war and the complete 
territorial surrender of one's city and population, according to some scholars, carried 
strong sexual undercurrents because it relates to the total collapse of control. 15 It 
dismantles existing power structures and strip one of any rights as a human being. 
Warfare across religious fault lines were also very much entrenched in rape and 
sexual violence. During the Catholic Church's First Crusade (1096-1099) "knights and 
pilgrims took time off for sexual assault"16 when surging ahead toward Constantinople. 
And so were also 18th century struggles for independence. During the Battle of Culloden 
in 1745 in the Scottish Highlands, for example, men of the defeated clan were routinely 
forced to watch on as their wives were raped by the British, 
13 Vikman, Elisabeth 2005, 23. 
14 Kern, Paul Bentley 1999, 81. 
15 Ibid., 81. 
16 Brownmiller, Susan 1975, 31. 
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"Where the River Doe meets the Moriston in a black waterfall, Isobel Macdonald 
was raped by five soldiers, and her husband, skulking high in the heath, watched 
this in agony."17 
Further the account recalls in the same paragraph the role of humiliation and the 
shame of the rape victim also a key feature and objective of wartime rape: "The women 
who had been ravished made pacts not to lie with their husbands until nine months were 
passed. "I8 
One could also interpret this as an indication how rape survivors were often 
rejected and abandoned by their husbands or community. 
B. THE RULES OF RAPE 
Only on occasion did sexual violence during war in ancient times come with a 
policy or an understood set of behaviors how soldiers should treat female captures of war. 
Hebrews, for example, in the laws of Yahweh around 2000 or 1800 B.C. set out specific 
rules that prevented soldiers to sell women after they have been taken in as a soldier's 
wife. "If you have no delight in her, you shall let her go where she will, but you shall not 
sell her for money, you shall not treat her as a slave, since you have humiliated her."19 
The implication here of providing female captives with a degree of moral dignity and 
providing soldiers with a framework of regulations of how to address female prisoners of 
war, however, remains unusual and unique and rather the anomaly than the rule. During 
Macedonian warfare, which was prominent 359 to 323 B.C., for example, it was common 
that enslaved women were prohibited to accompany soldiers during war campaigns. 
17 Brownmiller, Susan 1975, 39. 
18 Brownmiller, Susan 1975, 39. 
19 Kern, Paul Bentley 1999, 82. 
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Macedonian leaders such as Philip and then Alexander the Great were known to have 
implemented such rules "in order to increase its [the army's] mobility."20 
Female captives were usually deemed as easily disposable sub-human products of 
war - without any rights for humanity and dignity. For example, at one point Alexander 
had allowed for some imprisoned women to come along during one particular war 
campaign. But in the Gedrosian desert, Alexander had ordered them to camp in a low 
riverbed, far away from the troops. All women and children consequently died in a 
subsequent flash flood, while the soldiers, who were all specifically positioned on higher 
ground, survived. Scholars later argued that Alexander had strategically placed the 
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women in the lower riverbed to "lighten his army for the arduous desert march." 
Whether or not sexual violence, rape, forced prostitution and sex slavery during 
war was a crime or a punishable act of low moral standards remained throughout history 
largely contested. In Babylon, for example, the female victim of rape was equally 
punished like her attacker. Both were thrown (bound) into the river. Later the Hebrews 
punished the victim and the rapist likewise by stoning since rape was considered adultery, 
regardless of fault.22 Others, however, saw rape as a rather corrosive underpinning of 
war, which fundamentally undermined and morally inflicted and corrupted troops. 
Richard II of England in 1385 wrote in one of the earliest articles of war for solider-
rapists to be hanged.23 Likewise, many scholars encouraged and engaged in legal and 
philosophical discourse as to whether or not sexual violence carried far reaching 
implications, was morally tolerable and whether or not should be punished. On the advent 
20 Kern, Paul Bentley 1999,235. 
21 Kern, Paul Bentley 1999, 235. 
22 Brownmiller, Susan 1975, 19. 
23 Ibid., 34. 
of the Enlightenment, for example, the father of International Law, Dutch jurist Hugo 
Grotius, wrote in 1646 that "rape should not go unpunished in war any more than in 
peace."24 However, throughout history, rape remained an accepted side effect of war and 
a silenced undercurrent, endorsed by governments and authorities. This sanctioning of 
rape stems primarily from the character of rape, which - even if utilized during war -
maintained throughout a distinct domestic feature. "Rape during war was not thought to 
have a similarly disruptive effect" as torture, for example, merely because it was 
viewed as a domestic and rather private act between two individuals. 
Despite of the commonality of rape and sexual violence during war, its effects 
were inherently traumatic - on the individual, communal or state level. For example, 
Roman men were known to kill their wives after they have been captured - and raped -
by the enemy because of shame. Or suicide has increasingly been advocated as a 
mechanism of choice to escape rape. In the siege of the Jewish fortress of Masada in 
A.D.73, for example, the leader Eleazar told his people to commit suicide or for the men 
to rather kill their wives and children to avoid for their wives to be raped, 
Let our wives thus die undishonoured, our children unacquainted with 
Slavery; and when they are gone, let us render a generous service to each 
Other, preserving our liberty as a noble winding-sheet.27 
24 May, Larry 2005, 98. 
25 Ibid., 100. 
26 Kern, Paul Bentley 1999, 345. 
27 Ibid., 1999, 350. 
C. MODERN WARTIME RAPE AND PROPAGANDA 
Rape during war, even in modern times, was hardly ever reported, but often 
accidentally revealed. Rape as a narrative, however, was also often utilized as an 
effective tool of allied so-called atrocity propaganda. It was not until World War I when 
rape was for the first time in detail documented by historians. German soldiers were 
known to have strategically raped Belgian women and girls when Germany invaded 
Belgium in 1914, according to British historian Arnold Joseph Toynbee. Toynbee, who 
served for the British Army during World War I, was one of the first historians, detailing 
the accounts of these rapes in two books about the World War I. Not only the instant 
availability of details of these rapes remained an anomaly, but also the assertions that 
these rape were specifically utilized as a systematic weapon of war. Such anomaly 
eventually introduced doubt into the truthfulness of these rape accounts. Toynbee argued, 
for example, in his writing that "the German General Staff deliberately mounted a 
campaign of terror in the first three months of the war."29 
However, other scholars saw in Toynbee's depiction rather as a mechanism of 
political propaganda by allied troops than one of historical truth. Feminist Susan 
Brownmiller wrote in 1975 that "in the hands of skilled Allied manipulators, rape was 
successfully launched in world opinion, almost overnight, as a characteristic German 
crime, evidence of the "depraved Boche" penchant for warfare by atrocity." 
Brownmiller cited publications such as the volume of the American Newell Dwight 
Hillis' German Atrocities: Their Nature and Philosophy, which were published in 1918 
28 Gerlach, Christian 2010, 154. 
29 Brownmiller, Susan 1975,41. 
30 Ibid., 44. 
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in the U.S., Great Britain and Canada to underscore the German barbaric methods of war. 
Hillis, for example, wrote, 
"When the Germans ruined a village near Ham, they carries 
away some fifty-four girls and women between the ages of 
fourteen and forty. These girls were held behind the lines 
among the camp women, kept for the Huns."J/ 
Hillis then elaborated very graphically how the German soldiers had raped one 
particular girl and then killed her. Many scholars today agree that most of these accounts 
were exaggerated, graphically embellished and used to fuel anti-German sentiments 
during the war. Rape was - due to its emotional potential and domestic character -
effectively used as a tool of political propaganda. The British account of the German 
invasion, the Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages, later known as the 
Bryce report, for example, explicitly detailed horrific accounts of German rapes in 
Belgium. A Belgian solider for example recited that "he had seen the Germans gang-rape 
fifteen women on tables set up in the main square of Liege."32Accounting for more than 
twelve-hundred eye witness accounts from refugees and soldiers of atrocities committed 
by Germans against civilians, but did not name any of them or identified them.33 
Eventually translated into ten languages by June 1915 and named after James 
Bryce, British member of the House of Lords, former Chief Secretary for Ireland and 
former ambassador to Washington, the report however was just one of many official 
records, which utilized rape as a political propaganda tool. According to newspaper 
accounts, the May 7, 1915 German torpedo attack and sinking of the British ocean liner 
Lusitania aggravated anti-German sentiments and public discourse. After the attack, 
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allied forces linked the various Belgian hear-say rape accounts immediately to German 
evilness and inhumane barbarism. Rape became the emotional qualifier of good and evil 
and emerged as a galvanizer of morality. The New York Herald, for example, was quoted 
to have written that "the two [the Belgian rape accounts and the sinking] together ended 
any hope that German atrocities had been exaggerated."34 Rape became a tool of war 
propaganda to outrage the masses and fuel war efforts. The New York Tribune linked the 
sinking to the rape of Belgian women when they printed photo captions such as "At least 
they only drown your women."35 
Today, these embellished and unsubstantiated mass rape accounts during World 
War I have been coined a successful "propaganda stunt"36 also utilized to recruit British 
soldiers for the war effort. Military recruitment posters, for example, were displayed, 
asking "Have you any women-folk worth defending? Remember the women of 
Belgium."37 Rape was utilized as a moral justification of war. Princeton professor Dana 
Carleton Munro, who had visited Belgium to assess the conditions in 1915, filed a report 
with the Rockefeller Foundation referred to the various mass rape accounts as "so-called 
German atrocities."38 The Bryce report was eventually deemed flawed, inaccurate and 
grossly embellishing German rapes. The 350 eye witness accounts "containing 155 
references to mutilation, rape, deliberate murder of children, or a combination of these, 
but no two statements confirmed any single incident."39 After rape was successfully 
utilized as a propaganda mechanism during and after World War I, it again fell silent. In 
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1941, for example, the Yale University Press published a report about Atrocity 
Propaganda 1914-1919 and "expended no more than a few skimpy sentences to construct 
a witty dismissal of rape."40 
Even today, some historians and scholars refer to World War I as an example of 
how wartime rape acclaimed undeserved prominence. Scholars such as Larry Zuckerman 
in 2004 concluded that the Bryce report's focus on mutilation, sexual violence and rape 
"obscured the murder, arson, pillage and deportations" which did happen and "made the 
terror seem trivial, at least in retrospect."41 This statement in itself, however, again 
undermines the gravity of wartime rape. It suggests again a disqualification of rape as a 
"legitimate" tool of terror, war crime and crime against humanity. It places other wartime 
atrocities such as "murder, arson, pillage and deportations" above rape and creates an 
absurd hierarchy of terror. It renders rape once again as a secondary or inferior method 
of violence, a subset of wartime reality and it renders rape once again insignificant and 
inconsequential. 
Rape also during World War II remained an understood, accepted yet silenced by­
product of conflict. At the advent of World War II, General George S. Patton was quoted, 
saying "there would unquestionably be some raping."42 German soldiers, for example, by 
law were prohibited - according to Nazi ideology underwritten by the Nurnberg 1935 
race laws - to rape or have sexual relationships with Jewish women. Such sexual 
relations between Jewish and non-Jewish Germans were deemed - and officially 
punishable - as "Rassenschande" or "so-called racial defilement legislation."43 However, 
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despite of these legal restrictions, rape of Jewish women and young girls, for example in 
the Warsaw ghetto, were common and "sexual humiliation had a part to play as the 
Germans tightened their grip on the Warsaw ghetto."44 Rape was also commonly utilized 
by Germans throughout their increasing eastern encroachments and invasions of Poland, 
Hungary and eventually the Soviet Union. Rape by German soldiers cut a swath of 
horror, for example, to Stalingrad in 1942. During the Nurnberg trials after World War II, 
Soviet foreign minister V.M. Molotow entered the "The MolotovNote," which detailed 
the many horrific accounts of "lust-maddened German gangsters break into the houses, 
they rape the women and girls under the every eyes of their kinfolk and children" and 
"women and girls are vilely outraged in all the occupied areas."45 
D. RAPE AS AN INVISIBLE WEAPON OF WAR 
But rape was not only a hallmark feature of European or westernized warfare. The 
Asian Pacific War and the consequent Japanese invasion and occupation of parts of 
China and the Korean Peninsula in 1931 would eventually introduce the terminology of 
"comfort women" to a global memory. During the Japanese occupation of the Korean 
Peninsula from 1919 to the Japanese capitulation in 1945, an estimate 50,000 and 
200,000 of women were held as sex slave. These women, mainly Korean, were referred 
to as "comfort women" according to the English translation of the Japanese word ianfu. 
The meaning of ianfu itself stems from the combination of "comfort or solace" and 
"woman or wife." The ianfu system was implemented to provide "solace and comfort to 
Japan's Imperial Forces"46 during the occupation. The women were primarily Korean, 
but also included also Japanese, Chinese and other women in the British colonies of 
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45 Ibid., 55. 
46 Orreill, Kirsten 2000, 129. 
37 
Burma and Singapore, for example.47 So-called "ianjo " or "comfort stations" were first 
established during the second Sino-Japanese War in 1937.48 Often Korean 
"entrepreneurs" women and men ran these "comfort stations"49 for Japanese soldiers. 
But it is believed the system, including brothels, were already set in place way before 
then. Some historical accounts referred to these brothels as "licensed prostitution" and of 
pleasure quarters, starting as early as during the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905).50 
Usually, Korean women and girls were either sold by their very poor parents to human 
sex traffickers to the Japanese military or forced into sex slavery by recruiters. Japanese 
brothel owners in Korea also solicited prostitutes from their own homeland, calling them 
"second class geisha."51 
After the Russo-Japanese War, Korea was officially colonized by Japan in 1910 
and known as a Japanese protectorate. The concept of colonization and the comfort 
women as a mechanism and function of colonization adds to the complexity of sexual 
violence implemented during the Japanese occupation of the Korean peninsula. It links 
sexual violence, sex slavery and rape to an institutionalized system of political 
oppression. Sexual violence becomes then a function of a political strategy. Korean 
scholars argued that "the plight of Korean women can be linked to the failure of their 
country to avoid colonization by Japan."52 In the 1990s an increasing movement to 
condemn these sexual atrocities by the then imperial Japan have been launched and the 
surviving Korean women of the Ianfu system consistently pressured the Japanese 
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government for an official apology. Most recently, Japan's comfort women legacy 
prohibited the country to receive a permanent seat at the U.N. Security Council.53 
Most notoriously, however, the rape of Nanking exemplifies the brutal atrocities 
of the 20th century Japanese Imperial Forces. When Japan invaded China in summer 1937 
during the Second Sino-Japanese War to acclaim valuable Chinese territory and 
resources, the siege and capture of the former Chinese capital Nanjing became a key 
strategic war objective. The city fell on Dec. 13, 1937. The capture and siege of 
Nanking, however, entered the history books only reluctantly, but when it did it revealed 
one of the worst atrocities committed in modern history. Not only the scope and the sheer 
number of the death toll, but the matter of how most of the Chinese found their death was 
in particular notorious. More than 200,0000 people were slaughtered, usually tortured 
before they died. "For months the streets of the city were heaped with corpses and 
reeked with the stench of rotting human flesh."54 Most astonishing, however, was the 
ensuing mass rape that followed the siege. An estimated 20,000 to 80,000 women were 
raped, often with their husbands, brothers, relatives or young children forced to look on. 
Japanese soldiers would later carry amulets made from pubic hair of their rape victims for 
"magical powers against injury."55 The scope of the capture still today remains one of 
most controversial and most horrific conflicts worldwide. For example, the death toll at 
Nanking even exceeded the nuclear bombing of both, the Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
nuclear bombings, combined.56 
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By the end of the 20th century, the Nanking massacre became a symbol of the 
brutal Japanese war atrocities. John Rabe, for example, a German businessman in 
Nanking, tried to establish safety zones to protect civilians. According to his diary 
entries: 
"Last night up to 1,000 women and girls are said to have been 
raped, about 100 girls at Ginling College Girls alone. You hear 
nothing but rape. If husbands or brothers intervene, they're shot. 
What you hear and see on all sides is the brutality and bestiality of 
C7 
the Japanese soldiers." 
In Japan, the incident and in particular the mass rape remained a silenced and 
contentious interpretation of Japanese history58 throughout the later part of the 20th 
century. Only as recently as in 1997 appeared the very first English account of the 
atrocities written by former journalist Iris Chang. The book became not only a New York 
Times bestseller, but also political bone of contention between China and Japan. When 
the book was first published, the Japanese ambassador to the U.S. called the book riddled 
with errors "and one-sided."59 However the Chinese embassy issued a statement, saying 
that the "Nanjing Massacre was not a historical fiction."60 Consequently, the 1999 
Japanese version of Chang's book was canceled.61 
Rape in war was utilized not only as a reward for the victors of war, but also as 
revenge and a retaliation force. As German soldiers left a horrific trail of rape and sexual 
violence on their way to Stalingrad in 1942, in the aftermath of a defeated Nazi Germany, 
the west-marching Soviet Red Army likewise killed and raped their way into Germany. 
The fall of the German capital Berlin in 1945 became for German women the symbolism 
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of Soviet revenge of the immense death toll suffered by the Soviet Union during World 
War II. It is estimated that the UDSSR lost approximately 26 million people. This 
accounts for disproportionately more military and civilian deaths compared to any other 
nation during World War II. The Red Army reached Berlin on April 27, 1945 and the 
hunt for women - and the mass rape - began shortly afterward. "Hordes of Russian troops 
coming up behind the disciplined front-line veterans demanded the rights due to the 
conquerors: the women of the conquered."62 Estimates about the women raped in Berlin, 
according to Russian archives, are about one million German women and two million in 
the regions of eastern Germany occupied by the Soviet Union. Berlin in early 1945 was a 
city, mostly consisting of women, children and the elderly. Men were either dead or at the 
front. Similar to Stalin, Hitler had refused to evacuate the civilians from the city "in order 
to force his troops to defend the city more bravely."63 
The mass rapes in Berlin and in the Soviet occupied regions became not only a 
mechanism to humiliate the enemy even further, but in case of Germany elevated itself 
also into a function, according to some accounts, of a perverted de-Nazification process. 
German woman were raped not only as a symbolism of war conquest, but to un-German 
the German war Nazi.64 Some of the earliest and most detailed accounts of the mass 
rapes of German women by Soviet troops were based on a diary by a female journalist, 
who was also for weeks and months raped during the fall of Berlin. The book "A woman 
in Berlin" was first published anonymous as an incomplete version in English in 1953/4 
and in German in 1959, it found harsh German critics. One reviewer, for example 
"complained about the author's shameless immorality. German women were not 
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supposed to talk about the reality of rape; and German men preferred not to be seen as 
impotent onlookers when the Russians claimed their spoils of war."65 Later, the author 
asked for the diary not to be republished until she had died. 
According to this diary, the rape of German women was initially part of the 
random Soviet de-Nazification campaign against surviving Germans. Later, however, 
Red Army troops became more selective and picked their rape victims based on 
attractiveness. Some rape victims also came to "informal agreements with a particular 
soldier or officer, who would protect them from other rapists."66 
For decades, information and details about the mass rapes of German women after 
the end of World War II was silenced. The Cold War and the iron curtain had effectively 
divided Europe not only politically or ideologically, but it had also separated Europe 
memory into two different truths. Equally, in West-Germany, the topic of Soviet mass 
rape was taboo. ".. ..the male half of the German population wanted the subject to be 
buried Women were forbidden to mention the subject of rape as if it somehow 
dishonored their men, who were supposed to have defended them."67 The provisional 
West-German government at the time approved a policy to fund abortions for thousands 
of rape victims.68In October 1949 the Soviet Union claimed the regions of Saxony, 
Saxony Anhalt, Thuringia, Mecklenburg and Brandenburg under Soviet and communist 
rule and as an entire new country, referred to as the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR). Mass rapes of German women continued way the end of World War II in the 
Soviet occupied regions, but were effectively silenced. 
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While in Europe the Cold War and the Iron Curtain had effectively muffled 
reports about systematic rapes in the Soviet occupied eastern territories, mass rapes 
equally were silenced elsewhere around the world. Rape as a weapon of war, for 
example, was systematically utilized during the Bangladesh independence war with 
Pakistan in 1971. Today, it is estimated that between 200,000 to 400,00069 women and 
girls were sexually abused and raped by Pakistani troops. Often women were gang raped 
in broad daylight during the conflict, in front of their husbands and brothers and small 
children. Many women were also held as sex slaves for several months in particular 
"military cantonments or camps."70 
Today many scholars argue that mass rape and forced impregnation were part of 
an overarching systematic strategy by the Pakistani government to retain and reclaim the 
Bangladesh territory. A Pakistani officer was quoted after the defeat "We are going. But 
are leaving our seed behind."71 According to estimates, between 25,000 and 150,00072 
abortions were performed in the after-war period. Like in other conflicts, rape was also 
known during the independence war to be utilized by the Pakistani military leadership as 
a form of humiliating the Bengali men and "feminizing" them in the "view of West 
Pakistanis who, referring to the lungi customary in Bengal, had a saying: "In the East 
[....], the men wear the skirts and the women the pants. In the West, things are as they 
should be."73 The social implications of sexual violence during the war were also far-
reaching. Because of the cultural stigma that was attached to rape and its survivors, many 
women were either killed by their husbands, or relatives, committed suicide or moved to 
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neighboring Pakistan.74 A government program called biranganas (war heroines), 
initiated in 1972, which was designed to help rape survivors to recover and to integrate 
them back into their communities, failed.75 
E. WAR AND RAPE TODAY 
Rape, however, has never lost its effectiveness. In other areas of conflict, for 
example, in the Sudan Arab militia groups have raped women of non-Arab descent to 
bear Arab children and to dominate territory. Amnesty International reports that Arab 
women cheered and sang on when Sudan militia raped black Sudanese non-Arab women. 
The Arab women have been quoted by Amnesty International, saying "We take their 
goods and we chase them from our area and our cattle will be in their land."76 
However, most notoriously today remains the current civil war in the eastern part 
of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Coined "Africa's World War," the conflict has 
cost nearly six million lives and produced human rights violations on an unprecedented 
and epidemic scale. The conflict accounts for some of the worst sexual violence offences 
including mass rapes the international community has witnessed, utilizing rape as a cheap 
and effective weapon of war. The civil war in the DRC began to engulf shortly after the 
genocide in neighboring Rwanda in April 1994 and remains a hodgepodge of rivaling 
internal and external forces. 
The conflict still today includes "seven foreign armies and a myriad of militias 
and mercenaries.77 These forces took advantage of a fragile central government and 
corrupt leadership to mainly fight over the DRC's vast natural resources such as 
74 Gerlach, Christian 2010, 157. 
75 Ibid., 157. 
76 Cudd, Ann E. 2008, 192. 
77 Adebajo, Adekeye 2010,44. 
44 
diamonds, gold or other valuable minerals. National troops from the Uganda People's 
Defense Forces (UPDF), the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and Congolese rebel groups 
including the Congres national pour la defence du people (CNDP) and the Forces 
democratiques pour la liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) which side either with the Rally or 
Congolese Democracy (RCD) and the Congolese Liberation Front (CLF) began to rival 
over power - and mining territory - as early as 1996. After the genocide in Rwanda in 
1994, the Rwandan Tutsi-led government began to infiltrate the fragile DRC. In 1998, 
Uganda and Rwanda admitted having troops in the DRC78. After the first wave of the 
civil war ended officially in 2003 with a glimpse of hope for peace. The Lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement in summer 1999 initially halted rebel fights. A power sharing agreement 
brokered by South Africa in 2003 promised a return of a functioning government and a 
presidential election in summer of 2006. The CNDP eventually became part of the 
official DRC army after a fragile peace agreement in 2009.79 
In 2007, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs John 
Holmes declared that the growing rape crisis in the DRC was "the worst in the world." In 
2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton called rape in the Congo "one of mankind's 
greatest atrocities.80 The U.N. Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, 
Margot Wallstrom, briefed the U.N. Security Council in fall 2010 that the "mass rapes in 
Walikale demonstrate a nexus between the illicit exploitation of natural resources by 
armed elements and patterns of sexual violence."81 For example, the eastern part of the 
DRC, which is bordering the Lake Kivu region in Rwanda, today is home of the "world's 
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largest Coltan reserves."82 Coltan is a mineral used, for example, in cell phones, laptops 
and other high-tech appliances. These multi-million dollar Coltan deposits, in addition to 
large reserves of gold, silver and diamonds, coupled with ethnical rivalry and political 
muscle-flexing, have sparked the DRC conflict. Wallstrom in 2010 linked the 
"competition over mining interests" to the horrific sexual violence atrocities in the 
conflict.83 
For centuries, rape during conflict has enjoyed a widespread legal reluctance to 
hold perpetrators accountable. Usually, rape during war was denoted either as "revenge 
and triumph for the winning side" or "humiliation and defeat for the conquered."84 
Crimes against Humanity only recently were legally defined and took on a more 
universal character. During the Nurnberg trials after World War II, many Nazi war 
criminals were prosecuted "because they are accused of having offended against society 
itself, and society, as represented by international law, has summoned them for 
explanation; their crimes, it said were not crimes against any specified country, but 
against humanity. Humanity is the sovereignty which has been offended."85 Only 
recently, international law scholarship linked mass rape and mass sexual violence to 
international prosecution. "When the assault is either directed at a group [women] or 
involves a state (or state-like) actor, and ideally when both conditions are met, then it is 
sufficiently linked to the international harm principle to call for international 
prosecution."86 
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Framing rape today as a systematic tool of warfare divorces the sheer act from 
its initially gendered, domestic and, hence, "inferior" context to a conscious and effective 
method to advance specific strategic goals. Rape as a systematic tool of war was utilized 
during the conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda - and recognized as such. The definition of 
"systematic" for example during the Bosnia conflict was very specific. The 1991 "Ram" 
or "Brana" Plan, outlined very specifically the objectives of warfare during the Bosnian 
conflict. It points very specifically to women and children as the target for the conflict's 
psychological war. Focusing on a specific portion of the population, the plan then 
became "military policy."87 Likewise, the U.S. attorney Daryl Mundis, who prosecuted 
the notorious Foca trial in 1992 saw a clear strategic connection between the rape camps 
in Foca, for example, and an overarching strategy. "You can certainly draw inferences 
oo 
that there might have been, or that there was, a common purpose or plan." Prosecutor 
Dirk Ryneveld also consistently argued that "rape is one of the constituent ingredients in 
OQ 
the widespread or systematic attacking." 
The objectives of mass rape during the Bosnia conflict, for example, were 
specifically genocide, territorial, political and social gains. During the genocide in 
Rwanda, rape and sexual violence was linked to the systematic eradication of the Tutsi 
ethnic group. The Rwandan Tribunal, for the first time in history, convicted officials and 
mass rapists for utilizing sexual violence as a mechanism of genocide. The conflicts of 
Bosnia and Rwanda - compared to the other wars throughout history - uniquely 
established sexual violence and rape finally as a crime against humanity - and made rape 
finally visible. 
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CHAPTER III 
SECURITIZATION THEORY - A MATTER OF WORDS 
This chapter explores the genesis of the Securitization Theory. It looks at its 
historical and intellectual roots, trying to address fundamental questions such as who 
created the theory and why. It also explores its political backdrop and its global context, 
which so critically seem to have underwritten a new theoretical framework. It explains 
what the theory is, what it does and what steps and processes are essential to make the 
theory work - and, as such, to make it effective. Further, this chapter points to current 
applications of the theory and provide examples and analyses of its current utilization 
such as areas of terrorism, global warming, and migration. Additionally, it outlines and 
addresses the critics of the Securitization Theory, the debate and intellectual and political 
"ambiguities" that often have been attached to the use of the word "security." It also 
briefly surveys other theoretical frameworks and how they have effectively succeeded (or 
failed) to interpret rape as a systematic weapon of war. 
A. WHAT IS SECURITIZATION? 
Securitization Theory was first introduced in the late 1980s by Barry Buzan and 
Ole Waever. Securitization, in general terms, means shifting an issue/a concern into the 
realm of security. The theory primarily holds that someone or something cannot be dealt 
with the normal/regular way. Once an issue reaches this point "of no return," this point 
beyond normalcy and beyond the previously understood, it will be viewed and treated as 
a threat and a security issue. Securitization turns a concern or problem - e.g. the 
environment, immigration, HIV-Aids infection, sexual violence - into a danger and labels 
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it accordingly as a security issue. It redefines its significance and its degree of 
importance. It moves and elevates an issue from the regular level to the threat and 
security status. 
Securitization Theory emerged from the growing debate among security scholars 
after the end of the Cold War, challenging core realist and liberal theoretical views. 
Realists link almost exclusively security to military issues. Realism and Liberalism 
focused on the nation state and the prevalence of the national interest as the dominating 
security objective. The post-Cold War security debate then began to focus on what the 
end of the superpower rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union really meant and 
symbolized for international relations in general - and for International Security Studies 
and its intellectual discourse in particular. While realists and liberals, for example, 
struggled with explaining the peaceful end of the Cold War, Buzan and Waever saw in 
the newly emerging post-Cold War environment an opportunity to redefine security. The 
sudden absence of the Cold War, superpower rivalry and nuclear muscle flexing 
presented for Buzan and Waever the backdrop for a new theoretical framing, a fresh look 
at what constituted security in a new political reality. 
Security studies and in particular its traditional pillars, Realism and Liberalism, 
privileged the nation state almost solely as the core and central object that needed to be 
secured. Wars were fought and peace was "waged" to protect the state, its people, its 
borders, interest and power. However, for Buzan and Waever the newly emerging post-
Cold War security environment revealed a new frontier, an opportunity for a new 
theoretical terrain that allowed for a larger, expanded and wider view of what security 
means. It reexamined and challenged the traditional way of how we have thought and 
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explained security in the past. It shifted the notion of international security from the 
traditional to a broader and more all encompassing concept. This became later better 
known as the widening and deepening of security studies. It widened its focus to more 
areas and issues - and deepened its core functions as to who needed to be secured from 
the state vertically downward to the local and finally the individual. Securitization 
Theory then became one of the theoretical underpinnings for these new "shades of grey," 
these new nuances of how the term security is transcending the traditional state and 
military nexus. 
For Buzan and Waever, the act of securitization itself shifts an issue - e.g 
environment or economic issues - into the realm of security. Buzan also defines 
securitization as the opposite of politicization or normal politics; as the opposite of initial 
norms and rules, the understood and acknowledged peripheries of things; as contrary to 
the established rule of law, different to open political deliberation and other processes 
with accepted norms and guidelines. According to Buzan, securitization takes place once 
a referent object is being transformed from a non-political, then a political issue into a 
threat. 
This is how this process works: 
Very distinctly, he argues that once someone (political leadership, institutions, non­
governmental organizations etc.) defines an issue as a threat - for example a threat to the 
sovereignty of the state, to national identity or the cohesion of a nation - the assumptions 
that have surrounded "this something" (area, sector, object) for so long are being 
1 B. W. Buzan 1998, 23. 
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redefined. It's being moved and transformed from its original to a new state. It's being 
securitized. The act of securitization - of attaching the term "security" to an issue - lifts 
an issue (object, area, or sector) above politics and above regular (political) agenda 
setting. 
Further, securitization can view and privilege other issues in lieu or in addition to 
the nation state as the object or problem or concern that needs to be secured. These other 
issues can include multitudes of areas such as the environment (global warming, the 
survival of species and food supply) terrorism, economic multinational firms; 
development; national and global markets, society (migration; identity, gender, religion). 
Securitization Theory then becomes the theoretical construct that explains the act and the 
processes of securitization. It morphs into a mechanism that explains if and when 
something is worth to be securitized, how securitization exactly works, who securitizes 
an issue, why - or why not. It also elaborates as to how successful - or not - this method 
is. 
On a theoretical spectrum, securitization brings Buzan's discussion about sectors 
of security and Waever's redefinition of security under one theoretical umbrella. Buzan 
defines "sectors of security" as a variety of different areas - e.g. military, environment or 
economic issues - where the process of securitization can occur and where issues are 
affected by the sheer act of labeling something as a security concern. Waever, on the 
other hand, defines security as a process that focuses exclusively on the threat and how 
one defies such a threat. For Waever, security allows anyone or anything involved to 
deploy all possible actions or measures to dampen, curtail or eliminate danger. Security, 
according to Waever "moves the particular case into a specific area, claiming a special 
right to use the means necessary to block this development." 
To fully understand securitization, it warrants a brief discussion as to how one 
defines security in the first place. The term security stems from the Latin securitas, which 
translates into "a condition of individuals, of a particular inner sort. It denoted 
composure, tranquility of spirit, freedom from care."3 Throughout most recent history, 
security has been termed as a key function of what states and governments do: states 
ought to provide security and safety for their citizens. States protect their citizens from 
harm, violence and injustice and, by doing so, states usually perpetuate an environment 
that fosters peace. Security and peace are not only defined as the absence of war, but also 
as critical conditions that help societies and human beings to grow and flourish: 
economically and politically, but also as social, cultural and moral markers. The absence 
of a constant slaughter instills confidence and trust in the state. And this confidence in 
turn creates and projects prosperity from the inside out to other states and their citizens. 
The philosophical roots of the term security originate in part from the discussion 
surrounding British philosopher and political theorist Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). 
Hobbes sees men in a constant state of nature where people are at war with each other all 
the time. This state is inherently anarchical because there is no one or no overarching 
governmental entity that provides universal norms, rules and regulations. Life is brutal 
and its outlook pessimistic and dire. Life and the survival of men are constantly under 
threat by men themselves. Hobbes finds human beings prior to the organized system of 
states trapped in a world surrounded by "continual fear, and danger of violent death; and 
2 Waever 1995, 5-6. 
3 Rothschild, E. 1995. 
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the life of man, solidarity, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."4 Hobbes argued that human 
beings can only overcome these desperate and brutal circumstances if they surrender 
themselves to an entity (a person or a structure) that will protect them from constant 
harm. Hobbes calls this entity Leviathan. Leviathan is able to provide an environment 
without the ever-presence of war and violence in people's daily lives. Leviathan protects 
citizens from this brutish, consistent insecurity and the constant state of despair. Without 
Leviathan, human beings are doomed to live with "no propriety of goods, or lands; no 
security."5 But Leviathan comes at a price. According to Hobbes, security is being 
accomplished by people surrendering their individual independence, self-determination 
and responsibility for one's own destiny. By surrendering this degree of independence, 
individualism and self-governance to an overarching, broader government or entity 
(Leviathan), one gains security. 
Several centuries fast forward, the term security remains attached to the state as 
the central object to be secured. It also remains still inherently connected to the military 
and the threat and the use of force. In 1943 journalist and political adviser Walter 
Lippmann, who is also known for turning the term "Cold War" into a household name, 
argued that "A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate 
interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war."6 Here 
Lippmann clearly argues for security and its traditional state centrism and the notion that 
only war, counter-aggression and force can in fact provide such security. Henry Kissinger 
argued in his 1957 dissertation that good statesmanship has to understand how actors 
define security and threat likewise (Kissingerl957/Carrl939). Kissinger also wrote that 
4 Hobbes 2008, 84. 
5 Ibid., 142. 
6 Lippman 1943, 51. 
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political leaders have to be able to understand the threshold at which other actors will feel 
threatened. 
Other scholars tried to delve into the objectivity and subjectivity, the ambiguities 
the concept of security provides. Yale University Professor Arnold Wolfers in 1959, to 
compare, addresses the intersection between the reality of a threat and how one perceives 
a threat. He wrote that "security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to 
acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be 
attacked."7 
Against the backdrop of the Cold War and a looming nuclear inferno, former 
Swedish Premier Minister Olof Palme, for example, explored alternative definitions of 
security. He, in the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues Report 
in 1982, saw security in a nuclear age as an endeavor of the collective, what he referred 
to as "common security."8 Such common security emerges, according to Palme, due to 
the devastating nature of a nuclear war. The prospect of the evitable destructiveness then 
calls for a security system that understands the concept of security as a "joint survival."9 
Some scholars defined security as to what is does to (or fails to do) for a specific portion 
of a population e.g. women. In 1985, for example, the World Conference to Review and 
Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for women saw security and 
peace for women as a multi-faceted concept. The definition of peace, for example, not 
only included the sheer absence of conflict, but also included "the enjoyment of 
economic and social justice."10 Most recently, however, many scholars interpreted 
7 Wolfers 1952,485. 
8 Palme and Vance 1982, xiii. 
9 Ibid., xv. 
10 Tickner, 1992,55. 
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security more of a fluid and flexible notion. In 1990, G.M. Dillon, for example, 
interpreted security not as a "universal need or a universal concept, but a function of 
discourse, a function within a specific and modern discursive economy of the political."11 
Further, security then becomes a "process of subjectification"12 or "pervasive cultural 
practices that serve to discipline ambiguity."13 
To connect these varieties of security definitions to Securitization Theory, Barry 
Buzan interprets security as being inherently linked to existential survival, the survival of 
not only people and states, but also objects and issues such as the environment, global 
health and identity. For Buzan, insecurity, and inversely then also security, is a 
condition, which is based on who is threatening the survival and sheer existence of 
objects and issues. Buzan defines insecurity as reflective of "a combination of threats and 
vulnerabilities."14 It is likewise linked to how these objects and issues expose themselves 
to certain threats, how these issues become vulnerable and indicate certain vulnerabilities. 
If insecurity is the combination of threats and vulnerabilities, security then is the result of 
mastering and diffusing these threats and vulnerabilities. 
For Buzan like Wolfers in 1959, broadly described, security can be objective 
(there is a real threat) or subjective (there is a perceived threat). For example, one could 
argue that Iraq after the Sept. 11 terrorist attack was perceived by the U.S. government as 
an existential threat while in reality (and objectively) such a threat lacked substantive 
backing e.g. the weapons of mass destruction. A purely objective measure of security - as 
proposed and advocated by realists - is nearly impossible because, according to Buzan, 
" Dillon, G.M. 1990, 110. 
12 Ibid., 114. 
13 Campbell, D. 1998, 17. 
14 Buzan 1983, 112. 
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such a measure has not been provided by any security theory.15 For example, an invasion 
could be a threat to some (e.g. the elite of a country), but an invading army could also 
resemble a liberating force to others.16 Buzan offers the example of a "hostile" tank. Even 
in the face of an immediate threat, e.g. a hostile tank at the border, such a threat not 
necessarily has to be objectively perceived as a threat because the tank could also be 
related to a peacekeeping force. The tank can represent and resemble something 
completely different to different people. Its capacity as a threat is subjective. For one 
group, it's an invasive act and a threat to one's survival; for another group it represents 
just the opposite - namely liberation. 
Likewise, who securitizes - who constructs the process of securitization and its 
mechanisms - remains subjective. As Buzan points out, with such subjectivity comes a 
wide range of ambiguities. Not every country and government defines security - and 
threat - equally. Global warming such as rising sea levels might be a security issue for 
one state such as Japan, but not for another, such as Liechtenstein. Likewise, political 
ideology (a conservative versus a liberal government) can trigger securitization in one 
country, but not in another. For example, immigration in the U.S. has emerged as a clear 
security issue after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. Conservative leaders such as President 
George W. Bush tightened immigration enforcement and imposed more immigration 
regulations and restraints. Similarly, a growing immigration and assimilation debate in 
Europe has heightened overall cultural and social tensions, for example, in England and 
France. However, immigration has not reached security levels and threat assumptions in 
very liberal states such as Norway. Securitization takes on a political undertone 
15 Buzan 1998, 30. 
16 Ibid., 30. 
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depending on who is constructing it - and against what political backdrop. These 
17 
converging ambiguities are what Buzan calls "a political fact that has consequences." 
Since within the framework of Securitization Theory, the definition of the term 
"existential threat" is also critical, it warrants for a brief description what "existential 
threat" exactly means. A threat is not necessarily a threat because it is real, but sometimes 
a threat can also be perceived (wrongfully or rightfully so) as one. Michael Shapiro in 
1992, for example, argued that the deployment of military means are usually deployed 
not to tackle a random threat. "They function as an adjunct to some already determined, 
often historically conceived threats."18 According to Buzan, threats can emerge from 
military areas (issues that are directly linked to any branch of the military) and non-
military entities (issues that do not have any links to the military e.g. the environment, 
global health or migration). A threat can also be an individually perceived threat or a 
threat that is based on structural implications such as structural violence. Structural 
violence is a threat, which presupposes that a threat has structural origins e.g. such as the 
Apartheid regime in South Africa, the Nazi government in Germany, the Red Scare 
during the 1950s. 
To consider a threat as a security issue, it has to meet certain criteria, elevating the 
nature of a threat from a benign, normal level to a sudden height of severity and crisis 
mode. The reasonableness and such severity of a threat are critical within the process of 
securitization. A threat needs to be deemed existential otherwise securitization will fail. A 
threat needs to question the existence of an issue or needs to target key components that 
are essential for the survival of an issue or area. The legitimacy of a security claim or 
17 B. W. Buzan 1998, 30. 
18 Shapiro, M.J. 1992, 456. 
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claim for survival needs to be real. However, such reality can only come from a logical 
and coherent existential nature of the threat. The threat of blue jeans and Coke to the 
Soviet Union (compared to the U.S. and Europe) or the Danish complacency during the 
Cold War 19 are examples of unreasonable and illogical threats. If a threat is 
unreasonable, not legit or weak and flawed, securitization remains limited, artificial and 
ineffective, hence weak and flawed itself. Reasonableness and credibility of a security 
claim, the interaction of who securitizes and the interplay between varies actors and units 
(political leaders, institutions or non-governmental organizations) amid the securitization 
process are critical for a successful securitization. 
The assumptions, which traditionally have surrounded the definition of'security' 
in International Relations theory, have usually unleashed very narrow and predictable 
measures and responses. Usually these responses were connected to force, aggression and 
the military as the actor. They include invasions, first strikes, attacks and other common 
actions. However, Securitization Theory, in comparison, suggests alternative measures, 
which are not linked to the military or the traditional use of force. These alternative 
measurers often include resolutions of international institutions such as the UN, 
international legal actions through the international court system, economic sanctions and 
the curtailment of domestic rights and liberties. The widening of these alternative 
measures connects to the widening and deepening of issues after the end of the Cold War. 
The interplay between varies actors and units (political leaders, institutions or 
non-governmental organizations) amid the securitization process is also essential not only 
in legitimizing a security claim for survival, but in accepting the breaking of rules or 
tolerating the scope of extraordinary measures (which otherwise would not have been 
19 Buzan 1998, 30. 
58 
tolerated). Such threats have also been deemed existential because they provoke and 
generate extraordinary measures to deal with the severity of the threat. Such emergency 
20 measures are forces and actions completely "beyond existing binding rules." These 
measures bypass and surpass existing norms and regulations and establish often new and 
extraordinary ones to combat this extraordinary threat. The exceptional threat here not 
only justifies the exceptional means, but actually requires and demands them. 
As a process, the Securitization Theory holds that once actors securitize an issue 
(turn it into an existential threat) norms and values about this issue change and 
extraordinary measures are being deployed to confront and combat this threat. For 
example, once a state is being attacked, it acts within its rights of self-defense and 
preservation of its sovereignty. It deploys extraordinary measures to defuse and 
eventually overcome the threat that had questioned its existence. Such urgent and 
extraordinary measures not always need to include force, but rather could also encompass 
other actions and procedures such as sanctions, the withholding of aid, or the domestic 
curtailment of rights and liberties of a population. In short : These measures are called 
extraordinary because they consist of something leaders or other entities/units of 
authority (institutions or non-governmental organizations) would not do under normal 
conditions and under regular circumstances. Through elevating something to a security 
issue, actors such as political leaders or institutions or non-govemmental organizations 
recognize the urgency and crisis mode and, hence, begin to abandon prior values, 
assumptions and norms (and procedures, rules) and assume new ones. 
20 Buzan 1998,5. 
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WHAT ARE THE STEPS! 
The widely accepted method of securitization as proposed by Buzan and Waever 
in general undertakes three steps and stages. These steps are: 1) the presentation of an 
issue as an existential threat 2) The acceptance of this threat by a credible audience and 3) 
The deployment of extraordinary measures to combat this threat. 
This is - in general - how a simple securitization outline would look like: 
Actor/Agent | ~^> Presenting something as an (existential) threat 
Audience | Accepting the threat 
Measures | ~^> Taking extraordinary steps to combat the threat t21 
FIRST STEP: 
The issue (the concerns e.g. environment, HIV infection, migration etc.) needs to 
be presented to someone or something of competence and authority as an existential 
threat. Such competence is also referred to as a credible audience. However, just 
portraying something as a threat (Buzan calls this a securitization move) does not 
automatically produce and result in securitization. It only initiates the first step toward 
securitization. The securitization move - shifting something from the ordinary to the 
extraordinary, from the regular to security - creates a platform from which eventually it is 
possible to take extraordinary actions. 
Emergency or extraordinary measures are steps that would not have been possible 
had the discourse not taken on the form of an existential threat. According to Buzan, such 
a securitization move - the initial argument to validate such an emergency measure - does 
21 Buzan 1998, 23. 
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not necessarily need to be adopted, but only the existential threat needs to be argued and 
the threat accepted as such. 
According to Buzan, this first, initial step usually involves a process that is called 
the speech act. A speech act means someone "speaks/writes" the word "security" (or a 
word that in its meaning articulates a similar notion than the word security). By 
"speaking," connecting the word security to an issue, this issue then becomes a security 
concern. The speech act underscores that something is being spoken and, therefore, is 
being defined or articulated a certain way. However, this act also has very real and 
tangible implications. By saying the words, by labeling an issue as a security concern, 
something is also being done. The speech act implies and creates specific actions. A 
speech act, therefore, is never only passive, but entails very specific active components. It 
is active as it is consequential. Creating securitization through speaking comes with 
specific consequences and reactions. A speech act creates real effect and actions. 
However, successful speech acts (successful in its ultimate goal to securitize), do not 
automatically imply that the same speech act will be successful again or is consistently 
successful. New or unexpected conditions or different factors can alter an established and 
once successful securitization pattern, shift trends - and then obviously change the 
outcome. 
SECOND STEP: 
Buzan's second securitization step draws attention to "audience." An audience is 
an entity or a large body (e.g. of international institutions and/or NGOs) that is able to 
recognize an existential threat and security issue as such and then execute actions. Such 
an audience is the ultimate receiver of the labeling of an issue as a security issue. The 
61 
audience becomes a key actor that carries the sole responsibility of evaluating an issue as 
an existential theat. This receiver or audience needs to be credible and, therefore, an 
entity or person of legitimate competence and authority. This audience then needs to 
recognize a threat as an existential one and deem a security issue as valid and real. This 
second step also establishes the negotiation between who securitizes and who accept such 
securitization as legit (the audience). Only a credible audience can interpret and then 
accept the extraordinary and existential threat as such: something that "cannot be dealt 
with the normal way." 
THIRD STEP: 
The third stage of securitization encompasses the actual reaction to the act of 
securitizing an issue. During this stage all involved parties and entities agree to deploy a 
set of measures to combat the threat. These measures, however, need to be extraordinary. 
They are called extraordinary because they are so inherently severe and different from the 
norm that they are actually seen as a violation to established rules. This kind of violations 
of rules for the sake of one's (an issue's/object's) survival is also a key feature and 
driving force of securitization. 
Buzan's securitization - summary of securitization steps: 
The realization (and articulation/speech act) of an existential threat (A securitizing 
move upsets orders of mutual accommodation among units 
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The securitizing agent says someone cannot be dealt with in the normal way 
(Negotiation between securitizer and audience); Moving referent object from the 
political to security 
NX 
The deployment of extraordinary measures to combat this threat 
The securitizing agent obtains permission to override rules 
that would otherwise bind it 
yy 
De-Securitization: return the referent object from the security to political realm 
FOURTH STEP: 
After an issue has been successfully securitized, extraordinary measures have 
been deployed and the threat has been dealt with, according to Buzan and Waever, then 
de-securitization can take place. De-securitization reverses the initial securitization move 
and the securitization process. It returns the object or issue, which was initially 
securitized, to the political sphere. It removes the threat and reverts the issue to its initial, 
pre-securitization state, to its normal and previous condition. De-Securitization is, in fact, 
the removal of issues from the security agenda. This step only occurs once the object and 
the subsequent threat has been - satisfactorily for the audience - treated and removed. 
Extraordinary measures have been successfully launched and implemented to deal with 
22 Buzan 1998, 23. 
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and defuse the threat. De-Securitization can even entail to return an issue to a non-
political agenda. It's being again addressed in a regular fashion and with ordinary 
measures. An issue now can again be dealt with the normal way. 
De-Securitization as a process then would look like this: 
In the last two decades, securitization has been successfully applied to several 
fields. Most prominently such successful securitization applications were utilized in the 
areas of the environment, migration and global terrorism after the Sept. 11 terrorist 
attacks in New York. 
B. SECURITIZATION AND ITS CURRENT APPLICATION 
I. ENVIRONMENT 
Securitization of the environment gradually developed due to the increasing strain 
the worldwide industrialization and development has put on the globe and its natural 
resources. The United Nations Environment Programme, for example, sees climate 
change, resource efficiency, disasters and conflict, environmental governance, harmful 
substances and hazardous waste and ecosystem management as its six priority areas of 
Non-I Political ^ Securitization 
De-Securitization23 
23 Buzan 1998, 23. 
64 
the global environment.24 Securitization holds in its core argument that the environment 
is in danger and needs to survive because without it, the sheer survival of human kind 
seems questionable. The application of Securitization Theory, therefore, makes the case 
that an audience (a state, a region or the international community as a whole) is accepting 
the assertion of such an existential threat and is deploying extraordinary measures to 
protect the environment - and to protect humanity per se. 
Some International Relations scholars such as Robert D. Kaplan in the 1990s have 
explored this link between security and the environment. Kaplan argued in his 1994 
article "The Coming Anarchy" that the destruction of the environment in the 21st century 
will become a fundamental threat to national and global security. In his article he clearly 
equates the term environmental sustainability with the state or a national identity that 
needs to be secured. "The environment, I will argue, is part of a terrifying array of 
problems that will define a new threat to our security."25 Kaplan argues that a rising 
world population will trigger mass migration, deforestation, water depletion, soil 
erosions, air pollution and the spreading of diseases. He sees the environmental 
degradation and abuse on a supra-scale that will eventually threaten the survival of 
central governments, national boundaries and territorial sovereignties. Kaplan's declared 
prophecy of "The Coming Anarchy " holds that local militia, riots and conflicts along 
ethnical and religious fault lines will dominate the fixture. This coming anarchy will not 
only inflict nations in the south such as Africa and Asia, but will most prominently affect 
and devastate the developed and advanced civilizations in the north and west. 
24 United Nations Environment Programme 2012. 
25 Kaplan, Robert 1994,20 
While often such "doomsday" prophecies struggle to make themselves heard and 
affect real change outside the realm of academia, many environmental concerns have 
evoked specific actions by many national governments. As early as in 1979, the Brandt 
and Brundtland commission pointed to the link between socio-economic factors and the 
environment and argued already then for the expansion of security to the environment.26 
Most recently, such as in June 2009, the British government included key environmental 
issues such as climate change and energy into its national security strategies. For 
example, the British connected global warming and climate change very clearly to 
security by calling both "a wide-ranging driver of global insecurity."27 
By connecting climate change to poverty, migration and the "risk tipping fragile 
states into instability, conflict and state failure," Great Britain securitized the issue. The 
British government obligated itself to reduce its emissions by 2050 by at least 80 percent 
through Great Britain's Climate Change Act. Likewise, the United States acknowledged 
in 2006 in its National Security Strategy environmental factors to destruction "whether 
caused by human behavior or cataclysmic mega-disasters such as floods, hurricanes, 
earthquakes or tsunamis" as a threat to national security. 
As Buzan, however, points out, successful securitization of the environment, for 
example, depends on "whether states, major economic actors, and local communities 
embrace the scientific agenda"29 that sees the environment existentially threatened. 
Successful securitization depends on following the logic and pattern of Buzan's outlined 
26 Tennberg 1995,241. 
27 Peoples, Columba and Vaughan-Williams, Nick 2010,93. 
28 Ibid., 93. 
29 Buzan 1998,91. 
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conditions such as the effective portrayal of a credible and existential threat and the 
deployment of extraordinary measures to curtail such a threat. 
In the early 1990s, the term environmental security was increasingly utilized by 
environmental advocacy groups such as Greenpeace, the Sierra Club etc. to bring 
attention to a variety of environmental issues such as climate change. Such utilization 
points to the fact that in particular environmental degradation is not exclusionary 
affecting just one state, but has widespread consequences. For example, some see 
Bangladesh threatened by the rise of sea levels triggered by climate change. Such threat, 
however, does not only have local and domestic implications, but spreads across national 
borders to other states. Domestic politics of neighboring states, for example, will be 
affected and threatened by the projected influx of refugees from Bangladesh.30 Such 
regional threat symbolizes a crisis mode, creates a sense of urgency and, hence, starts the 
securitization process. "The security label is a useful way both of signaling danger and 
setting priority, and for this reason alone it is likely to persist in environmental 
debates"31. 
Realists often oppose the securitization of the environment by arguing that it 
removes security from the state as the key object that needs to be secured since 
environmental issues usually transcend territorial boundaries and state borders. Daniel 
Deudney in 1990 opposed the link between national security and the environment mainly 
because he as a realist resists the widening and deepening of security studies - and the 
expanding of the term (international and national) security - in the first place. Such 
expansion of what security means has not been accepted "in principle outside certain 
30 Peoples, Columba and Vaughan-Williams, Nick 2010, 81. 
31 Waever 1995, 63. 
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progressive circles, despite the sound reasoning behind it." Deudney like many realists 
rejects that environment and conflict are in fact connected and argues that both are not 
connected to "the traditional focus of national security - interstate violence."33 Deudney 
also argued that the link between security and environment diverts attention from the 
environmental core issues and objectives. For example, Deudney also criticized that 
securitizing the environment by environmental groups only "dresses their programms in 
the blood-soaked garments of the war system" which then "betrays their core values and 
creates confusion about the real task at hand."34 Also, labeling an environmental issue as 
a security concern could in some cases be unhelpful, even aggravate measures and 
elevate instead of ease problems in the first place. For example, attaching security to 
climate change and pollution could enact strict if not defensive measures in one country 
and, therefore, evoke protectionism instead of cooperation in neighboring countries. 
2. INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 
Migration and the move of populations - and the conflicts and the controversies 
that come with it - have been a consistent trend throughout history. According to the 
most recent report by the U.N. the number of migrants has more than doubled from 75 
million global migrants in 1960 to 191 million in 2006. 
With the increase of migration globally comes the ebb and flow of a political and 
societal pull and push for and against immigrants. In the wake of the global economic 
crisis, Xenophobia, for example, has emerged as a world-wide problem without borders. 
The lack of jobs and the fear of the otherness have played significantly into the rise and 
growth of global Xenophobian tendencies, stretching from Europe to Africa to the 
32 Deudney 1990,469. 
33 Ibid., 461. 
34 Deudney 1990,474-5. 
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American and Asian continent. Xenophobia, has globally connected immigration and to 
security. Such securitization has thrust migrants and immigrants into the realm of human 
rights protection and many international advocacy groups have taken on migration and 
immigration issues. 
On a domestic level and in particular after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. 
and the consequent tightening of immigration laws has underscored and fueled the fear of 
the otherness, often along religious and ethnical fault lines. As the U.S. has emerged as 
the country with the largest influx of international migrants in 2005, the U.S. government 
(and also other countries) has increased its border controls and security measures. Such 
new measurers have connected and, hence, securitized immigration and migration with 
international crime including terrorisms, drug wars and sex trafficking. 
On a global level, international institutions such as the United Nations have tried 
to ease growing anti-immigration sentiments and, by doing so, also inversely securitized 
the issue. As the UN likes to see universal standards and processes and bilateral, multi­
lateral efforts, to change "the often inflammatory mainstream political discourse on 
migration"35 such global legal standards have in itself a security component to it and 
serve as a securitization mechanism. With the UN pushing for "creating a level playing 
field for immigrants, employers and states and international instruments,"36migration and 
immigration has been placed on the global security agenda. 
Scholars such as Jef Huysmanns argued in 2006 that immigration, for example, in 
post- World War II Europe has been often successfully utilized as a political tool to win 
elections. Immigration was, for example, a hotly contested and domestically politicized 
35 United Nations 2011,4. 
36 Ibid., 4. 
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issue in the 1960s. Huysmanns cited a 1968 speech, for example, of Enoch Powell, who 
rallied his constituents against the increasing influx of immigrants into Great Britain.37 
According to the Securitization Theory, this would then symbolize the first stage of 
securitization: moving an issue from the non-political to the political phase. Security for 
Huysmanns has become "a political technique of framing what structures social 
relations."38 
For Huysmanns the gradually increasing European integration under one EU 
umbrella, most prominently with the lifting of the borders and hence the implementation 
of specific EU asylum and migration legislation in the 1990s, began to define also a 
moment whereas a political issue has been securitized. Connecting very specific legal 
parameters, rules and regulations e.g. asylum to migration is linking the political issue of 
migration to securitization. According to Huysmanns, this defines a securitization move 
because it placed migrations in the larger context of security within the newly created 
European Union. It connects migration with the notion of a European security. 
While in the past many politicized migration issues were nearly exclusively 
connected to migrants from the developing world in Africa and Asia, after the Sept. 11 
terrorist attacks Muslim immigrants emerged as a specifically targeted migrant group. 
The securitization of migration soon was linked not only in the U.S., but also in Europe 
to radicalized young Muslim men, for example.39 Against this political backdrop, 
Huysmanns finds securitization being often exploited by politicians, who try to create the 
idea of a culturally homogenous and sovereign community/enclave. As this culturally 
homogenous enclave is being infiltrated, intruded and tainted by immigrants, it sheer 
37 Peoples, Columba and Vaughan-Williams, Nick 2010, 137. 
38 Huysmans, 1998, Xii. 
39 Peoples, Columba and Vaughan-Williams, Nick 2010, 137. 
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existence is being threatened. Huysmanns argues that politicians then securitize the 
existence of such a community "through the exclusion of those migrants who are 
identified as cultural aliens." 40 
3. GLOBAL TERRORISM 
The securitization of terrorism after the Sept. 11 attacks is one of the prime 
examples of the successful application of the Securitization Theory since it has taken on 
almost escalating national and global dimensions. The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq 
are just two examples of such a securitization. Terrorism is not something new and 
unique to the 21st century. In fact, its definition in terms of securitization has always been 
linked to a political context. For example, Nelson Mandela was sentenced to 27 years in 
prison in South Africa for sabotage, but he became in 1994 the country's first black 
president. Likewise, other formerly-coined terrorists such as Yassir Arafat ended up 
winning the Nobel Peace Prize. Someone else's terrorist is another one's freedom fighter. 
However, after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the securitization of terrorism 
globally took on a priority of unprecedented proportions. Domestically, for example, the 
U.S. created an entire new body of bureaucracy with its Department of Homeland 
Security to address terrorism and national security. The new department now is 
responsible not only for immigration, domestic emergency preparedness, prevention of 
chemical, biological, and nuclear attacks, but also intelligence information analysis. 41 It 
enacted a slew of new legislation (including the controversial Patriot Act) to open new 
channels for a more effective information flow between governmental departments and 
potential sources of terrorism. Myriad extraordinary measures in the post-Sept. 11 
40 Peoples, Columba and Vaughan-Williams, Nick 2010, 138. 
41 Ibid., 109. 
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security environment not only included force (the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq), but 
in the U.S. also the curtailment of domestic rights and liberties. 
Elsewhere e.g. in Europe, governments had already tightened their terrorism 
legislation prior to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. Great Britain in 2000 passed the UK 
Terrorism Act. On a global scale, international institutions, for example, the United 
Nations Security Council passed with Resolution 1566 in 2004 a new definition of 
terrorism, following pressure mainly from the United States and Great Britain. 
C. SECURITIZATION AND OTHER CONCEPTS AND THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORKS 
1. SECURITIZA TION AND HUMAN SECURITY 
In the 1970s and 1980s, rising economic inequalities, environmental concerns and 
populous movements became indicators for a gradually changing theoretical playing field 
in International Relations. In the 1990s, identity and growing transnational issues such as 
organized crime added to the new political environment that eventually drove the 
dynamics between the "narrow versus the widening/broadening" debate in International 
Relations. New theoretical lenses began to explore new security concepts and to develop 
new theoretical off springs. One of the most successful concepts became what now is 
known as the concept of "Human Security." 
Securitization as a theory and Human Security as a concept emerged from the 
security debate after the end of the Cold War. Human Security as a new framework tried 
to expand the definition and objective of security and put a "human face" on security 
studies. Human Security aimed to connect security to humanity, and by doing so, linked 
for the first time security to the individual itself. Within this debate about a new post-
72 
Cold War security environment, this is also referred to as deepening. The deepening 
vertically expanded the object that needed securing downward from traditional state-
centrism to the local and individual. Human Security, however, also broadened and 
shifted the focus from the state as the key security objective to a variety of issues. This 
expansion to other areas such as the environment and global health is also referred to as 
the deepening and widening of security studies. This "widening/broadening" is an 
approach that horizontally expanded the object that needed securing to various fields. It 
started "claiming security status for issues and referent objects in the economic, 
environmental and societal sectors." 42 It began to include research areas, which up until 
then had stayed far removed from the conventional fields of security studies. 
The new areas that suddenly sought to be worth of securing varied from migration 
and identity to environmental and global health and have one factor in common: they 
focus on people, on individuals as the key object that needed securing. It focused on the 
human being as a singular unit that mattered most when it came to security. Additionally, 
it also expanded the term security to include development and the notion of a collective 
significance and consciousness. By doing so, it privileged the intersection of the 
theoretical narrative, political activism and the sense of moral responsibility/a collective 
consciousness as a new, yet critical and legitimate part of security studies."No other 
concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the 
disciplinary power of security."43 Instead of consistently privileging states interests, 
territorial boundaries and nuclear muscle-flexing, international relations scholarship 
sought out to expand security to global non-military issues. Areas such as infectious 
42 Buzan 1998, 1 
43 Der Derian, J. 1995, 24-5 
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disease, food, health, gender and the environment combined theory with an activism 
component and a specific policy agenda and practical objectives. These objectives 
included to reduce poverty and foster development. Human Security also introduced a 
historical and more of a contextual component to security studies. For example, the 
U.N.'s eight Millennium Development goals as outlined in the 1994 UN Development 
Report ARE a Human Security concept.44 The report, for example, pointed out that 
people's daily security concerns have been neglected in the shadow of the five decades of 
the Cold War. "Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought 
security in their daily lives. For many of them, security symbolized protection from the 
threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and 
environmental hazards." 45 
The UN report pointed to four key points of Human Security: 
1. Human Security is a universal concern. 
2. Components of Human Security are interdependent; overlapping 
responsibilities and objectives 
3. Emphasis on prevention rather intervention 
4. Human Security is people-centric46 
Also, new political realities such as the dissolution of the former State of 
Yugoslavia underscored the legitimacy of a new security discourse and a new theoretical 
terrain. The securitization of migration and immigration in a new restructured Eastern 
Europe, resurfacing in the 1990s, for the first time again after World War II, became such 
a Human Security concept. Human Security emerged, similar to Securitization Theory, as 
an event and history-driven framework. Scholars began to see these new theoretical and 
44 United Nations Development Program 1994. 
45 Ibid., 1994. 
46 Ibid., 1994. 
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conceptional lenses "in terms of the relation between the way that security is theorized 
and the historical context in which that theorization takes place."47 
Human Security steered the key object that needed to be secured away from the 
traditional narrowness of realism and liberalism toward a more people/humanity and 
individuality-driven centrism. The widening toward Human Security triggered a shift 
within the overarching definition of security: are food shortages, regional and global 
terrorism and economic despair security issues? Caroline Thomas, for example, argued in 
2001 for economic inequality as a key security factor. She wrote that "the globalization 
process is resulting in highly uneven distribution of gains, and, without converted action, 
inequality may deepen further with all its attendant implications."48 The emerging Human 
Security perspective helped to shift traditional bi-polarity foreign policy objectives to a 
broader approach that focused on human rights issues. States such as Norway and Canada 
were among one of the first nations in the late 1990s to embrace the Human Security 
concept. These countries began to endorse international law, international institutions and 
globalization and, hence, legitimized them as progressive parameters of a new security 
environment. 
Human security, however, also attracted its pool of critics. Some, for example, 
made the argument that only "middle power" or weak states (Norway, Japan) advocate 
for Human Security as a legitimate security concept as a tool to assert their power on the 
global stage, while superpowers such as the United States and China employ more 
conventional instruments (nuclear weaponry, UN veto rights etc.). As some celebrate it as 
an inventive and creative way to expand security studies from the state to the individual, 
47 Peoples, Columba and Vaughan-Williams, Nick 2010, 8. 
48 Thomas, Carolina 2001, 173-4. 
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others doubt it theoretical and practical effectiveness. For most critics it's "at best an 
unhelpful chimera, and at worst an understanding so broad it both voids the concept of 
security of any substantive meaning and simultaneously subjects a whole new range of 
human activities to security practices unnecessarily."49 
Roland Paris, similar to many other scholars fundamentally questioned the 
relentless inclusiveness (the deepening and widening) and lack of discriminatory capacity 
of Human Security. Paris, similar to Stephen Walt, argued that the seemingly endless 
expansion of this new 21st century security environment renders those new security issues 
increasingly meaningless. "If human security means almost anything, then it effectively 
means nothing."50 Paris and others argued that the widening becomes too broad and 
issues lose their political and theoretical (security) relevance. Stephen Walt further 
articulated in 1991 that the inclusion of poverty, AIDS, environmental hazards, drug 
abuse etc. into the concept of security studies runs "the risk of expanding security studies 
excessively." 51 In Walt's opinion, this would "destroy the intellectual coherence and 
make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems."52 Stephen 
Walt argues against the widening and deepening of security studies as suggested and 
practiced, for example, through Buzan and Waever's Securitization Theory. According to 
Walt, these widening and deepening efforts are excessive and essentially destructive 
rather than productive and effective. Walt underscored with this argument the realist view 
49 Peoples, Columba and Vaughan-Williams, Nick 2010, 120. 
50 Paris, Roland 2001, 7. 
51 Walt, Stephen M. 1991,213. 
52 Walt, Stephen M. 1991,213. 
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that security studies should remain focused on the centrism of the state and the 
explanation of "Phenomena that can be controlled by national leaders."53 
Others also criticize fundamentally contradicting tendencies of Human Security 
itself. Some critics argue that Human Security underplays the relationship of state and 
individual while yet in turn Human Security requires some degree, if not quite a lot, of 
interaction between the individual and the state as key actors. Another source of 
controversy for Human Security as a legitimate security concept is its adoption as a tool 
in the 2001 report of the "Responsibility to Protect," published by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). This report outlines if and 
when to intervene and to invade a country in order to protect people. Some critics pointed 
for many powerful states and in particular Western states to use Human Security as a 
convenient alibi to muddle in other nation's (often developing countries) domestic 
affairs.54 Also, Human Security's close link to development - and the assumption that 
underdevelopment is a security concern - raises critical questions about national 
sovereignty, imperialism and whether or not development has been too western-centric. 
Duffield points to the intersection of human security and underdevelopment and 
argues for containment and management of underdevelopment rather than for 
underdeveloped countries, trying to copy the rampant industrialization of developed 
countries. This would just further paralyze smaller developing countries and eventually 
cause them "to die chasing the mirage of self-reliance."55 He argues that a western-centric 
53 Walt 1991 
54 Peoples, Columba and Vaughan-Williams, Nick 2010, 127. 
55 Ibid., 129. 
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development has damaged small developing nations to a point "within which the 
modalities of underdevelopment have become dangerous."56 
Also, some argue such as Williams and Peoples in 2010 that human security (and 
in general the widening and deepening of security studies) has been gendered and 
therefore such gendering has creating a perception of femininity and softness surrounding 
human security.57 While very rightfully so human security shifts the attention of what 
security is to what security does, gendering human security by including sexual violence 
only removes human security from what's real - from real issues, security threats and 
how to curtail them. 
2. SECURITIZATION AND CONSTRUCTIVISM 
To be able to interpret Securitization Theory and Human Security and its critics 
accurately, one also needs to explore the foundation and the scope of Constructivism. 
Human Security as a new security concept and Securitization as a new theoretical 
underpinning widened security studies. To compare, Constructivism as a theory deepened 
security studies and questioned the core assumptions of realism and liberalism. 
Constructivism, in broad terms, argues that conditions in international relations are not 
given, as realists believe. They are not a sheer fact of human nature and, therefore, static, 
constant and not able to change. Instead, constructivist rather argue that conditions are 
socially constructed and often a product of historical and social context. Therefore, 
according to constructivists, change is possible and, in fact, inherent to the international 
system. Constructivists such as Alexander Wendt, for example, argued that structures 
such as the concept of anarchy in international relations as recognized by realists and 
56 Duffield, Mark and Waddell, N. 2006, 15-6. 
57 Peoples, Columba and Vaughan-Williams, Nick 2010, 130. 
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liberalists are socially constructed. This social construction is achieved through ideas and 
interaction between actors rather than given by nature. For example, realists such as John 
Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz struggled with explaining the peaceful end of the Cold 
War while constructivists such as Wendt where able to utilize these events to underscore 
their arguments. According to Wendt, the dissolution of the Soviet Union was the result 
of a historical development rather than a rational decision as argued by realists.58 
Culture also became in the 1990s a key aspect of Constructivism. Peter 
Katzenstein in 1996 argued with his book "The Culture of National Security" for the 
inclusion of culture as a key marker for explaining security issues and state behavior. 
According to Katzenstein, for example, structure as argued in realism (anarchy) cannot 
explain, or only in a limited fashion, the actions that lead for many countries to the Iraq 
and Afghanistan invasion (e.g. Germany's reluctance to participate). Yet, according to 
Katzenstein, history and culture can. For Katzenstein, it is critical to understand norms, 
identity and institutions to analyze the actions of states. According to Katzenstein, 
"Constructivists could prove that ideational explanations could account for outcomes 
missed by materialistic realists and liberalists"59 Other constructivists such as Kenneth 
Booth and Richard Wyn Jones, for example, began with the Welsh School to introduce 
the notion of emancipation and expanded on the constructivists' focus on the individual. 
Booth argued that human beings need to be emancipated from the shackles of "physical 
and human constraints, which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to 
do." 60 
58 Wendt, Alexander 1999, 76. 
59 Katzenstein, Peter 1996, 24. 
60 Booth, Kenneth 1991,319. 
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Some scholar saw clear common philosophical roots of Constructivism and 
Securitization, despite the fact that constructivists pushed for security to focus on the 
individual while securitization continued to embrace its attention toward an issue or an 
object rather than the individual. According to Johan Erickson, while there were 
correlations between realism and securitization, Buzan and Waever increasingly became 
more constructivists. "With each new book, however, the authors take one step further 
toward a wider, more inclusive and constructivist approach to security.61 Erickson even 
linked Securitization Theory with Alexander Wendt's social constructivism. "Security is 
viewed as a social construct. According to this view, there are no objective threats, only 
attempts to saddle issues with security implications." 
Other scholars such as Kjell Goldman argued already in the 1970s that labeling 
anything else but military issue as a security issue should be termed as "security 
politicization." 63 Goldman seemed also rather radical in his fundamental repudiation of 
securitization. Goldman, for example, goes so far as to advocate for denying 
securitization theorists funding usually allocated for security studies because the 
securitization of basic human needs is "straightforward political advocacy." 64 
3. SECURITIZATION, REALISM, AND FEMINISM 
Within Critical Theory, feminist and gender scholars most prominently applied a 
unique theoretical lens to the intersection of global security, gender, women and war. In 
particular after the Cold war, feminist and gender scholarship began increasingly to 
interrogate questions such as why and how for decades Security Studies, a field primarily 
61 Eriksson 1999, 314. 
62 Ibid., 315. 
63 Ibid., 312. 
64 Ibid., 313. 
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dominated by realists, has effectively bypassed women and the effect of security 
(insecurity) on women. Feminist scholars likewise explored whether or not war and 
security affect women differently and how structures, norms and assumptions within 
Security Studies are gendered to suggest (perpetrate and perpetuate) key social, 
economical and political disparities. 
The core assumptions of feminist/gender theory compared to realist are different. 
Realism and Neo-Realism, as one of the traditional pillars of International Relations 
theory, centers its structural framework on the nation state as the main actor. Feminism 
and gender theory, broadly described, places its emphasis more on the individual and the 
local and domestic as its immediate environment. The realist view of security employs an 
equally rather narrow focus. It sees the use of force as a key mechanism of power and a 
central function within the international system. Additionally, capabilities, power and the 
balance of power are also some of the key dynamics within the system. Realists Stephen 
Walt, for example, defined security studies as a field that examines and interrogates "the 
conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of force affects 
individuals, states and societies, and the specific policies that states adopt in order to 
prepare for, prevent or engage in war."65 He defines security studies further as a field 
that aims to explain war and as a very nuclear study "of threat, use and control of military 
force."66 
Feminist security studies, in its core argument, focuses on individual security, 
rather than collective and national security.67 Feminists, however, increasingly have tried 
to cross these ideological faultlines within the established international relations theory. 
65 Walt 1991,212 
66 Ibid., 212 
67 Buzan, Barry and Hansen, Lene 2009, 140. 
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Feminist scholarship has "played an important role in proposing alternative conceptions 
of power and violence that go beyond the traditional military configuration of the 
discipline of IR, including ideas of common and cooperative security arrangement, and 
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non-state-centric perspectives on security." Feminist and gender theory, early in its 
assertions, for example in 1985 after the Women's International Peace Conference in 
Canada, measured security more based on various sectors and structures in which 
women feel insecure. These include poverty, health, labor/working environments, 
domestic violence and areas that display structural violence e.g. racism, political and 
economic discrimination.69 Feminist theorists also argue that the field of security studies 
and its central issues such as identities, state's sovereignty, sources of conflict and 
resolutions etc., are consistently masculinity-dominated. This means that these issues 
have been for centuries debated, argued and resolved - by men. While women have been 
part of armies, wars and conflict resolutions throughout history, many feminist scholars 
such as J. Ann Tickner argue that "images of war depend on rendering women 
invisible."70 
However, feminist scholars have remained not solely focused on the individual, 
but are also concerned with structures and spaces in which women operate. Many 
feminists have observed, studied and effectively re-farmed or dismantled existing 
traditional power structures. "We must work through them, understand them, displace 
them in order to create space of [our] own, a space designed and inhabited by women, 
capable of expressing their interests and values."71 In the 1990s, feminists have expanded 
68 Wibben, Annick T.R. 2011, 5. 
69 Tickner, J. 1992, 54. 
70 Tickner, J. 2001,57. 
71 Cross, E. 1990, 60. 
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into Security Studies, trying to re-define and reframe security. According to Christine 
Sylvester, for example, "security is elusive and partial and involves struggle and 
contention. It is a process rather than an ideal in which women must act as agents in the 
provision of their own security."72 Sylvester sides with conventional constructivists such 
as Alex Wendt who sees security not as a constant and a structural concept, but rather an 
evolution and a consistent development. Sylvester argues that security which "relies on 
protection to reinforce gender hierarchies"73 does not make women feel safer but 
"diminishes women's real security."74 
In the late 1980s and early1990s, feminism and gender theorists began 
increasingly to consistently challenge the privilege of patriarchy within security studies. 
Realism's focus on military and state-centrism, according to many feminist scholars, 
marginalized women within the non-political and political spheres, but also within 
traditional security settings such as conflicts. Men were not only seen and interpreted as 
key top-down authoritative actors, but also as prominent war casualties (soldiers) and 
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victims while women have been consistently portrayed as passive victims of war. 
Feminists argue that realism has entertained for decades the notion of a 
masculinity-tainted "top-down" political approach while Feminist Theory is seen as 
operating from the "bottom-up." A masculinity-tainted top down approach means that 
political decisions are made and national security provided mostly by men in 
authoritarian (top) positions.77 These positions usually include all functions of 
72 Sylvester, Christine 2002,4. 
73 Ibid., 6. 
74 Ibid., 2002,6. 
75 Tickner, J. Ann and Sjoberg, Laura ed. al. 2011, 189. 
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governments, states, national and international institutions. Feminist theorists, in general, 
see a "bottom up" approach, evaluating peaceful resolutions as the utilization of the 
individual and civic society from "the bottom up." This compares to the top down 
approach that comes from the hierarchical power structures from "the above" (state 
leadership, military) etc. Women act from a local point of departure (again the reference 
to "bottom up") and are often found "at the grassroots level in peace, environmental, 
women's and other social and economic movements."78 This notion, however, is most 
recently also expanding with some feminist scholars defining feminist International 
Relations not only "global but local in its globalism."79 This widens the feminist view 
from the local to the international, expands the personal to the political and argues that its 
local emphasis affects the international politics and global security concerns. 
Sandra Whitworth argues that the social order of International Relations is 
oppressive almost by default because of its masculine centrism. Feminist theory tries to 
explore how to change such an oppressive and discriminative environment.80 Feminist 
scholars also accuse the traditional security theorists to be gender-tainted and for key 
International Relations terms such as state, power, hegemon, deterrence and anarchy to 
privilege masculinity. By doing so, traditionalists have discredited for decades other 
theoretical modules of interpretation and nearly completely excluded gender from the 
theoretical debate. 
The gradual and inevitable broadening of security studies, feminist and gender 
scholars made the intersection between global security, gender, women and war more 
visible and diversified it. For example, feminist scholarship introduced the notion of 
78 Tickner, J. 2001, 129. 
79 Tickner, J. Ann and Sjoberg, Laura ed. al. 2011, 223. 
80 Tickner, J. 2001, 137. 
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security narratives and "how security has worked by producing particular types of 
security narratives."81 In particular after the end of the Cold War, feminist and gender 
scholarship started more persistently to interrogate questions such as why and how 
security studies as a research field remained dominated by realists and how and why 
realists have so effectively bypassed the impact of security and insecurity on women. 
Feminist and gender scholarship began increasingly to examine whether or not war and 
security affect women differently and how structures, norms and assumptions within 
security studies are gendered to suggest (and perpetrate) key social, economical and 
political disparities. 
Yet even today how to effectively articulate such challenges to traditional realist 
views is controversial even within the scholastic circles of feminism and gender studies. 
For example, liberal feminist Cynthia Enloe, author of the 1989 International Relations 
feminist text Bananas, Beaches and Bases, centers her key argument on the notion of 
female visibility. For Enloe, female visibility (and the lack thereof) emerges as central in 
International Relations and Security Studies. Enloe's work is groundbreaking because it, 
for the first time, argues for elevating the Feminist-inherent personal-political view 
("personal is political") from the domestic to the international (and international 
relations) level.82 It takes the argument that the "personal is political" from the local to 
the global. Further, for Enloe the increased invisibility of women has created a lopsided 
and exclusionary framework within International Relations that is far removed from the 
actual global reality. It portrays an international system orchestrated and controlled by 
men that intentionally excluded half of the world's population, namely women. It renders 
81 Wibben, Annick T.R. 2011, 25. 
82 Enloe, Cynthia 2000, 195. 
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issues that involve women as secondary on the international security agenda. By doing 
so, it portrays a fundamentally flawed picture of international politics and foreign affairs, 
"only men, not women or children, have been imagined capable for the sort of public 
decisiveness international politics is presumed to require." The recognition of such 
exclusionary attitude is important and critical because it deprives security studies of one 
critical segment of the populations as key political actors: women. This renders women's 
issues not as priorities and such neglect has real security implications. It causes security 
studies to become a flawed and artificial framework that lacks the critical power 
relationship and interaction between men and women with all its social and political 
implications. It "hides the workings of both femininity and masculinity in international 
politics." 84 
While Enloe's work is being criticized of largely catering toward the realist point 
of view of state centrism (privileging the state as the key actor and structure within the 
international system), J. Ann Tickner, to compare, is often credited for trying to upset 
these gendered structures. In order to do so, Tickner utilizes and integrates women's 
views and experiences into explaining international relations. Tickner argues that the 
sheer distinction between the "domestic" and the "international" is gendered - and has 
been remained uncontested and accepted as such. Domestic, for example, in general has 
been recognized as a more feminine term while masculinity is usually automatically 
linked to international relations principles such as power, anarchy, and force. According 
83 Enloe, Cynthia 2000,4. 
84 Ibid., 11. 
86 
to Tickner, "Ideals of both, manhood and the state, have been mutually reinforcing 
throughout the history of warfare, as encapsulated in the figure of the citizen-soldier."85 
While Enloe seem to accept gender discrimination within international relations 
as a given reality,86 Tickner sees the gendered identity and gendered power relationship 
as purely socially constructed. Tickner argues that even the most basic international 
political structures such as local governments, council and relationships among local 
government departments have been constructed around realism's masculinity. Tickner 
writes, "International politics has always been a gendered activity in the modern state 
system." 87 By deconstructing such gendered identities and mechanisms, Tickner argues 
for the interconnectivity between the domestic and the international and for explaining 
"revealing and challenging these "gendered hierarchies."88 She argues that feminine 
views have very tangible objectives such as they enhance the possibility for more 
peaceful resolutions.89 
D. SECURITIZATION AND RAPE 
1. FEMINIST/GENDER THEORY AND CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE 
In general, feminist theorists of the 1990s such as J. Ann Tickner have explored 
how violence during conflict affects the individual in general and women specifically. 
Tickner, for example, points to the absurdity of the definition of a "just war."90 The loss 
of civilian lives, according to Tickner, alone defeats the justification of war and its 
assumption that war is fought to protect the ones (the weak and vulnerable) who cannot 
85 Tickner, J. 1992, 1. 
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protect themselves. War and security within the overarching framework of gender studies 
and feminist theory maintain a fragile position. Tickner, for example, argues that the 
relationship of women, state and security is inherently ambiguous. "Women's space was 
usually inside households, which has been often beyond the reach of law in most 
states."91 Due to the historical exclusion of women from public life, Tickner argues 
further that feminists have to question the construction of a state-centric security and the 
notion of the perpetual peace because it's exclusively "based on the knowledge and 
experience of men." 92 
2. REALISM, FEMINISM, AND RAPE 
To connect rape with securitization, according to Buzan, Security Studies and its 
traditional theoretical frameworks such s Realism and Liberalism have, for the most part, 
ignored rape as a systematic tool of warfare. "Domestic and sexual violence and 
violence against marginalized groups have also been traditionally beyond the gaze of 
security studies, and such concerns are usually given greater salience within discourses of 
human security."94 For decades scholars and governments have bypassed and neglected 
wartime rape as a valid state, national and international security concern. According to 
Barry Buzan, states "have constituted wartime rape as an expectable by-product of 
conquering soldiers."95 
In particular realists have consistently denied legitimacy to the claim of rape as a 
systematic weapon of war, but saw rape rather as natural, exceptional and insular during 
91 Tickner, J. 1996,21. 
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war. As Lene Hansen argued, realists view rape as "predictable and unavoidable,"96 and 
do not think for mass rapes to "constitute a security problem."97 Realists see war time 
rape solely defined as an "individual, not a collective problem."98 
To analyze the symbolic nature of women as victims of mass wartime rape, some 
argue that women serve as a proxy not only as enemies and women, but also as a symbol 
of the nation state. Women are often perceived as the core of the enemy. Feminist 
scholars argue, for example, that by systematically attacking women during conflict, the 
state as an entity is being attacked. Using documentation from World War I, scholars 
Sjoberg and Peet argued in 2011 that "Belligerents attack civilians to attack women to 
attack the essence of the enemy." 99 Also, by expanding on the Clausewitz notion that 
war is only effective if it strategically targets "the center of gravity," some feminist 
scholars see rape of women during war as such center of gravity.100 Clausewitz defines 
such a center of gravity as the "symbolic centers" 101 of a society, the core that 
symbolizes a state and differentiates itself from other states such as its culture, social 
norms, leadership, government, moral compass etc. The Clausewitz analogy is based on 
the argument that effective war defends or attacks such centers of gravity. Other feminist 
scholars see the sheer feminity of women as a convenient target during war. By exploring 
the correlation between Human Rights and Women, for example, feminist International 
Law scholar Hilary Charlesworth argued in 1994 that women are almost by default 
vulnerable during conflict because of their sex, because of them being women.102 
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Many feminists also see systematic wartime rape as a form of "sexualized 
ethnonationalism" that attacks this center of gravity. It attempts to destroy the ideological 
and social heart of the state by attacking, raping and psychologically destroying its 
women. It also feminizes the men of the enemy since they failed to protect their state's 
women, failed to protect the symbolic center of their state.103 Through interviews of 
soldiers, for example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, scholars found that these 
soldiers often expressed their frustration with the failure of their masculinity through 
violence. They seem to exert violence toward women because they were not able to fulfill 
their role as the head of the household their role as a man. This failure, according to some 
scholars, led them to the fulfillment of masculinity in other forms e.g. sexual violence 
during combat. This "manifests itself in a negative and sexualized image of women" 104 
For Tickner, for example, the Bosnian and Rwandan conflicts driven by ethnic 
rivalry, clearly underscored the strategic and systematic nature of sexual violence 
consciously utilized as a weapon of war. 105 Women began to symbolize very drastically 
"the other," the enemy for the opposing military force. And this symbolism ushered in 
"directly or indirectly legitimized sexual savagery beyond the norm in military 
conflict.106 Also Lene Hansen sees a clear correlation and inherent link during the 
Bosnian conflict between national security and gender. "The rapes were subsumed by the 
Bosnian and Serbian governments in a security debate centered on the nation."107 
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3. SECURITIZA TION THEORY AND RAPE 
Feminist scholars find the sheer concept of norms within International Relations 
and its literature problematic. The problem not only includes that norms are gendered, 
constructed by usually masculine actors or masculinity-tainted entities/institutions, but 
they are also are conditioned as to what makes norms possible. These norms are 
conditioned to what interests and ideals are pursued, which actors are powerful and hence 
effective. If we extend this notion to the norms of securitization, gendered norms would 
then define what issues are being securitized and "what counts as a problem, and whose 
1 OS 
voices are represented and marginalized." 
However, Buzan and Waever argued that wartime rape within its theoretical 
context has increasingly been securitized. Women have been increasingly seen as a 
collective body or collective entity that needs to be secured. This securitization triggered 
a shift, reversing rape as an individuality-driven, opportunistic act to a strategic function 
that threatens national/regional security. Categorizing rape and dividing it into "peace­
time" and "war-time" rape, Hansen argues that war-time rape is a threat to collective 
security because it occurs not as a sheer consequence of the behavior of individuals, but 
"it happens as a question of national warfare."109 Since in Bosnia and Rwanda hundred-
thousands of women were primarily raped because of their ethnicity and cultural identity 
and only secondarily because they were women, this de-genderizes them as victims. It 
turns them into a body of individuals and collectively into a strategic war objective. It 
removes them from the assumption that rape was utilized en mass as insular sexual 
assaults. Rather, these assaults targeted them as individuals of one ethnic group and 
108 Tickner, J. Ann and Sjoberg, Laura ed. al. 2011, 76. 
109 Hansen, Lene 2000, 59. 
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therefore made them into a collective strategic objective of war. This separates wartime 
rape from a domestic assault and elevates it to a collective and systematic method of 
warfare. Barry Buzan also argues that the securitization of rape is elevating the act of 
rape not only from a natural/common/opportunistic" occurrence to a systematic tool, but 
turns it into a national and international security issue. By doing so, it likewise also de-
genderizes rape, removes women as "depoliticized" entities and re-establishes them as 
"active agents." 110 
The Bosnia and Rwanda tribunal records also underscore these assertions. In the 
case of Bosnia, for example, the prosecution completely bypassed the issue of rape as a 
pure sexual conduct. It treated the systematic nature of rape as a security issue and as a 
systematic method that received attention by the state as such. Judges, for example, wrote 
that "the increased attention to wartime rape is in part a result of increased attention at the 
national level."111 
E. SECURITIZATION AND ITS CRITICS 
While Securitization Theory has been endorsed by many post-Cold War scholars 
as a valid and effective theory, it has also has encountered its fair share of criticism. 
Criticism, for example, focuses on the theory's shortcomings such as: its Western- and 
Euro-Centrism; its potential of being used (and abused) as a political tool; its state and 
elite centrism and its exclusion of the individual and gender, for example. 
Some critics of Securitization Theory find the concept of securitization too 
Western and Euro-centric and see it as a too culturally homogenous and exclusive 
framework. Such narrow focus, according to many scholars, leaves very little room for 
110 Buzan, Barry and Hansen, Lene 2009, 247. 
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other, non-western views and approaches. Columba Peoples, for example, most recently 
in 2010, questioned the sheer fact of the Western labels being attached to various schools 
of thought that provided the philosophical and intellectual underpinning of Securitization 
Theory: e.g. the "Copenhagen" School (similar to the "English" or the "Welsh" School). 
The theory is western-based, western-funded and is, therefore, viewing and measuring 
security issues from a limited point of view. According to Peoples such restrictive 
approaches raise "valid questions over the role institutional and funding structures play in 
this." 112 Such Western centrism tilts Securitization Theory a certain way and affects (and 
confines) how the theory is applied within a broader global security agenda. Claire 
Wilkinson argued in 2007 that Securitization Theory was inherently unsuited to explain 
conflict beyond Western borders. She based these findings on her unsuccessful 
application of Securitization Theory to explain the overthrow of the Kyrgyzstan 
government in 2005. Wilkinson concludes that the "Westphalian straitjacket," the 
European understanding how politics and the state system is constructed and should 
work, hinders Securitization Theory to be applicable to conflict outside a Western 
periphery. Securitization Theory, according to Wilkinson, is a continuation of such euro-
centrism that "contributes to a portrayal of a situation that is by default cast in Western 
terms."3 
Wilkinson also asserts, for example, that Buzan and Waever apply very exclusive 
and limited Western views when it comes to defining what a nation state means. 
According to Wilkinson, Securitization Theory evaluates identity and society in terms of 
112 Peoples, Columba and Vaughan-Williams, Nick 2010, 10. 
1,3 Wilkinson 2007, 8. 
93 
Western assumptions and is basing it on the "Westphalian notion of the nation state." 114 
Wilkinson argues that Securitization Theory neglects, local culture, relationships and any 
other social particulars, and relies too heavily on the speech act. Such reliance focuses on 
the ability of the object that needs to be secured to voice what it feels and experiences 
e.g. fear. It assumes that one can articulate an existential threat and through such 
articulation can express and ask for securitization. "The central position of speech in the 
School's conceptualization of security thus sets overly restrictive criteria for an analysis 
of security." 115 
The theory's application as to how and when one securitizes an issue or an object 
is also a source of controversy and increasing criticism. Some scholars argue that 
sometimes securitization is being exploited and misused or even over-utilized by elites or 
people in power to achieve very specific political goals. Sometimes extraordinary 
measures are being deployed (for example the invasion of Iraq after the Sept. 11 terrorist 
attacks) in the name of national security, however, such securitization is often utilized to 
serve very different domestic and foreign policy goals (the removal of Saddam Hussein). 
Some scholars argue that the sheer utterance of the word "security" in connection with an 
immediate crisis situation or a political stalemate can we abused as a political vehicle for 
goals that have nothing to do with the core principle of securitization in the first place. 
According to some critics, there are specific "costs" and dangers associated with the 
relatively narrowly defined and applied framework of Securitization Theory. Some 
declare securitization as panic politics that helps leaders to profit from the ambiguous and 
vague assumptions and constructions of what constitutes a threat or not. Baldwin 
1,4 Wilkinson 2007, 11. 
115 Ibid., 12. 
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asserted that "Careless use and abuse of the security concept may already have rendered 
it useless for everyone but the politicians).116 
In less developed countries, for example, domestic politics is often securitized for 
pure political reasons. The call for national security (securitization of a national issue), so 
Buzan, then often becomes a convenient tool to silence oppositions.1,7 To compare, in 
democracies, on the other hand, the act of securitization is usually consistently exposed to 
transparency, pushed into public discourse and open debate. However, democracies are 
not immune to the abuse of securitization either. The creation of an artificial threat also in 
democracies can aid certain elites to keep the population or a particular segment of the 
population in check, to keep its voice politically suppressed and its rights and liberties for 
the sake of national security curtailed. "It is always a political choice to securitize or to 
accept a securitization."118 Securitization can also be over-utilized, used excessively and, 
hence, being abused for various political or other purposes. The speech act and the 
utterance of security buzz words and language in itself can escalate and artificially create 
more or even unwanted securitization. By manipulating and abusing securitization, 
political leaders can in fact create an environment of fear and anxiety and corrupt specific 
political outcomes. "Even when talking security in order to achieve de-securitization, it is 
possible that one contributes to securitization by the very act of producing more security 
talk."119 
Some critics also worry that securitization could, occasionally, be over-utilized. 
The effects of excessive securitization (security dilemmas) or the lack of securitization -
116 Baldwin 1997, 26. 
117 B. W. Buzan 1998, 28. 
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"the inability of handling an issue effectively unless it is securitized." 120 can be 
widespread and effecting entire regions. By citing as examples the former Soviet Union, 
North Korea and Iran, some scholars assert that over-utilization and excessive 
securitization and widening security issues potentially - "stifles civil society, creates an 
intrusive and coercive state, cripples (eventually the economy, and maximizes the 
intensity of the security dilemma with neighbors who do not share the ideological 
project"121 Eriksson also criticized Buzan and Waever to act not like researchers or 
scholars or analysts, but politicians who are "objectifying security, and spreading the 
1 yy 
negative connotations of threats and enemies to new issue areas. 
Some critics see Securitization Theory, similar to the traditional theories of 
Realism and Liberalism, as too state and elite centered and too focused on the state and 
elites as the key objects that need to be secured. Many scholars, for example, argue that 
the notion of authority and its link to successful securitization can cause significant, if not 
corrupt, implications. For example, it leaves securitization and the use of "security 
grammar," which words to use to imply that something needs to be securitized, as an 
exclusive tool of the powerful, the elite. For Waever, this "creates something of an ethical 
i "yx dilemma for the prospective analyst of securitization." 
These converging interests of securitization and elitism not only are most visible 
within the speech act in power politics itself, but transcend into the more fluid worlds of 
gender and culture. Lene Hansen, for example, criticized the focus of Securitization 
Theory on dominant voices. Hansen argues that Securitization is oppressive as it has the 
120 B. W. Buzan 1998, 40. 
121 Eriksson 1999, 316. 
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tendency to privilege the powerful and suppress the weak and/or silent. Hansen argues 
that securitization relies too heavily on the speech act. It relies on the person who 
securitizes to be able to do so, to articulate security concerns. It relies on the ability of 
actors to freely utilize the speech act - to be able to speak. Sometimes victims, according 
to Hansen, in particular of sexual violence, remain silent because of the shame and social 
pressures such violence has caused. Hansen criticizes Buzan and Weaver for not offering 
an alternative to the speech act for those victims who have to remain silent e.g. also HIV 
infected people. "Reliance on speech act theory presupposes the existence of a situation 
in which speech is indeed possible."124 
According to Hansen, Buzan's speech act argument bypasses the issue of gender 
and does not provide measures in particular in countries where gender disables people of 
speaking of security. Using, for example, the honor killings in Pakistan, where often girls 
and women are being killed for bringing dishonor to one's family or village, Hansen 
argues that Securitization Theory discriminates against women.125 Women in many 
developing countries, for example, are not able to claim security and to effectively attach 
the security label to a threat. Hansen calls this the "silent security dilemma."126 Such a 
silent security dilemma occurs when the object that needs to be secured is unable to speak 
of its insecurity. The security issue is not only being oppressed, but in fact aggravates 
exactly the opposite: securitization becomes insecurity and turns into a threat. For 
example, Hansen argues that a HIV infection could cause societal pressure and 
ostracizing or even punishment in some communities. This is when the call for 
124 Hansen, Lene 2000, 285. 
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securitization, when speaking about one's HIV infection is reversed and turned into a 
threat to the community. This is when securitization becomes insecurity.127 
Additionally to the speech act as centrally utilized in Securitization Theory, other 
critics of the theory see the complexity of the women identity (gender linked to ethnicity 
or religion, for example) as difficult to grasp within the securitization framework. "This 
multidimensionality of identities makes gender a tough fit the Copenhagen School's 
qualification of referent object." 128 
Critical theorists such as Kenneth Booth criticize the marginalized role of the 
individual within the Copenhagen School. According to Booth, the Securitization Theory 
1 ">0 does not move far enough into the direction of "real people in real places. The 
exclusion of the individual as an object that needs to be secured provides for a weak and 
unreliable theoretical framework. Also, the connection of security and survival implies 
state and elite centric roots.130 Booth also deems the Copenhagen School as politically 
passive (neither progressive nor radical), conservative and dominated by elite 
discourse.131 Richard Wyn Jones, likewise, argues that the title of Buzan's "People, 
States and Fear" should not include "people" because "Buzan's broadening only 
accounted for the ways in which non-military issues such as environmental degradation 
and economic crisis might threaten the state"132 and completely bypassed the individual. 
Similarly, Bill McSweeney also very heavily criticizes Securitization Theory for not 
going after the intellectual heart of hearts of security: the human being. McSweeney 
127 Hansen, Lene 2000,286. 
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129 Booth, Kenneth 2005, 366. 
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argued that "security must make sense at the basic level of the individual human being 
for it to make sense at the international level.133 
To diffuse some of these arguments, Weaver contended that focusing on the 
individual would expand the securitizing principles too far. It would turn everything into 
a threat and a security issue. Such indiscriminate inclusiveness would render these 
security issues meaningless. "The concept of security becomes all-inclusive and is 
thereby emptied of content." 134 Waever also argues against including individual security 
as an aspect of Securitization, rendering it "impractical for the purposes of analysis.135 
Some scholars claim that security issues and securitization in general deals with urgency 
and secrecy that involves only a small pool of actors. Since only a few contribute to the 
political debate about how one issue should be addressed and securitized, such logic is 
not consistent with the principles of liberal democratic politics. It mutes the voices of the 
majority by adhering to the rules of the few. Also, other critics such as Williams (2003) 
advocate for expanding the scope of the speech act to include visuals and images 
(internet, television and photography). Further, some critics argue for greater focus on 
"the key role played by security experts and institutions in securitization"136 and see the 
need for the speech act to "be supplemented by awareness that audience, political agency 
I "*7 
and context are crucial to successful securitization." 
133 Booth, Kenneth 2005, 225. 
134 Waever 1995,49. 
135 Peoples, Columba and Vaughan-Williams, Nick 2010, 82. 
136 Ibid., 86. 
137 Peoples, Columba and Vaughan-Williams, Nick 2010, 86 
99 
CHAPTER IV 
SECURITIZATION OF RAPE - THE APPLICATION: CASE STUDY I BOSNIA 
A. INTRODUCTION: 
In the 1990s the Bosnian War emerged as an unparalleled conflict in many ways. 
When NATO in February 1994 shot down four Serbian planes over Bosnian airspace, the 
world witnesses the first use of force of the transatlantic alliance since its creation in 
1949. When reports about rape camps, forced impregnation and the systematic rape of 
Bosnian Muslim women first surfaced, the sheer barbarism about these acts seemed 
incompatible with a globalized community at the advent of the 21th century. After the 
Srebrenica massacre in July 1995, genocide and the ghosts of the Holocaust had officially 
returned to the European continent. 
Most significantly, however, Bosnia made its mark as the conflict that 
transformed how the international community with its institutions and legal mechanisms 
interprets wartime rape. Bosnia brought the haunting images of systematic rape and rape 
as a relentless and gruesome weapon of war into people's living room. And into 
international institutions' assembly halls. Mass rape during war began to step outside of 
its for centuries established periphery. With the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia the mass rapes in Bosnia evolved and became internationally 
recognized crimes against humanity and war crimes against international law. And with 
the 2001 conviction of three Bosnian Serbs Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, the Tribunal 
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underscored this historical evolution holding for the first time in history perpetrators 
accountable for rape during war.1 
The objectives of mass rape during the Bosnia conflict were genocide, territorial, 
political and social gains. The constant psychological terror of rape aims to 
systematically destroy communities and to paralyze and dismantle local governmental 
authorities, institutions, and structures. It eventually progresses toward a strategic goal of 
territorial gains as the lack of security drives the terrorized population to abandon its 
villages. They become refugees and settle somewhere else for security. According to 
Tribunal testimony, Beverly Allen describes the methodical act of rape with the strategic 
goal of territorial gain as follows: Serbian forces enter a village and rape several women 
in public view. The now terrorized population is then promised to be able to leave the 
village safely, under the condition they will never return to the village. A strategic plan, 
which during the trials was referred to as the Ram or Brana Plan, specifically defines 
assaults against women and children as an effective military policy to gain territory and 
"to provoke the spontaneous flight of many communities. During the Foca trial, the 
prosecutor Ryneveld successfully argued that rape in Bosnia was used as a method of 
terror and humiliation "with the goal of setting examples and getting Muslim residents to 
permanently leave the area."4 
Rape has also taken center stage as a systematic tool to psychologically rip apart 
the structural fabric of a society, to damage and erase the patriarchal culture and 
structure/fabric as husbands, brothers and fathers are often forced to witness the rapes of 
1ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sections/Aboutthe ICTY 2011. 
2 Allen, Beverly 1996, 62. 
3 Ibid., 57. 
4 Hagan, John 2003, 187. 
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their wives, sisters and daughters. As men are emasculated and paralyzed into watching 
the sexual assault of the female population, they are being stripped of their masculinity 
and their masculine "instinct" to protect. Scholars have argued that in particular in Balkan 
patriarchy the failure of the Bosnian men to protect their women from rape has 
demoralized the Bosnian masculinity and this failure "to control their sexual and 
procreative powers" has become "a critical symptom of weakness."5 Further, in particular 
Muslim men in Bosnia felt responsibility toward the exposure and vulnerability of 
women. This became "religious and social concerns of Muslim men for the women and 
children of their families," "the whole community was then vulnerable to being 
manipulated through these concerns of its men" and the concerns of the Muslim fathers, 
husbands, and brothers in turn become concerns about "the future of the community"6 
Claudia Card also argued in a 2003 paper that the social death of victims - she defines 
social death as the loss of social vitality and standing due to the loss of social identity - is 
central to genocide, regardless whether or not genocide resulted in homicide.7 This 
D 
separates the initial definition of genocide from the context of mass killings and allows 
for the conceptualization of mass rapes in Bosnia as genocide (with women and men 
suffering a social death). 
The influx of children originating from genocidal rape "could cause social chaos 
to the extent of destroying the culture and institutions of a society." 9 Mass rape and 
enforced pregnancy due to the imposed trauma and terror on a community, hence, could 
reduce or even erase an entire generation and "might actually lead to physical destruction 
5 Hansen, Lene 2000, 66. 
6 Card, Claudia 2008, 177. 
7 Ibid., 182. 
8 Cudd, Ann E. 2008, 191. 
9 Ibid., 193. 
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of the community." 10 Such communal destruction is fueled not only by the sheer horror 
of rape and the sexual strategic oppression of the female population, but in general by the 
multi-ethnic identity and inclusive rather than exclusive (heterogeneous, not 
homogeneous) nature of Bosnian Muslims. This identity was not only based on 
"ethnicity, but upon a multi-ethnic way of life."11 After ethnic cleansing, this inherent 
identity trait could be almost possible to recover. 
B. THE CONFLICT 
The Bosnian War was a conflict of its time. It erupted from the political and 
ethnical rubbles of the Cold War and it made its mark in history as the conflict that 
returned the term genocide to European soil. 
Yugoslavia, a patchwork of regions and ethnicities since 1918, dissolved with the 
Soviet Union in 1991. In its wake, it left its six republics - Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Montenegro - struggling to find their own 
political destinies. In 1991, wealthy regions such as Croatia and then Slovenia quickly 
declared their independence. In 1992, Serbia and Montenegro merged and created the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.12 Ethnical enclaves within the Serbian territory such as 
Kosovo and Vojvodina became autonomous provinces.13 Likewise, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Macedonia pushed for independence. Serbian nationalism and its claim 
of regional supremacy proved troublesome. Already in the 1980s, Yugoslavian president 
Slobodan Milosevic, a Serb, emerged in the Balkans as a stern promoter of "Serbian 
10 Cudd, Ann E. 2008, 193. 
11 Weine 1999, 15. 
12 Ching, Jacqueline 2009,9. 
13 Appendix I Timeline about the Bosnian Conflict 1992-2008. 
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nationalism."14 The looming Bosnian independence in 1992 seemed a slap in the face of 
the Serbian ambition for a Greater Serbia. In 1991, Bosnia and Herzegovina accounted 
for 44 percent Muslims, 31 percent Serbs and 17 percent Croats.15 The collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire with the two Balkan Wars in 1912 to 1913 brought about the influx of 
Islam in parts of Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 16 In January 1992, Serbian forces and 
the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) pushed against Bosnian independence and 
announced after a military intervention the Serbian Republic of Bosnia. In February and 
March 1992 Bosnian Muslims and Croats officially voted for their independence, while 
Serbs in Bosnia boycotted the referendum.17 The tensions between Bosnian Muslims and 
Serbs in the region began to escalate into a full-fledged civil war after the European 
Community and the United States in April 1992 officially recognized the independence 
of The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic 
shelled Sarajevo, captured the city and declared it the capital of the new Serb Republic. 
From 1992 through 1995, the conflict saw the largest human slaughter on the 
European continent and first genocide since the end of World War II. Starting in 1994, 
NATO authorized aerial bombardments eventually forced the Serbian army out of 
Bosnian territory. In July 1995 Serbian forces invaded Srebrenica, one of six declared 
U.N. "safe areas," slaying all of its Muslim men. Later, the Srebrenica mass killings of 
8,000 men will officially be declared genocide, the first of such account since the 
Holocaust during World War II. In November 1995, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, 
Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic came to a 
14 Appendix I Timeline about the Bosnian Conflict 1992-2008. 
15 Ching, Jacqueline 2009, 10. 
16 Buzan, Barry and Waever, Ole; 2003, 380. 
17 Reuters 2008. 
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peace agreement in Dayton, Ohio. The consequent Dayton Peace Accord of Dec. 14, 
1995 divided the disputed territories into Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbian states.18 It also 
brought about the presence of 66,000 NATO peacekeeping troops. In February 2002, 
Milosevic was charged with numerous counts of genocide and war crimes. Karadzic was 
captured and charged with genocide in 2008.19 Eventually, the war would cost 200,000 
lives, injuring several hundred-thousand including 50,000 children, systematically raping 
at least 20,000 Muslim women and sparking the largest refugee crisis throughout the 
European continent since World War II.20 Bosnia still today is struggling with its past. 
An International Crisis Group asserted in a report in 2001 that Balkan states in general 
still wrangle with having efficient institutions and political structures in place, which t 
allow for a well-functioning and reasonably corrupt-free political system. After the 
dissolution of the State of Yugoslavia were "dominated by the expectation that public 
office and state-dominated assets should and will be exploited as a source of power and 
patronage."21 As of September 2011, there are 10,000 people missing related to the 
Bosnian conflict.22 
C. THE CASE STUDY 
Through the application of the Securitization Theory, the study of the Bosnian 
War allows us to investigate the development of securitization of rape during the conflict. 
The issue or the referent object that seeks securitization during the conflict are Bosnian 
Muslim women. I am proposing that the securitizing actors during the Bosnia conflict 
need to be divided into external and internal securitizing actors. These actors either 
18 Appendix I Timeline about the Bosnian Conflict 1992-2008. 
19 Reuters 2008. 
20 Center for Balkan Development 1996. 
21 International Crisis Group 2001, 15. 
22 European Commission Staff 2011,22. 
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securitized or significantly influenced securitization from the outside (externally) or 
inside (internally) the former Yugoslavian territory. A securitizing actor is someone (an 
entity or mechanism or influential leadership) who is declaring that something is a threat 
to the object's survival. A securitizing actor is also an entity or mechanism that is 
articulating the speech act and by doing so, is attaching the word "security" to an issue. 
Such securitizing actors - in general - could include the state, individual political leaders; 
individuals within different forms of bureaucracies and agencies; governments; lobbyists; 
civil society. These actors speak on behalf of something/someone whose survival and 
sheer existence is threatened. 
As external actors of securitizing rape as a systematic tool of war during the 
Bosnian conflict, I am examining the involvement of International Institutions, which 
includes various entities of the United Nations e.g. the Security Council, the UN Higher 
Commissioner of Refugees and U.N. international law entities such as the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 
Other external actors are also the International Media, which includes accounts 
collected by representatives of the international media; Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) and Transnational Networks (TANs), which includes the Red Cross, Human 
Rights Watch, Amnesty International and other non-governmental and transnational 
actors and agents; and the state, which the United States and the European 
Community/Union and other European states as individual countries, which securitized 
or effectively influenced securitization. 
As internal actors and agents, I am examining the involvement of the State - or 
entities that resembled something functionally similar to what is commonly understood as 
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the state. In the case of Bosnia, these actors are the representatives of the newly declared 
state of Bosnia and the Serbian state. This category includes actors and agents of the 
political regimes in power and opposition leaders, who securitized rape during the 
conflict. 
I will examine how these actors securitized rape as a systematic tool of war 
through the securitization mechanism/method of the speech act (someone says the word 
"security) and through other rhetorical measures/images, which also effectively 
articulated the speech act. While focusing on the speech act from the actors' perspective, 
I will then outline how securitization has been implemented by the audience through the 
deployment of commitments, legal measurers and resources. An audience is an entity or a 
body of authoritative and legitimate units (institutions, NGOs, alliance, hegemonic 
leadership) that not only accept securitization from the securitizing actor, but initiates and 
deploys actions. In the conclusion of the chapter, the following actor/audience matrix will 
then summarize the different mechanisms/methods and deployed measurers. 
This part of the case study is therefore divided into Speaking of Rape and in the 
later part Securitization through Audience Deployment of Extraordinary Measurers. This 
is important to point out, because, the International tribunals, for example, "speak of 
rape" as a security issue in their initial statutes, but deploy measurers only later in this 
case study through the actual convictions and various rulings. 
107 
TABLE 1. ACTOR AND AUDIENCE MATRIX BOSNIA I: 
Actors 
Audience 
The State incl. 
Political 
Opposition 
Intl. Institutions NGOs / TANs / 
Civil Society 











D. SPEAKING OF RAPE: SECURITIZATION THROUGH THE SPEECH 
ACT 
I. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
The 1980s saw gradual shifts of the ideological fault lines, which had underscored 
the Cold War for more than four decades. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union began 
to soften toward the West. Soon the thawing and the subsequent end of the Cold War 
ushered in an array of multilateral efforts. International institutions such as the United 
Nations began to take center stage at the front of global conflict resolution by revitalizing 
global UN peacekeeping efforts. While Margaret Thatcher, for example, had argued for a 
more unilateral take to resolve the 1990-91 Gulf War,23 then US President George H. 
Bush and his advisors such as James Baker advocated for a multi-nation alliance against 
Iraq, underwritten by the UN. Consequently, UN Resolutions 678 condemned the Iraq 
invasion of Kuwait and endorsed the multilateral use of force. In the wake of such multi­
lateral efforts, the definition and parameters of international security took on new 
dimensions. For example, in 1992, the UN Security Council resolution 688 condemned 
Saddam Hussein's terror against Iraq's citizens in particular the Kurdish minority 
population in the north. This was unique because it marked the first time for the UN to 
call out such oppression of an internal actor (Kurdish minority) as a threat to international 
security.24 
However, the mid 1990s brought about four key failures of UN peacekeeping: 
Angola, Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda. The Bosnia conflict in particular with its ethnic 
and religious entanglement and the involvement of UN peacekeeping troops 
23 Thatcher, Margaret 1993, 826-8. 
24 Dannreuther, Roland 2007, 150. 
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(UNPROFOR) proved too complex against the backdrop of a new generation of brutal 
warfare that left "little or no regard for humanitarian principles."25 
The Bosnian conflict became the first European test case of the new post Cold 
War security environment. It revealed the many ailments of the international institutions, 
immature and ill prepared to function effectively without the clear bi-polar Cold War 
structures. It brought about the realization within the international community how its 
institutions lacked mechanisms and the political will to function as effective 
peacemaking or peacekeeping instruments. 
During the increasing escalation of tensions in the Balkans the UN was not able to 
function effectively without NATO. Additionally the Bosnian conflict also produced 
security challenges with regional and international implications. It triggered one of the 
largest refugee crises in the heart of Europe since World War II, which was seen as a 
"politico-strategic threat to regional and international security."26 It also perpetuated an 
increasing fear that the "cycle of ethnic cleansing and communal violence" which 
included rape could spread throughout the Balkans. Additionally, the inconsistency 
between Europe and the U.S. how to resolve the conflict causes a rift in the transatlantic 
relationship. 
a) THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 
With fighting of Serbian forces and Bosnian militants ensuing in April 1992, the 
U.N. Security Council with its Resolution 752 of May 15, 1992 for the first time 
mentioned its concern about the "rapid and violent deterioration of the situation in Bosnia 
25 Dannreuther, Roland 2007, 151. 
26 Ibid., 153. 
27 Ibid., 153. 
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and Herzegovina. The speech act of securitization of rape, however, and the mentioning 
of rape specifically as one of the key atrocities committed during the conflict for the first 
time does not appear until the passing of U.N. Security Council resolution 808 on Feb. 
22, 1993. With this resolution the Council formally established the International Criminal 
Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia. 
A report attached to the resolution mentioned for the first time to allegations of 
atrocities committed against Muslim women in Bosnia. Referring to a European 
Community investigation, the resolution included the following passage, 
Noting also with grave concern the "report of the European Community 
investigative mission into the treatment of Muslim women in the former 
Yugoslavia" (S/25240, annex I),29 
On May 2, 1993 the U.N. Security Council report of the Secretary-General, 
according to paragraph 2 of resolution 808, outlined the statue of the ICTY. While the 
report in its introductory paragraph 6 mentioned these detailed crimes and atrocities, 
especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including reports of mass forcible 
expulsion and deportation of civilians, imprisonment and abuse of civilians in 
detention centres, deliberate attacks on non-combatants, hospitals and 
ambulances, impeding the delivery of food and medical supplies to the civilian 
population, and wanton devastation and destruction of property.30 
it fails to mention rape. Only in the statute's paragraph 9, rape is mentioned for the first 
time. 
By letter dated 9 February 1993, the Secretary-General submitted to the President 
of the Security Council an interim report of the Commission of Experts 
(S/25274), which concluded that grave breaches and other violations of 
international humanitarian law had been committed in the territory of the former 
28 United Nations Security Council 1992, 1. 
29 ICTY, http://www.icty.Org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_808_1993_en.pdf 1993,2. 
30 icyy, http://www.icty.Org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_re808_1993_en.pdf 1993, 3. 
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Yugoslavia, including willful killing, "ethnic cleansing," mass killings, torture, 
rape, pillage and destruction of civilian property, destruction of cultural and 
religious property, destruction of cultural and religious property and arbitrary 
arrests.31 
Below the statute of the ICTY specifically for the first time included rape as a 
crime against humanity. Furthermore, in paragraph 10, the report calls these human rights 
violations in Bosnia "a threat to international peace and security," as the below 
paragraph points out and, therefore, connects rape as one of many violations, which are 
threatening international security: 
The Council determined that this situation constituted a threat to international 
peace and security, and stated that it was determined to put an end to such crimes 
and to take effective measurers to bring to justice the persons who are responsible 
for them.32 
The statute's articles 2 and 4 refer to repeated grave breaches according to the 
-5 •J 
1949 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Article 
4 defines genocide as acts "committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group."34 Investigating the relationship between rape 
and genocide during the Bosnian conflict, some scholars concluded from this definition 
that raping a person in order to erase and destroy one's ethnicity, can constitute genocide 
"if at least one of the additional elements, such as causing serious bodily or mental harm 
can be established."35 When rape and sexual violence are committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, such acts can 
constitute an element of genocide/ethnic cleansing, for example through forced 
impregnation. 
31 ICTY, 1993,4. 
32 Ibid., 4. 
33 Ibid., 12. 
34 Ibid., 12. 
35 Askin 1997, 393. 
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Paragraph 48 of the Tribunal's statute confirms such interpretation. It refers to 
crimes against humanity as "inhumane acts of a very serious nature" and names torture or 
rape "committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian 
population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds."36 Paragraph 48 
concludes that such inhuman acts not only included ethnic cleansing, but also the 
"widespread and systematic rape and other forms of sexual assault, including enforced 
prostitution." 37 
On July 31,2003 with the Stakic case, the Tribunal pointed specifically to this 
particular phrase "causing serious bodily and mental harm," which, according to the 
ICTY statute, ought to be understood to include inhumane or degrading treatment, 
including sexual violence and rape. Article 5 of the Tribunal Statute, according to UN 
Security Council resolution 8080, then specifies rape as one of nine crimes against 
humanity, including rape,38 
Article 5 
Crimes against Humanity 
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible 
for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or 








h) Persecution on political, racial and religious grounds; 
i) Other inhuman acts; 
36 ICTY, 1993, 13. 
37 Ibid., 13. 
38 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of genocide.Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro. 2007. 
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On April 17, 1993, UN Security Council resolution 820 in paragraph 6 for the 
first time mentioned the systematic nature of rape utilized during the conflict. In this 
paragraph for the first time the UN refers to "the massive, organized and systematic 
detention and rape of women"39 and links it to the violations of international 
humanitarian law, see below: 
Condemns once again all violations of international humanitarian law, including 
the particular the practice of "ethnic cleansing" and the massive, organized and 
systematic detention and rape of women, and reaffirms that those who commit or 
have committed or order or have ordered the commission of such acts will be held 
individually responsible in respect of such acts; 
It repeats the terminology of "systematic detention and rape of women" in 
paragraph 11 of the introduction of the report - and hence the notion of a systematic and 
organized fashion that drove the mass rapes during conflict, see below: 
The Secretary-General wishes to recall that in resolution 820 (1993) of 17 April 
1993, the Security Council condemned once again all violations of international 
humanitarian law, including in particular, the practice of "ethnic cleaning" and the 
massive, organized and systematic detention and rape of women, and reaffirmed 
that those who commit or have committed or order or have ordered the 
commission of such acts will be held individually responsible in respect of such 
acts.40 
The establishment of the connection between ethnic cleansing and rape, the 
articulation of rhetoric such as "massive", " organized" and "systematic detention" as a 
reference point for the systematic utilization of rape here articulated to the Secretary-
General clearly sense of urgency and severe violations. It securitized rape. The report 
also points to the systematic nature of rape administrated, orchestrated and utilized by 
entities of authority. Many of these rapes "seem to be part of an overall pattern."41 This 
pattern then was described as, for example, to displace residents from their homes, to 
39 ICTY, 1993,4. 
40ICTY, 1993. 
41 United Nations Commission on Human Rights 1993,9. 
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perpetrate shame and humiliation onto the rape victims and her community. Further the 
rapes in detention facilities, according to the report, have been often underwritten by "a 
systematic rape policy" and "a level of organization" that existed in certain parts of the 
conflict.42 
During the Bosnia conflict, more than 20,00043 women were raped, some of those 
impregnated and held captive in numerous camps spread throughout the region until an 
abortion was impossible. Such forced impregnation, systematically implemented through 
these rape camps, emerges as the key tool in ethnic cleansing. Women were raped by 
Serbian soldiers "to give birth to little Chetniks/Serb soldiers.44 Feminist scholars such as 
Allen and Askin in 1998 created new terms such as "Genocidal rape," "ethnorape" or 
"femicide" in connection with the central objective of forced impregnation/eradication of 
the victim's cultural and ethnic identity. While this notion is biologically/genetically 
flawed (the child will have the genetic mix/build-up of the Bosnian mother and the 
Serbian father), nevertheless, this illogic fueled the cleansing process, according to Allen. 
b) UNITED NA TIONS SECURITY COUNCIL'S COMMISSION OF EXPERTS 
With resolution 780 of Oct. 6, 1992, the U.N. Security Council established "as a 
matter of urgency" an impartial commission of Experts to investigate violations of 
International Humanitarian Law in the former Yugoslavia. Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni 
became the chairman of the Commission and the Commission's Special Rapporteur from 
1992 - 1993. In a final report published Dec. 28, 1994, Bassiouni saw a correlation 
42United Nations Commission on Human Rights 1993, 9. 
43 Ibid., 22. 
44 Allen, Beverly 1996,96. 
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between "paramilitary activity and reports of rape and sexual assault, detention facilities, 
and mass graves." 45 
Involvement of paramilitary groups in the commission of grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law is 
alleged in the vast majority of the reports in which paramilitary groups are 
mentioned. The most frequently reported violations are the killing of civilians, 
torture, rape, destruction of property, and looting. 32/ there is also a strong 
correlation between reports of paramilitary activity and reports of rape and sexual 
assault, detention facilities, and mass graves. These types of activities (i.e. 
paramilitary activity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions) tended to 
occur in the same counties 33/ and evidence of localized nature of the activity.46 
In this final 1994 report, Bassiouni securitizes rape by establishing parallels 
between sexual assaults and conventional and strategic war objectives. In his report he 
links sexual assault with mass casualties of war, with "the bombardment of cities, the 
destruction of mosques and churches"47 linked to the method of ethnically "cleansing" 
territory, to kill or deport Muslim populations from a specific territory 
While Bosnian Muslims forces have engaged in practices that constitute "grave 
breaches" of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international 
humanitarian law, they have not engaged in "ethnic cleansing" operations. The 
vast majority of reports alleging "ethnic cleansing" operations involved Serbian 
forces who have used means, such as the mass killing of civilians, torture, sexual 
assault, the bombardment of cities, the destruction of mosques and churches, and 
other practices to eliminate Muslim and Croat populations that lie within Serb-
claimed territory. 48 
In the next excerpt, Bassiouni repeatedly injects the word "terror" in his 1994 
report. By setting rape equal to institutionalized terror, he portrays rape as a mechanism 
for the Serbs to gain territory, 
Thus, Serb officials relied on the use of terror, entailing mass killings, torture, 
rapes, and prison camps to eradicate the non-Serb population. The non-Serbs had 
45 United Nations Security Council Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni 1994, 15. 
46 Ibid., 15. 
47 Ibid., 15. 
48 Ibid., 17. 
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to be sufficiently terrorized to ensure that they would flee the area and never 49 
return. 
The report asserts the existence of detention facilities for the sole purpose to 
perpetrate sexual violence. Wordage such as "detention facilities" and its linkage to rape 
and sexual abuse inherently connect rape to a systematic method of war. By doing so, 
Bassiouni frames the systematic nature of rape during the Bosnian conflict as a security 
issue. 
Those women and children detained were also subjected to the worst kinds of 
abuse, including rape and other sexual assaults. There are reports of many 
detention facilities in existence of the sole purpose of holding women and girls for 
rape and sexual entertainment. There are numerous allegations of rape at camps 
wherever women and girls were held. Captors reportedly rape female prisoners in 
front of other prisoners. Those who resisted, were often reportedly killed or 
otherwise brutalized, often in the presence of others. There were also reports of 
the sexual abuse of men, as well as castration and mutilation of sex organs.50 
The 124-page Annex IX to Bassiouni's 1994 report has been specifically 
dedicated to rape and sexual assault during the conflict. The information, collected 
through field investigation and interviews, accounts for only 1,100 reported case of rape 
and sexual assault, with 800 names and 1,800 rape victims not identified. However, the 
report estimates of more than 10,000 rape victims. The following 162 rape camps were 
named in the report, 
There are about 162 detention sites in the former Yugoslavia where people were 
detained and sexually assaulted: 
a) 88 of those are reportedly run by Serbs; 
b) 35 are run by unknown forces; 
c) 17 are allegedly run by Croats; 
d) 14 are allegedly run by Muslims and Croat forces together; 
e) 8 are reportedly run by Muslims.51 
49 United Nations Security Council Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni 1994, 21. 
50 Ibid., 50. 
51 Ibid., 71. 
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The choice of words such as "detention sites" again alludes to the security aspect 
and systematic nature of rape. According to Bassiouni, the systematic rape and sexual 
assault campaign during the Bosnia conflict followed five very specific patterns. These 
included using rape as an intimidation and terror mechanism and as aid in looting and 
gaining territory.52 This last assertion clearly links rape to one of the key objectives of 
war: to secure and control territory. Such findings securitize rape as an effective and 
methodological tool of war. 
Other objectives of rape, according to the report, included prostitution for the 
purpose of providing instant sexual gratification for soldiers. The report also stated that 
some rapes occurred just as a common side effect of general fighting; other times rape 
was specifically implemented to humiliate community and displace certain segments of 
the population. Also, according to the report, some male perpetrators said they have been 
ordered to rape.53 This assertion would underscore the findings that military and political 
leaders did know about the mass rapes, if not indeed ordered them or at least did not stop 
them. Scholars have identified the mass rape and forced impregnation of Muslim Bosnian 
women as "rape on order", a "standard tactic of war" with a distinct "political purpose" to 
cleanse the Bosnian population, for example.54 Additionally, victims have also often been 
told they will be raped to "bear children of perpetrator's ethnicity." These assertions link 
these rape cases to forced impregnation as a mechanism of ethnic cleansing. According to 
the Bassiouni report, soldiers would tell the victims that they have to carry on with the 
pregnancies until it's too late to abort them. The report concludes that many of the rape 
cases display an organized, 
52 United Nations Security Council Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni 1994, 3. 
53 United Nations Security Council Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni 1994, 74. 
54 Allen, Beverly 1996, 95. 
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Perpetrators tell female victims that they will bear children of the perpetrator's 
ethnicity, that the perpetrators were ordered to rape and sexually assault them, or 
that, if the victims ever tell anyone or anyone discovers what has happened, the 
perpetrators will hunt them down and kill them;55 
The report also asserts that rapes predominantly occurred in detention camps. For 
example, out of 1,000 rape cases 600 occurred in these detention facilities. The report 
asserts that "these patterns strongly suggest that a systematic rape and sexual assault 
policy exists, but this remains to be proven." 
Some of the reported rape and sexual assault cases are clearly the result of 
individual or small group conduct without evidence of command direction or on 
overall policy. However, many more cases seem to be part of an overall pattern. 
These patterns strongly suggest that a systematic rape and sexual assault policy 
exists, but this remains to be proved. It is clear that some level of organization and 
group activity is required to carry out many of the alleged rapes and sexual 
assaults.56 
Later, Bassiouni, and the Commission's Special Rapporteur on Gathering and 
Analysis of the Facts from 1992-1993 developed a video database - today known as the 
Bassiouni Report - that keeps the accounts of people testifying about the Bosnian rape 
camps, the torture and genocide.57 According to the 1994 report, the majority of the 
rapes happened during the time period March 1992 to November 1992. The report 
became a testimony of the impact of the atrocities committed during the conflict. The 
report found, for example, that between 1991 and 1993 the Muslim population, for 
example, in the region of Prijedor shrank from about 50,000 to only about 8,000.58 
c) UNITED NA TIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
55 Allen, Beverly 1996, 75. 
56 Ibid., 75. 
57 United Nations Security Council Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni 1994, 6. 
58 Ibid., 22. 
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In August 1992 the UN Commission on Human Rights asked for a special 
rapporteur to be appointment to investigate the allegation of potential human rights 
violations in Bosnia. Special Rapporteur Tadeusz Mazowiecki will consequently write 17 
reports from 1992 to July 1995, when he resigned, outlining an horrific array of atrocities 
and human rights violations in Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. 
These reports were made available to the Secretary-General, the Security Council and to 
the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.59 
Mazowiecki first reported Nov. 17, 1992 about "rape as a feature of ethnic 
cleansing."60 In its fourth report on Feb. 10, the Commission consequently elaborated on 
the allegations of widespread rape cases and asked for a team of experts to investigate 
these allegations.61 
On June 30, 1993 the Commission on Human Rights (in its 15th session, 
regarding item 12 of the provisional agenda) issued a report exclusively dedicated to the 
issue of rape and abuse of women in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. 
Between June 29 and July 1993, a special investigation team consisting of 
Canadian military personnel, two Canadian military policy investigators and a Canadian 
military lawyer,62 was tasked to gathered information about the alleged mass rapes. The 
team consisted of two Canadian military policy investigators and a Canadian military 
lawyer.63 
Eventually, most of the information collected by the team came from the 
established War Crimes Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its database listed 105 
59 United Nations Secretary-General 1995. 
60 Tadeusz Mazowiecki 1995, 22. 
61 Ibid., 22. 
62 United Nations Security Council Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni 1994, 77. 
63 Ibid., 77. 
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rape cases and included the names of the alleged perpetrators. However, the report 
concluded that such a minute "pilot study" was not practicable to gather precise 
information." 64 
With its resolution 1993/8 of February 1993, the Commission on Human Rights 
"strongly condemned the abhorrent practice of rape and abuse of women and children" 
and set out six demands to stop such abuses.65 The resolution introduced for the first time 
aggressive rhetoric, comparing rape as a "deliberate weapon of war in fulfilling the policy 
of ethnic cleansing carried out by the Serbian forces." U.N. General Assembly resolution 
47/121 of Dec. 18,1992 had already classified ethnic cleansing as a form of genocide. 
Following the June 30, 1993 report, the special rapporteur emphasized on the importance 
to investigate the allegations about widespread rape of women and children, 
The Special Rapporteur continues to place high priority on the question of the 
rape and abuse of women and children, as well as on the physical and mental 
rehabilitation of victims.66 
The Special Rapporteur office was expanded and increased to five staff members 
at the Zagreb office. The report also cited the need for resources including funds to work 
with local organizations, government departments, international agencies and a 
psychologist to attend to the many rape victims.67 The report further pointed to the need 
to create a record of the victims through interviews and testimonies. 
In the same report, the commission asserted further that that rape "constitutes an 
extremely grave violation of international humanitarian law" as outlined by the Geneva 
64 United Nations Security Council Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni 1994,6. 
65 United Nations Commission on Human Rights 1993, 3. 
66 Ibid., 3. 
67 Ibid., 5. 
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Convention Article 27,68 reintegrated that not only the perpetrators need to be held 
responsible, "urged States members of the United Nations to exert every effort to bring to 
justice all those individuals directly or indirectly involved in these outrageous 
international crimes."69 
Further, the Special Rapporteur pointed specifically to rape as a weapon for ethnic 
cleansing and connected the utilization of rape to political and military leadership as 
follows: 
The Special Rapporteur concluded in his report to the Commission on Human 
Rights at its forty-nine sessions (para. 62) that rape that been used as an 
instrument of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia. 
Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur has stated that he is not aware of any 
attempts by those in positions of power, either military or political, to stop the 
rapes (para. 60). Therefore, in accordance with the Special Rapporteur's 
recommendation (para. 72), those who committed rape, those who ordered it, or 
those in positions of authority who failed to prevent it should be held accountable 
and brought to justice.70 
d) OTHER UNITED NATIONS ENTITIES AND ACTIONS OF SPEECH 
In early 1992, UN workers in Bosnia had informed their superiors about the 
existence of concentration camps. A memo written by a UN staffer located in a Serbian-
controlled territory in Croatia points how a soccer field was converted into a "holding 
round where Muslim groups are detained while their houses are being 'searched,' the 
men isolated and transported to concentration camps."71 The memo identifies the camps 
in Keraterm, Trnopolje, Omarska and Manjaca as "reported concentration camps." The 
characteristics of calling these facilities "concentration camps" associated these camps 
immediately with the Holocaust and the Nazi regime during World War II. Linking the 
68 United Nations Commission on Human Rights 1993, 6. 
69 Ibid., 6. 
70 Ibid., 6. 
71 Helsinki Watch 1992, 7. 
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Serbian camps publically to the imagery of Nazi-like atrocities as a speech act creates a 
sense of urgency, an environment of crisis mode and international outrage. The report 
also writes of atrocities committed at the concentration camps by Serbian soldiers and of 
the increasingly deteriorating conditions at the camps, affecting the United Nations 
peacekeeping mission. 
The report also alludes to a growing sense of frustration among UN personnel 
with the institutions ineffectiveness. "Our frustration arises from our inability to do 
anything other than write reports and stand by since UNPROPFOR has no operational 
responsibilities across the border." 72 On Aug. 13, 1992 with Security Council Resolution 
771 the U.N. for the first time officially referred to "detention centers" and condemned 
ethnic cleansing. However, it was not until Dec. 18, 1992 when the U.N. Security 
Council for the first time officially cited the "massive, organized and systematic 
detention and rape of women" and asked for the immediate closure of all detention 
camps. 
The Director of the U.N. Division for the Advancement of Women joined the 
Human Rights Commission in January 1993 to investigate the mass rape allegations. In 
March 1993, the Commission on the Status of Women requested through resolution 37/3 
urging all member states to provide funds for the rehabilitation of the rape victims and all 
intergovernmental and non-governmental agencies to provide services for these women. 
The Committee further states that rape, other violent acts or attacks on women's 
dignity constitute grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the 
customary humanitarian law. Measurers taken to bring to justice those responsible 
for grave breaches of humanitarian law must therefore include prosecution of rape 
as well as other violent acts or attacks on the dignity of women.73 
72 Helsinki Watch 1992, 8. 
73 United Nations Commission on Human Rights 1993, 7. 
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UNICEF also provided humanitarian aid to women and children and psycho­
social development program to help traumatized children.74 UNICEF reported in its "The 
State of the World's Children 1996 Children in War" publication details about rape being 
used as a "deliberate policy to rape teenage girls and force them to bear 'the enemy's' 
child"75 during the Bosnian conflict. UNESCO in cooperation with the World Health 
Organization asked in May 1993 for a study to investigate the use of rape as a weapon of 
war, its causes and consequences. 
The Executive Council of UNESCO, meeting at its 141st session from 10 to 28 
May 1993, requested that a study be undertaken on "the use of rape as a weapon 
of war, its cause and consequences." The study is to be oriented towards the 
elaboration of a plan, in collaboration with WHO and UNICEF, for the 
rehabilitation of the women from Bosnia and Herzegovina who were victims of 
systematic rape and their children. 
2. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA (ICTY) 
In 2005, Tribunal prosecutor Dirk Ryneveld called the rape and sexual 
enslavement of Bosniak women in Foca in 1992 "as organized activities within a larger 
program of ethnic cleansing undertaken across Bosnia in 1992.77 Further, during the trial 
Ryneveld referred to these rapes in Foca "an organized campaign" and a "policy of ethnic 
cleansing unleashed by the Bosian Serb leadership on the no-Serb civilian population.78 
According to Tribunal records, the so-called "Ram" or "Brana" Plan, written by 
high-level Serb Army officers in 1991, was a document that very detailed and specifically 
outlined the overarching goals of ethnic cleansing, specifically defining women and 
74 United Nations Commission on Human Rights 1993, 8. 
75 UNICEF 1996. 
76 United Nations Commission on Human Rights 1993, 11. 
77 Hagan, John 2003, 183. 
78 Ibid., 183. 
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children as the most effective victims of psychological warfare. In the plan, officials 
defined targeted communities as a unit or entity "the religious and social structure is most 
fragile. We refer to the women, especially adolescents and to the children specifically."79 
As the plan expressively targeted women and children, such warfare became pragmatic, a 
systematic tool to advance specific goals (e.g. territorial gains).It matured and became 
"military policy."80 Daryl Mundis, a U.S. attorney in the Tribunal prosecution of the rape 
cases of Bosnia women in Foca in 1992, established during the trials a distinct correlation 
between the rapes throughout Bosnia and ethnic cleansing by Serbian soldiers and 
officials in the pursuit of a Greater Serbia. "You can certainly draw inferences that there 
might have been, or that there was, a common purpose or plan."81 
According to Mundis, rape becomes "a common purpose or plan" as these cases 
o'y 
carry similar patterns and similar types of progressions. Marina Bowder writes that the 
mass detentions and concentration camps in Bosnia "would not have been possible 
without the systematic and preplanned support of the ruling elites in Croatia and Serbia, 
and the organizations behind them."83 Also during the Foca trial in 2005, prosecutor Dirk 
Ryneveld was tasked by the court to prove "that the armed conflict against the civilian 
population was widespread."84 Ryneveld successfully arguing that "rape is one of the 
Of 
constituent ingredients in the widespread or systematic attacking." In the verdict, 
Tribunal Judge Florence Mumba wrote in her three-hundred page judgment that the 
79 Card, Claudia 2008, 177. 
80 Allen, Beverly 1996, 56. 
81 Hagan, John 2003, 180. 
82 Ibid., 181. 
83 Bowder, Marina; Jones, Francis R. and Rusmir Mahmutcehajic 2000, 61. 
84 Hagan, John 2003, 192. 
85 Ibid., 181. 
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Bosnian Serb Army was targeting Muslim women "and used rape camps along with 
expulsion as instruments of terror." 
3. THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA 
During the Bosnia conflict, journalists found themselves involuntarily thrust into 
the forefront of the war, its quickly unraveling events and increasing brutality. They 
became first account witnesses, uncovering and exposing the Serbian practice of ethnic 
cleansing in the early beginnings of the conflict such as in May 19992 in Zvornik in 
eastern Bosnia. Journalists were also the first ones to report about forced deportations and 
existence of concentration and rape camps such as in Foca near Sarajevo in 1992 and 
1993. They also began to initiate the use of the analogy of rape as "a weapon of war all 
over Bosnia, a way of terrorizing the Muslim population into flight and thus fulfilling the 
Serb war aim of ethnic cleansing." 87 
As the conflict escalated, the media emerged as a powerful mechanism to exert 
pressure on institutions and governments about their policies.88 The media fulfilled a 
basic and critical, yet inherently controversial dual role of disseminating images and 
information while pushing authorities to act. The 1992 Marshall and Williams ITN 
television report about the discovery of Serbian concentration camps, for example, had 
officials and states "caught off-guard and [left] unprepared for what emerged in the 
media."89 Then UN Under Secretary-General Kofi Annan was quoted, saying that 
governments and international institutions sometimes overcommitted or inadequately 
commit themselves because of the exposure through the media. "They have to do 
86 Hagan, John 2003, 199. 
87 Rieff, Slaughterhouse, 121. 
88 Paterson, James Gow & Preston, Alison, ed. 1996,2. 
89 Paterson, James Gow & Preston, Alison, ed. 1996, 7. 
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something or face a public relations disaster." 90 While UN General Lewis MacKenzie, 
for example, was quoted on saying in 1993 that "the media was the only major weapons 
system I had," 91 news reporting of the rapidly unfolding of events seemed not always 
convenient for many countries. British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd was quoted of 
saying in September 1993 that the television coverage of the Bosnia conflict "forces 
foreign policy makers to give one of the current twenty-five crises in the world greater 
priority." 92 
While the horrific images of the ITN television report and pictures of the 
emaciated Muslim prisoners shown behind barbed wires shocked the world, such reports 
were crucial in galvanizing an international political will, which up until then was 
nonexistent.93 The media, likewise, was also used as a public relations mechanisms and a 
tool of manipulation. Serbian leaders and surprisingly enough also New York Times 
reporter John Burns later publically asserted - falsely so - that the Muslim prisoner, in 
fact, was not a Muslim, but Serbian. Later the prisoner was identified as Fikret Alic, a 
Muslim.94 
Newly emerging user-friendly and readily available technology in the early 1990s 
such as handheld Video camcorder became also vital instruments to expose atrocities. 
Communication scholars in 1996 coined the Yugoslav conflict as the "most recorded and 
reported of all conflicts." 95 
90 Paterson, James Gow & Preston, Alison, ed. 1996, 86. 
91 Ibid., 173. 
92 Ibid., 173. 
93 Ibid., 89. 
94 Ibid., 6. 
95 Paterson, James Gow & Preston, Alison, ed. 1996, 3. 
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a) SETTING THE STAGE 
Newsday journalist Roy Gutman, who won in 1993 the Pulitzer Prize for his 
coverage of the Bosnia conflict, was the first journalists who reported about the detention 
camps and the systematic rape of Bosnian women and children.96 Gutman and the 
German freelance photographer Andre Kaiser began in the summer of 1992 to provide 
actual proof through interviews and photographs about the prisoners and gruesome 
conditions in these detention camps such in Omarska and Brcko Luka in northern Bosni. 
Newsday was at the time only an 800,000 circulation, New York City-based 
newspaper with a small pool of international reporters. But with its first news coverage 
about the conflict and its aggressive headline writing, for example, Newsday established 
immediately a mindset among its readers of urgency. Gutman's first story, published in 
Aug. 1992, carried the headline THE DEATH CAMPS OF BOSNIA "in two-inch 
letters."97 Such portrayal of the conflict - connected to the imagery of a detention camp -
immediately painted a picture of horror that surrounded this conflict. This established a 
baseline and framework of urgency and public outrage that then became the environment 
that consistently underscored the Gutman's news articles about the rape camps. 
The editorial decision to implement very effective headline writing not only sold 
papers and solicited readers, but it also the caught world's and political leaders' attention. 
It put pressure on international political leaders and institutions and organizations to 
intervene. The story was immediately distributed by the International newswire and 
consequently published in many other international media outlets. Other Gutman articles 
effectively carried similarly grim headlines such "Hidden Horror," July 19, 1992; 
96 Helsinki Watch 1993, 85. 
97 Gutman 1993, xiii. 
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"Witness Tells of Serbian Death Camp," July 19, 1992; "For Muslims, Misery," July 21, 
1992; "Like Auschwitz," July 21, 1992 and "The Death Camps of Bosnia," Aug. 2, 1992. 
98 The words used "like Auschwitz," Death Camps" and "concentration camps" 
effectively articulated the severity and crisis mode of the situation in Bosnia. 
b) REPORTING ABOUT RAPE 
The theme of rape, however, and its systematic nature entered only very gradually 
into Gutman's news reporting. With his article "Muslims Relate Atrocities," published in 
July 21, 1992 Gutman begins to write about the daily rapes in the detention camps. 
At night there were rapes. Guards entered with flashlights looking 
for young women, whom they took away for the night. If anyone 
resisted, they were killed. Only a few did.99 
Gutman began in late July 1992 to connect with Bosnian Muslim leaders to find 
out about the rumors about the systematic rape of Muslim women. In his Aug. 2,1992 
article "Withness's tale of death and torture," Gutman just briefly mentions that Muslim 
prisoners experienced every almost imaginable form of torture and humiliation including 
the "murder and mutilation of male prisoners and the gang rape of Muslim women." 100 
Another article in Nov. 1992 reported also about rape, but likewise only in a very 
subdued manner, attesting about the gradual realization, 
The women arrived in tears. They had been taken off the buses and 
stripped naked. The pretty ones had been taken away. No one 
could see where they wnet. They could only hear the screams.101 
In summer of 1992, Sevko Omerbasic, a distinguished cleric, told Gutman about 
women being first separated in June 1992 from their husbands (who have been taken to a 
98 Helsinki Watch 1992, 67. 
"Gutman 1993,41. 
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concentration camp at Brcko, at central Bosnia at the Sava River). Then they separated 
the women from the daughters, raped the daughters and later release them to reconnect 
with their mothers in Tuzla, crossing a minefield. 
Interviews obtained by Gutman became the first eye witness accounts and evidence of 
the ordeals. But Gutman not only interviewed the rape victims, his photographer Andree 
Kaiser also was able to take a group photo after a meeting with the mothers and daughters 
in the gymnasium in Tuzla, where many victims spend their nights. Kaisers' photos were 
published in the German popular magazine Stern. The German TV show Mona Lisa 
broadcasted its interviews with the rape victims in November 1992. What followed was a 
gain a storm of public outrage by governments, women's rights groups and other 
102 
organizations. 
With the February 1993 article "One by One" - The Ordeal of Women Raped and 
Beaten in Bosnia Camp" Gutman reports further details about the systematic nature of 
rape during the Bosnian conflict was unveiled, 
They took the women one by one," she said, describing the nightly 
beatings and rapes. "Not every one very day. They had a timetable. 
I was taken out four nights. Every night, a different one.103 
After the publications of these articles, many camps were closed and prisoners 
were moved across the region to other detention facilities. Gutman reports about the 
European Community investigation, which found that nearly 20,000 Muslim women 
were systematically raped. 104 In March 1993, with the article "Going Nowhere: US War 
Crime Commission Bogged Down in Bosnia Death Camp Probe," Gutman attacks a 
paralyzed U.N. bureaucracy, writing as follows, 
102 Gutman 1993, xv. 
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Five Months after a reluctant UN Security Council announced a 
formal probe into reports of death camps, mass rape and 
deportations in Bosnia, the panel intended to prepare the way for a 
war crimes tribunal is bogged down in confusion.105 
In April 1993, Gutman reported about one of the most notorious rape detention 
facilities during the Bosnia conflict: Foca in eastern Bosnia. In the article "Three Who 
Planned Rape and Murder. Leaders Inner Circle set up Rape Camp in Muslim 
Town"Gutman for the first time used the term: rape camp. Introducing this term and 
beginning to utilizing it consistently described not only the systematic nature of the mass 
rapes during the conflict, but links the horrifically violent act of rape with the equally 
terrorizing image of a camp, a detention facility without escape. 
Gutman writes, 
But for two months in 1992, between June and August, it [ transit 
facility] functioned as a rape camp, holding 74 people, including 
about 50 women. Partizan [sports center] was one of dozens of 
Serb rape camps in Bosnia - some are said to be still in operation -
and it was prominently located, next door to the police station.106 
The gripping details of the narrative captures well the systematic nature of these rapes: 
Each night they selected 10 or more Muslim women. The men led 
them at gunpoint to a nearby house and raped them, witnesses and 
victims said, one 27-year-old women told Newsday she was raped 
up to six times a night. Another woman was raped in the hall 
before the eyes of the others held there, witnesses said.107 
In this article, rape is also clearly correlated to the ethnic cleansing that has been 
orchestrated by the Serbian military. 
But a three-month Newsday investigation into ethnic cleansing in 
Foca suggests that those directing the process were members of 
Karadizic's inner circle. They called in paramilitary troops to 
conquer the town and gave the orders to "cleanse" Foca of all non-
105 Gutman 1993, 145. 
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Serbs, broad array of witnesses said. They set up concentration 
camps and rape camps.108 
The numerous articles of The Guardian journalist Maggie O'Kane in late 1992 
about the systematic rape of women also added to the fire storm of international outrage. 
It was also credited for the European Council to set up a commission to investigate the 
mass rape claims further.109 
Increasingly, journalists such as Washington Post reporter David Rieff also 
connected their reporting about the conflict to "genocide" when writing about rape. 
Under international law, not all Bosnian Muslims had to be 
massacred, raped, interned or displaced for the Bosnian Muslim 
people to have been the victims of genocide. The rape of Bosnian 
women, the slaughter of Bosnian men and what Goldstone's 
indictment describes as "the targeting of Bosnian Muslim and 
Bosnian Croat communities, and in particular their political 
leaders, intellectuals and professionals" is well documented.110 
Further, Rieff also reported about the Serbian obsession with ethnicity and 
thereby connected the ongoing genocide and ethnic cleansing with the terminology of 
reproduction and fertility. 
Herzegovina, they were obsessed with the fecundity of the 
Muslims. If we had allowed things to take their course," one of 
Karadzic's aides once told me in Pale, "the Muslims would have 
outbred us.111 
RiefFs reporting of the Tribunal procedures, the prosecution of the atrocities and 
war crimes through his deliberate usage of specific rhetoric instantly familiarized the 
public with the horrors of the conflict. In the following excerpt, the reader finds the 
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newly constructed word of "ethnic cleansing," and "systematic rape of women" and "new 
ethnic identity" connected. 
This was why, from the start, ethnic cleansing of people and the 
destruction of mosques and the Catholic churches attended by 
Croats was the principal Serb war aim. And Karadzic was the 
architect of this policy, just as Mladic was its executor. As the 
Trial Chamber judges wrote, "the systematic rape of women... is in 
some cases intended to transmit a new ethnic identity to the child... 
The destruction of mosques and Catholic churches is designed to 
annihilate the centuries' long presence of the group or groups [in 
Bosnia].112 
Gutman also very effectively exposed the political link between rape and the 
overarching Serbian objectives of the war. Here in his April 1993 article Gutman writes 
how the mass rapes have been specifically ordered by the Serbian leadership. 
According to Bosnian Muslim sources, Ostojic played a critical role in 
establishing a pattern of abuse of women. Alija Delimustafic, who was Bosnia's 
interior minister at the time of the capture of Foca, said he had received direct 
evidence from wiretaps that proved Ostojic had ordered the raping of women in 
Foca.113 
Freelance Journalists such as Alexandra Stiglmayer together with journalist 
George Rodrigue n4began in 1992 to chronicle the despair of women during the Bosnia 
conflict. After the end of the conflict Stiglmayer met with women's groups, local doctors, 
psychiatrists, and Bosnian government officials and connected with rape victims. This 
resulted in one of the first and most comprehensive accounts and interviews about the 
mass rapes during the conflict.115 Such accounts again brought increased attention to rape 
as a systematic weapon of war. 
The media coverage of the conflict, however, was also often criticized by scholars 
and government officials likewise. Former Armed Services Minister Archie Hamilton 
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criticized the overexposure of media reports in September of 1993 while Foreign 
Secretary Douglas Hurd lobbied for more coverage. "The tragedy remains a tragedy, even 
out of the headlines."116 The ebb and flows of international news reporting, in particular 
television coverage, remained, some scholars argued, arbitrary and often a matter of 
sensationalism. "Television lights are simply the contemporary version of the will of the 
gods. There is no justice or virtue in media coverage, only luck." 117 
c) IMAGES OF THE UNIMAGINABLE 
Shortly after Gutman filed his first stories in the summer of 1992 about the 
detention facilities (death camps) in Bosnia, the British television station ITN was able to 
get access to the camp in Trnopolje. The images of detainees, showing their naked 
emaciated bodies behind barbed wires, shocked the world.118 This imagery again 
connected the television viewers with the well-known World War II images of the Nazi 
regime and Holocaust atrocities. 
German freelance photographer Andree Kaiser, who worked with Gutman, also 
took secretly pictures of a queue of Muslim men standing on a hill in July of 1992, their 
heads bowing down, waiting to be shorn. The image again sent shock waves through the 
international community, again relating these images to Nazi concentration camp 
imagery. Similar, photography of rape victims from Brezovo Polje, northern Bosnia and a 
group photo of mothers and daughters reunited after the mothers being sent across 
minefields and the daughters systematically raped and then released, also Brezovo Polje, 
shocked the world.119 
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4. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS) AND 
TRANSNATIONAL ACTION NETWORKS (TANS) 
When the UN Security Council created the ICTY in early 1993 with resolution 
808, the UN received information from the ground from various transnational networks 
such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and non-governmental 
organizations. These organizations worked became later first-account witnesses of the 
systematic use of rape as a weapon of war. These organizations were, 
The Secretary-General has also received comments from the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and from the following non-governmental 
organizations: Amnesty International, Association Internationale des Jeunes 
Avocats, Ethnic Minorities Barristers; Association, Federation international des 
femmes des carriers juridiques, International Criminal Police Organization, Jacob 
Blaustein Institution for the Advancement of Human rights, Lawyers Committee 
for Human Rights, National Alliance of Women's Organizations (NAWO), and 
Parliamentarians for Global Actions. Observations have also been received from 
international meetings and individual experts in relevant fields.120 
The most active and outspoken group, however, became the Human Rights 
Watch. The Helsinki Watch, a division of Human Rights Watch, published its first 
extensive report about the conflict and the human rights violations in August 1992. A 
second report was published in April 1993. The first report covered two missions to the 
area of former Yugoslavia on March 19 to April 28 and May 20 to June 19, 1992.121 The 
second report was based on three missions to Bosnia between Sept. 26 to Nov. 2, 1992; 
Jan. 2-6, 1993 and February 9-11,1993. 
The first report referred to early findings that suggested the possibility of 
genocide occurring. It asked for the U.N. Security Council to intervene in accordance of 
120 ICTY 1993,5. 
121 Helsinki Watch 1992, vii. 
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the 1949 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 122 
The report asserted that the Serb implement ethnic-cleansing very strategically once a 
territory has been taken over. The report describes such -ethnic cleansing as the 
I 
"systematic execution, detention, deportation and displacement of non-Serbs." The 
1992 report characterizes the following Human Rights violations: Executions of civilians, 
ethnic cleansing and forcible displacement, mistreatment of prisoners etc. but does not 
mention systematic rape of women at all. The report confirms the existence of 11 
concentration camps, usually soccer stadiums, scholars or military barracks. 124 
The 1993 report, on the other hand, dedicated very detailed and separate sections 
of rape for each of the four geographical areas of Bosnia. Women who were interviewed 
by the Helsinki Watch team, including officials of hospitals and psychiatric clinics 
throughout the country, described in first-person accounts how they have been gang 
raped, "cursed by rapists who stated their intention forcibly to impregnate women"125 and 
how Serb soldiers organized the systematic nature of these rapes. The eyewitness 
accounts portray in detail how "the Serbian soldiers had list from which they called out 
women's names"126 and women boarded organized buses to transport them to rape 
facilities. Helsinki Watch also linked these eyewitness accounts to the question of 
accountability. The report eludes that Serbian leadership and individuals in authority 
positions have endorsed "the rape of women in an organized fashion" and "that local 
commanders must know that their soldiers are raping women." 127 
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The eyewitness accounts also detail the enormity of these rapes, "that the school 
hall where the women were forced to sit during the day with their knees pulled up to their 
chests was packed full of women of all ages."128 The town of Foca in southeastern 
Bosnia was in a particular named in the report as an area where "rape appears to have 
170 been rampant and an accepted mode of behavior for Serbian soldiers." Women were 
often transported to different facilities and repeatedly raped in each of them.130 
A report published by the human rights organization Amnesty International in 
January 1993 for the first time alerted the international community about the organized or 
systematic nature of mass rapes during the conflict. 
Although much more information is necessary to complete the picture and 
information is not available to confirm many of the allegations which have been 
made, Amnesty International believes that the rape and sexual abuse of women, 
the great majority of them Muslims, by Serbian forces has occurred in many 
places in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in some cases has been carried out in an 
organized or systematic way, with the deliberate detention of women for the 
purpose of rape and sexual abuse.131 
The report details camps where women are specifically held for the purpose to be 
raped and sometimes "with the apparent encouragement of their commanders."132 
However, the report remains cautious as to whether or not rape has been used by Serbian 
leaders as a weapon of war. 
Most of the interviews and information outlined in the report originate from 
human rights and women's groups and journalists. The report detailed the mass rape in 
June of 1992 of 40 young Muslim women between the ages of 15 and 30 years old in a 
furniture warehouse by Serbian soldiers in the Caparde in northern Bosnia; other rapes in 
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hotels, fire stations. Pointing to these human rights violations and violation of 
humanitarian law, the report urges the international community including institutions to 
hold political and military leadership accountable "for the conduct of the forces they 
jit  
command and for bringing perpetrators of abuses to account." 
Also, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International federation 
of Red Cross and the Red Crescent Societies likewise issued its outrage about the 
systematic use of rape as a weapon of war during the outrage, 
ICRC has repeatedly recalled that the civilian population in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina continues to suffer all types of violations: summary 
executions, torture, rape, arbitrary detention, forced transfers, harassment, 
taking of hostages, expropriation, threats and intimidation. All the 
violations are equally condemned and completely unacceptable. ICRC 
points out that these violations are committed by all the parties to the 
conflicts, even if the degree of intensity varies.134 
However, the International Red Cross pointed out that it "does not possess 
sufficient elements to confirm the allegation that there is a practice of systematic rape 
linked to a more global aim" 135 because it does not have access to all of Bosnia and only 
a few testimonies have been collected. 
5. THE STA TE OR STA TE-LIKE ENTITIES 
When Yugoslavia started to fall apart, different factions within the country had 
different expectation from external actors. For example, Croatia depended very heavily 
on Europe and the promise of an EU and NATO membership. The Serbs maintained their 
close links to Russia and Bosnian Muslim hoped for the U.S. to become more 
constructively involved.136 
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a) EUROPE. THE EUROPE COMMUNITY/UNION AND THE SECURITIZATION 
OF RAPE 
After the end of the Cold War with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and a 
rapidly political reshaping of Eastern Europe, the securitization priorities on the European 
continent shifted. Security demands began to expand beyond the boundaries of the then 
called European Community (later European Union), beyond the solely militaristic point 
of view and began to include issues such as immigration, ethnic conflict, organized crime 
and terrorism. 
When the conflict in Bosnia first erupted in April 1992 , the European Union 
(then called the European Community) was initially very willing and eager to engage 
itself as a self-efficient leader to solve the brewing Yugoslavian crisis. The then former 
Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacque Poos and president of the European Community 
was quoted of saying "The hour of Europe has dawned." 137 U.N. Security Council 
resolutions 752 of May 15, 1992 and 757 of May 30, 1992 already pointed in various 
paragraphs to the active involvement of the European community to resolve the Bosnian 
conflict peacefully. 138 According to some scholars, during the Bosnia conflict external 
actors such as the European Community were critical to halt the violence. The notion of 
Bosnia being part of Europe weighed equally heavy in this equation. "Being seen as part 
of 'us' and therefore impossible to let descend into barbarism and cruelty to the degree 
which the West can accept in Africa." 139 
However, the reality proved differently. The Helsinki Watch report, published in 
August 1992, asserts that most European Community states tried to remain uninvolved 
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and to distance themselves from the conflict. Most European countries have refused or 
remained reluctant to take in refugees, for example. While an early European Council 
monitoring mission, according to the report, documented many of the Human Rights 
violations in early 1992,140 the Council officials left Bosnia on May 12, 1992 after a 
member of the mission was killed. 141 
Likewise the United Nations leaned very heavily on the European Community to 
solve the Balkan crisis. In 1992 in the Security Council's resolution 798, for example, the 
Council underscored the importance of the involvement of the European Council and the 
European Community to investigate the existence of detention camps and the alleged 
atrocities, including the "massive, organized and systematic detention and rape of 
women." 142 Some countries tried to initiate their own legal mechanisms, but remained 
rather ineffective in doing so. For example, in May 1993, the Bavarian Secretary for 
Labor, Family and Socialorder filed a criminal claim with the German Attorney General 
(Generalbundesanwalt) and charged Serbian authorities with genocide and war crimes in 
the Bosnian war, including mass rapes in accordance with German Law and the Geneva 
Conventions. 143 
In December 1992, at the end of the Edinburgh European Council summit, the 
Council wrote in a two-page annex to the "Conclusions of the Presidency - Edinburgh, 
December 12, 1992, Declaration on the Treatment of Muslim Women in the Former 
Yugoslavia" - that the "European Council is appalled by the systematic detention and 
rape of Muslim women" and called these acts "a deliberate strategy to terrorize the 
140 Helsinki Watch 1992, 17. 
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Muslim community" 144 in Bosnia and as a mechanism for ethnic-cleansing. It further 
demanded in the declaration not only the immediate closure of camps, in particular where 
women were held, but also ordered the "rapid dispatch of a delegation of all member 
states, headed by Dame Anne Warburton" to investigate the allegations "and to report 
urgently to the Foreign Ministers."145 The delegation then travelled to Zagreb Dec. 20 -
24,1992 and January 19-21, 1993 and to Bosnia-Herzegovina Jan. 22 - 26, 1993. It 
released a report, called the Warburton Mission II Report, in February 1993through the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen. 
In the report to the European Community foreign ministers points to a Serb 
concentration of mass rapes in areas heavily populated by Muslim citizens. Such attacks 
have been committed by Serb forces to "carve out ethnically homogeneous territory." 146 
The report further, for the first time, accounted for the enormity of these mass rapes. The 
report estimated the number of rape victims varying from 10,000 to 60,000, but estimated 
"the number of victims at around 20,000."147 The report also pointed for the first time to 
force impregnations "to make women pregnant and then detain them until pregnancy is 
far enough advanced to make termination impossible." 148 Furthermore, the report 
asserted toward the systematic nature of rape where women were often raped in public to 
use rape "as a weapon of war to force the population to leave their homes." 149 The report 
throughout referred to rape as "an expansionist strategy," and "serving a strategic purpose 
in itself." 150 The report recommended for the EC Commission to "seriously consider 
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establishing a presence in the area" 151to help with assisting relief efforts. The mission 
also encouraged to categorize rape during conflict as "war crimes, irrespective of whether 
they occur in national or international conflicts."152 
In 1994, the European Commission on Human Rights found that a "state has a 
positive obligation to provide adequate protection for women against gender-based 
violence and harassment." 153 
b) THE UNITED STATES AND THE SECURITIZATION OF RAPE 
In the beginning of the conflict, then Secretary of State Warren Christopher was quoted 
in saying that Bosnia was "a humanitarian crisis a long way from home, in the middle of 
another continent." 154 In 1995, when a series of critical NATO campaigns would 
eventually end the Bosnian War, U.S. president Bill Clinton gave a speech where he 
asserted that "something had to be done" 155 Scholars such as Barry Buzan have long 
argued that within this three-year time span - between 1992 and 1995 - securitization 
took place. The U.S. government finally feared the ramifications from a crisis a long way 
from home - and worried that this conflict "can spread and become a problem in the 
USA." 156 
Human Rights activists and organizations portrayed the efforts of the United 
1 S7 States early in the conflict as "timid and belated" and as "sluggish and inconsistent." 
158 In 1993 these voices grew increasingly impatient, attacking not only the United States 
as "unable or unwilling to do more than intermittently and, in many cases, inadequately 
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deliver humanitarian assistance; adopt resolutions; and conduct seemingly endless and 
fruitless negotiations" 159 also European countries, the European Community, NATO and 
the United Nations. 
The relationship between the United States and Bosnia was difficult and 
inherently oneside. It was based on high expectations on the Bosnian side, met by 
political lackluster interest from the U.S. For example, the 1993 Vance-Owen plan 
(named after the former British foreign secretary David Owen and former U.S. Secretary 
of State Cyrus Vance) was proposed to bypass the ethnic tensions and to eventually 
resolve the crisis. The Bosnian rejection of the plan, however, examplifies the inherent 
flaw and misinterpretation of the U.S. and Bosnia relationship. The Vance-Owen plan 
would have divided Bosnia into ten ethnical sections: "three with Serv majority,, two 
with a Croat majority, three with a Muslim majority, and one mixed Croat-Muslim" 160 
area and with Sarajevo remaining its own entity. However, many scholars, believe that 
the close alignment of the Muslim Bosnians with some key U.S. leaders was the reason 
why the plan was at the time not accepted by Bosnian leaders. The plan failed "primarily 
because voices in the United States - in Congress, as much as from the adminsitration -
gave the Muslims a motive to ditch the agreement." 161 With the Bosnian conflict 
emerging on the heels of the first Gulf War, many Bosnian officials and leaders believed 
at the time that the international community, spearheaded by the U.S., would provide a 
Desert Storm-like international cooperation. 
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U.S. leadership never specifically linked rape or the systematic use of rape to U.S. 
or global security. In a 1993 letter, Human Rights Watch wrote to Cyrus Vance that 
ethnic-cleansing takes place in Bosnia through "murder, rape, torture, pillage and 
deportation."163 In a Jan. 27,1993 letter from Robert A. Bradtke, Acting Assistant 
Secretary for Legislative Affairs to Senator Arlen Spector, Bradtke referred to rape 
during war and international legal accountability. He mentioned that the U.S. Department 
of State believes "the legal basis for prosecuting troops for rape is well established under 
... customary international law."164 
Otherwise, the U.S. government never did specifically point to rape a systematic weapon 
of war in Bosnia or as a catalyst for the deployment of specific U.S. or NATO military 
actions during the conflict. 
In the early beginnings of the conflict, Bosnia officials were hoping for a Desert 
Storm-like involvement and intervention of the international community, spearheaded by 
the U.S. However, later a general disenchantment set in. Ejup Ganic, Izetbegovic's 
deputy, was quoted in the Guardian in August 1992, comparing the Kuwait invasion with 
the Bosnian conflict: "If you are a small country without oil, without strategic resources, 
the world only sends you messages like "stay brave."165 
c) INTERNALLY: BOSNIA 
With news of rape camps in the heart of Europe shocking the world in late 1992 
and early 1993, Bosnian officials tried to take advantage of the political momentum. The 
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Bosnian Government used the international and national media reports and publications 
of mass rapes as a tool to galvanize and organize support against the Serbs. 166 
On August 24, 1993, Bosnian Ambassador to the U.N. Muhamed Sacirbey, 
pleaded in a speech before the U.N. Security Council with the international community to 
intervene in the conflict. In his speech Sacirbey emphasis on the gravity and brutality of 
the atrocities in Bosnia, not seen in Europe since World War II. He used the imagery of 
"gang rape" to create this sense of unprecedented inhumanity. "Excellencies, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is being gang raped," he tells Council members.167 "As we know, systematic 
rape has been one of the weapons of this aggression against the Bosnian women."168 
In 1993, the Bosnian State Commission on War Crimes investigated and charged 
several Serbian leaders with war crimes such as in Foca. Since Serbian forces did not 
provide international journalists with access to Foca, for example, the Commission relied 
on witness accounts from former detainees to attest for "systematic rape in and around 
Foca and of the rape camp in the heart of the town." 169 In March of 1993, Bosnia sued 
Serbia and Montenegro in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In the application 
Bosnia not only alleged the mass killings, but also asserted rape as a method of terror and 
systematic humiliation as genocide. The application specifically refers to the "systematic 
rapes of Muslim women, perpetrated as part of genocide against the Muslims in 
Bosnia."170 The court, however, did not issue a judgment until 2007, when it found that it 
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cannot conclusively find that "these atrocities were committed with the specific intent to 
destroy the protected group" 171 to establish genocide. 
E. SECURITIZATION THROUGH AUDIENCE DEPLOYMENT OF 
EXTRAORDINARY MEASURERS 
According to the Securitization Theory, an audience is an entity or a body of 
authoritative and legitimate units (institutions, NGOs, alliance, hegemonic leadership) 
that not only accept securitization from the securitizing actor or agent, but initiates and 
deploys actions. During the Bosnia conflict, these measures can be divided in legal 
actions, resources and commitments. 
1. LEGAL ACTIONS THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLA VIA (ICTY) 
In 1993 the United Nations established the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY), located in The Hague, Netherlands, tasked to investigate the 
atrocities committed during the Bosnian conflict. It was the first war crime court of the 
United Nations established since the tribunals of Nurnberg and Tokyo after World War 
II.172 The UN Security Council voted on Feb. 22, 1993 and passed resolution 808 to 
establish the ICTY "for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law" in particular as outlined in the Geneva Conventions of 
Aug. 12, 1949.173 Crimes against Humanity were first addressed and named as such 
during the Nurnberg Trial after World War II and legally acknowledged as such in the 
Charger and Judgment of the Nurnberg Tribunal.The Geneva Conventions after World 
171 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) 2007. 
172 ICTY, 2011. 
173 ICTY, 1993,3. 
146 
War II became the internationally acknowledged body of law that would protect the 
victims and prisoners of war. The UN Security Council established various timelines for 
the Tribunal and mandated to complete the Tribunal's mission as soon as possible. Since 
2004, the Tribunal's president and prosecutors were required every six months, according 
to UN Resolution 1534, to report to the Security Council about its progress.174 The 
Tribunal estimated in 2010 to finish four of the 10 still outstanding cases, which are 
currently being worked on, by 2011. The case of the former Serbian leader Radovan 
Karadzic, who was captured in early 2011, is expected to complete by end of 2013. All 
pending appeals are scheduled to be resolved by end of 2014. 175 
In an unprecedented court ruling, in the Kvocka et al. case, for example, judges 
ruled that rape was used as a systematic tool of war and terror and that a "hellish orgy of 
persecution occurred in the Omarska, Keraterm and Trnopolje camps of northwestern 
Bosnia."176 According to some scholars, the fact that the International Crime Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia viewed and convicted rapists was a clear sign of recognition of 
rape as a "collective security problem.177 
In Feb. 2001, in the first of such convictions, an international tribunal in The 
Hague sentenced the three Bosnian-Serbs Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic to long prison 
terms for sexual violence. The three were charged with detaining women in rape camps 
in Foca in the summer of 1992. The Tribunal in The Hague not only held Serbian 
perpetrators accountable for rape as a strategic method of war, but also as a form of 
torture, which violates the Geneva Convention. During the Tribunal, Kunarac was 
,74ICTY, 2011. 
175ICTY, 2011. 
176 ICTY, 2011. 
177 Hansen, Lene. 2000, 55. 
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charged and later convicted "with command responsibility," which elevated this 
conviction from the regular soldier to the level of authority. Kunarac was also quoted of 
saying that "Muslim women would no longer give birth to Muslim babies, but to Serb 
children."178 These statements tie into the argument of the utilizing of rape as a tool of 
ethnic cleansing in connection with forced impregnation. Forced impregnation, 
systematically implemented through rape camps, emerges as the key tool in this context. 
During the Bosnia conflict, more than 20,000 women have been raped,179 many of those 
impregnated and held captive in numerous camps spread throughout the region until an 
abortion was impossible. Women were raped by Serbian soldiers "to give birth to little 
Chetniks/Serb soldiers."180 
During the trials regular soldiers and high-ranking officers in supervising and 
authoritative positions likewise were held accountable. For example, in 2000 General 
Blasic, Colonel of the Croatian Defence was sentenced to 45 years in prison for crimes 
against humanity, including rape. 
Since the implementation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993, the Tribunal charged 78 people with sexual violence. Out of 
these 78 people, 28 have been convicted as of mid 2011 of perpetrating sexual violence 
as defined in the tribunal's Article 7(1). In total the Tribunal has charged more than 160 
I o 1 
people with crimes. 
Hagan, John 2003, 190. 
179 United Nations Commission on Human Rights 1993. 
180 Allen, Beverly 1996, 96. 
181 ICTY, 2011. 
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2. COMMITMENTS: 
In its report of June 30, 1993 to the U.N. Secretary-General about the Rape and 
abuse of women in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, the U.N. Commission on 
Human Rights pointed to seven responses of the United Nations: 
• Negotiations to end the conflict in Bosnia 
• The appointment of a special rapporteur for sexual violence during the war 
• The establishment of a Commission of Experts for sexual violence 
• Actions of the Commission on the Status of Women 
• Actions of the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
• Actions of the U.N. Children's Fund, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, 
the U.N. Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the World Health 
Organization. 
3. RESOURCES: 
The following other resources were also initiated because of the reported 
systematic nature of rape during the conflict: 
• The Great Britain-based Marie Stopes International was contracted to establish 
psycho-social services for women in Bosnia. This program is predominately 
European Community funded. 
• The Danish Refugee Council was expanding its services in Bosnia for women. 
• The Soros foundation and the Jerrahi Women of California also provided social 
services for women. 
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• UNHCR signed an agreement with "Centre for Anti-War Action" for traumatized 
refugee children.182 
F. CONCLUSION 
As this case study indicated, international institutions, international legal 
mechanisms such as the International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia, the 
international media as well as states such as European Community and the United States 
have from successfully articulated the securitization of rape as a systematic weapon 
during the Bosnian conflict. Further, through the implementation of very specific legal 
measurers, judgments, convictions and rulings within the international law, the 
international community as a whole as very effectively deployment extraordinary 
measurers never deployed before to punish in particular Serbian rape perpetrators. Also 
with deployment of resources through the United Nations, non-governmental 
organizations and transnational networks securitization of rape as a systematic weapon of 
war took place. Securitization as prescribed through the Securitization Theory occurred 
and was successful. 
According to these findings, the actor and audience matrix concludes as follows: 
Table 2. ACTOR AND AUDIENCE MATRIX BOSNIA II 
Actors The State incl. Intl. Institutions NGOs / TANs / National and Intl. 
Political Civil Society Media 
Opposition 
Audience 
182 United Nations Commission on Human Rights 1993, 11. 
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Yet, securitization's effectiveness and overarching significance in regard to 
systematic rape during the Bosnian War is questionable. The Bosnian conflict remains an 
example of the failure of international institutions and the indecisiveness of international 
cooperation in a new post-Cold War security environment. During the conflict well-
meant agreements have come and gone, have been signed and broken. For example, 
according to a 1993 Amnesty International report on May 22, 1992 leaders of the four 
parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina signed an agreement - brokered by the International Red 
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Cross - to adhere and follow Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 183 In June 
1992, forty Muslim women ages 15 to 30 years for days were "systematically raped by 
Serbian forces in the town of Caparde in northern Bosnia." 184 
183 Amnesty International 1993, 3. 
184 Amnesty International 1993, 10. 
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CHAPTER V 
SECURITIZATION OF RAPE - THE APPLICATION: CASE STUDY II RWANDA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Similar to Bosnia, but different in its fiercely chaotic, less systematic and yet 
rampant brutal execution, hundreds of thousands of Tutsi women, girls and children were 
raped during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. It is estimated that nearly every surviving 
woman and girl in Rwanda in 1994 was raped or sexually assaulted. "Rape was merely a 
prelude to death."1 These mass rapes were utilized as a mechanism of genocide - with the 
specific objective and intent to eradicate Tutsis as an ethnic group. Such genocidal rape is 
defined by scholars such as Christopher Mullins as "a systematically organized military 
tactic of terror and genocide" that not only terrorizes the population, but aims to create 
the spoilage of identity through the birth of mixed ethnic children. Further, Mullins writes 
that genocidal rape "elevates assaults to a tactic of terrorism."2 Such genocidal intent 
through the mechanism of rape was not unique for Rwanda, but was uniquely recognized 
as such because of Rwanda. The Tribunal of Rwanda became the first international legal 
entity that charged and convicted people for utilizing rape as a mechanism and tool of 
genocide. 
During the Rwandan conflict, systematic rape was used to realize and advance 
specific strategic and political goals. Sexual violence against Tutsi women was 
orchestrated through the Hutu government to explicitly perpetrate genocide, for example, 
to gain territory. The Hutu government's objectives also included very specific socio­
' Weitsman, Patricia A. 2008, 573. 
2 Mullins, Christopher W. 2009, 722. 
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political gains such as the dismantling of the societal fabric of Tutsi communities. Radio 
propaganda before the 1994 genocide targeted specifically Tutsi women. Tutsi women, 
for example, were believed within Rwandan culture to be more beautiful and therefore 
often were depicted by Hutu extremists as arrogant and "devious and completely devoted 
to the interests of their fathers and brothers."3 Hutu extremists' propaganda saw Tutsi 
women as "seductress spies, who believed they were far too good for Hutu men."4 also 
These assertions transformed Tutsi women into political targets and connected gender to 
issues of national security and Hutus' objective to preserve their power. 
Similar to Bosnia, systematic sexual violence in Rwanda was used as the 
facilitator of terror. However, the systematic rape as implemented during the genocide in 
Rwanda differentiates itself from the mass rapes in Bosnia through its far reaching 
cultural implications. In Rwanda, the orders of rape "made by the leadership during the 
genocide not only increased the level of harm and shame done to the victims, their 
families and communities," 5 but it was also a method to entice the Hutu killers to 
"greater and more atrocious levels of violence."6 Sexual violence, including public rapes 
and forced display of public nudity - inflicting tremendous shame on the victim 
according to Rwandan culture - was used to humiliate and "add socio-cultural insult to 
physical injury for the victim and the ethnic group itself."7 
Psychologically, sexual violence began to systematically erode and eventually 
destroy inter-communal fabrics in Rwanda. "Not only is the population itself eliminated, 
3 Des Forges, Alison 1999, 163. 
4 Weitsman, Patricia A. 2008, 573. 
5 Mullins, Christopher W. 2009, 731. 
6 Ibid., 731. 
7 Ibid., 731. 
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but the final memories of the people's existence are tarnished."8 In particular in Rwanda 
the derogation and identity spoilage of rape victims caused them to be shunned by their 
community including their husbands, as they are often considered unfit as potential 
wives. Rape victims in Rwanda are usually being ostracized by their family, their 
community and immediate environment. As such they remain unmarried. In Rwandan 
culture evaluates women "as mothers and wives, so to be unmarried is to lose one's status 
in society."9 In Rwandan, marriage remains a critical source of material and social 
security and thus rape victims often find themselves without resources to survive and 
"live the rest of their lives in highly marginal social positions (e.g. begging, prostitution 
etc.) 
Additionally, in Rwandan society, rape carries an even more severe and 
intrinsically social stigma, compared to other African cultures. Many Rwandan rape 
victims were infected with HIV/AIDS and thus become "unwanted in Rwandan society." 
Amnesty International reported in a special 35-page report in April 2004 that 70 percent 
of all rape survivors during the genocide are HIV/AIDS infected.10 In traditional societies 
such as Rwanda, raped women also additionally lost their husbands. According to traditional 
law they don't have the right to inherit their husband's property." Rape during wartime then 
functions as an "accidental" enforcer of these social norms, closely tied to economic 
security. It "destroys interpersonal relationships in the community and shatters a 
• 1 
woman's sense of identity and security." 
8 Mullins, Christopher W. 2009, 732. 
9 Human Rights Watch/Africa and Women's Rights Project 1996. 
10 Amnesty International 2004. 
" McDougall, Gay J., Special Rapporteur 2000, 36. 
12 Bijleveld, Catrien. Morssinkhof, Aafke and Smeuler, Alette. 2009, 213. 
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Some scholars deem such consequences s as a function of genocide since they assist 
in the "elimination of a population, physically and socially." 13 
B. THE CONFLICT 
In spring of 1994 hundreds of thousands of people of one ethnic group in 
Rwanda, a tiny Central-African country of the size of Maryland or Wales, were 
systematically butchered, stoned, or hacked to death - mostly by farm tools, machetes, 
clubs and hoes, with the international community looking on. By summer 1994, during 
what some scholars today call "the twentieth century's fastest genocide," 14 nearly one 
million Tutsi Rwandans, one-tenth of the Rwandan population, had been massacred. 
With astounding pace, Rwanda saw its "rivers swollen by bloated bodies, the dead pile on 
top of one another inside churches." 15 
The conflict in the former Belgian colony centered on the nearly more than a 
century-old tensions between the two ethnic groups: the minority Tutsi and the ruling 
Hutu. For decades, hostility between Tutsis, who once were in power, and Hutus in 
Rwanda sporadically surfaced and were usually violently suppressed. The minority 
Tutsis were the economic and political elite in the country until 1961, when majority 
Hutus took over the Rwandan leadership after the country's independence. In 1990, the 
Tutsi-ruled Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) initiated attacks on the Hutu government 
from neighboring Uganda. According to court documents, since 1990 the Hutu had 
systematically orchestrated genocidal attacks of its Tutsi population. Such systematic 
strategy included the "preparation of lists of people to be eliminated."16 According to 
13 Mullins, Christopher W. 2009, 722. 
14 Straus, Scott 2006,41. 
15 Sebarenzi, Joseph with Laura Ann Mullane 2009, 2. 
16 Ntaganzwa Indictment 1998. 
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court documents, these lists were frequently updated and eventually systematically 
used, for example, at roadblocks during the 1994 genocide to identify potential 
targets.17 In 1991, a military commission report set up by then President Juvenal 
Habyarimana, defined the state's enemy to security as "Tutsis from inside or outside 
1R the country" and "anyone providing any kind of assistance to the main enemy." The 
reason for the "defeat of the enemy" (the killing of Tutsis) was the Tutsis "diversion of 
national opinion from the ethnic problem to the socio-economic problem between the 
rich and the poor."19 
In early 1994, the brewing ethnic undercurrents escalated into a civil war and 
genocide after Rwandan President Juvenal Habyariamana's airplane was shot down 
April 6. After the president's assassination, a power vacuum emerged and Hutu 
hardliners took advantage of the fragile political situation. Attacks on Tutsis began 
immediately the next day at a rapid pace, ordered by the quickly formed interim 
government20 and fueled by government-sponsored radio propaganda that urged Hutus 
•j * 
to attack Tutsis to avenge the killing of the president. Local mayors and community 
leaders followed the government's orders to executive Tutsis. The Rwandan military 
and Hutu militias, called Interhamwe, first began to systematically kill moderate Tutsi 
officials and political opponents of the Hutu government. The victims of the early 
"systematic assassinations"22 included Rwandans Prime Minister. The subsequent 
massacre of hundreds of thousands of Tutsis followed. 




21 Kuperman, Alan J. 2000,96. 
22 Ntaganzwa Indictment 1998. 
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Many Tutsis fled their homes and villages and sought refuge in churches or 
other large assembly halls. The killers followed them, turning churches, stadiums, 
hospitals and schools first into deceiving safe havens and holding cells, then into 
"slaughterhouses."23 Within 14 days the majority of the country's Tutsis were either 
attacked, maimed, injured or killed. By April 12, most of Rwanda's Tutsis were 
murdered. By the end of the conflict the country had lost nearly three-quarters of its 
entire Tutsi population.24 In July 1994, the RPF militia took over the government, and 
remains in power today. 
C. THE CASE STUDY 
Similar to the Bosnian case study, I am proposing that the securitizing actors 
during the Rwandan conflict need to be divided into external and internal securitizing 
actors. These actors either securitized or significantly influenced securitization from the 
outside (externally) or inside (internally) the referent object, which in this case study is 
Tutsi women. 
As external actors of securitizing rape as a systematic tool of war during the 
Rwandan conflict, I am examining the involvement of International Institutions, (this 
includes entities of the United Nations including the Security Council, the UN Higher 
Commissioner of Refugees and other UN entities including the International Criminal 
Tribunals of Rwanda.), NGOs and Transnational Networks (this includes the Red Cross, 
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and other non-governmental and 
transnational actors), the International Media and the state (the United States and African 
states including confederations on the African continent). These states and/or state-like 
23 Weitsman, Patricia A. 2008, 572. 
24 Kuperman, Alan J. 2000, 101. 
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entities have acted from the outside to effectively influence the securitization of rape as a 
weapon of war. 
As internal actors, I will examine the involvement of the state or entities that 
resembled something functionally similar to what is commonly understood as the state. In 
the case of Rwanda, these actors also include the Tutsi-ruled Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF) and other political oppositions groups). Internal actors also include National/Local 
Media, which includes accounts and reports collected by representatives of the national 
and local media. 
Again, similar to the Bosnia case study, I am examining how these actors 
securitized rape as a systematic tool of war through the securitization mechanism/method 
of the speech act (someone says the word "security," speaking of rape) and through other 
rhetorical measures/images. While focusing on the speech act from the actors' 
perspective, I again will then outline how securitization has been implemented by the 
audience through the deployment of commitments, legal measurers and resources. In the 
conclusion of the chapter, the following actor/audience matrix will again summarize the 
different mechanisms/methods and deployed measurers. This part of the case study is 
therefore divided into "Speaking of Rape " and in the later part "Securitization through 
Audience Deployment of Extraordinary Measurers." This is important to point out, 
because, the International tribunals, for example, "speak of rape" as a security issue in 
their initial statutes, but deploy measurers only later in this case study through the actual 
convictions and various rulings. 
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Table 3. ACTOR AND AUDIENCE MATRIX RWANDA I 
Actors 
Audience 
The State incl. 
Political 
Opposition 
Intl. Institutions NGOs / TANs / 
Civil Society 











D. SPEAKING OF RAPE: SECURITIZATION THROUGH THE SPEECH 
ACT 
1. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
With resolution 955 the UN Security Council established the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR") on November 8,1994. Located in Arusha, 
Tanzania, the Tribunal was tasked with prosecuting people who during the genocide have 
committed crimes against humanity, genocide or other violation of international 
humanitarian law between Jan. 1,1994 to Dec. 31, 1994. The international community 
backed the Tribunal's operation with an initial pledge of $7 million in May 1995, flowing 
in from twenty countries.26 The tribunal, however, struggled with the chaotic domestic 
conditions in Rwanda, including its collapsed legal institutions. By early 1997, the 
Tribunal had only issued 14 indictments in regard to 21 individuals. 27 By April 2000, 
this number increased to 50 individuals, yet these indictments included court cases of 
many high-profile state officials such as former minister Pauline Nyiramashuko and 
mayor Jean-Paul Akayesu. 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 955, which created the ICTR, asserts, similar to 
the Bosnian conflict, that the genocide in Rwanda was a threat to international peace and 
security. 
Determining that this situation continues to constitute a threat to international 
< • 29 peace and security, 
25 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 1996. 
26 Ibid., 14. 
27 (International Criminal Tribunal Rwanda 1997, 7. 
28 Coomaraswamy, Radhika., Special Rapporteur Violence against Women 2000, 15. 
29 United Nations Security Council 1994, 1. 
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Connecting the Rwandan conflict to international peace and security links the 
atrocities committed during the conflict, including mass rapes and sexual violence, to the 
concept of regional and international security. 
Similar to the Yugoslavian Tribunal, the ICTR's statue in Article 3 specifically 
lists rape as a crime against humanity and as a part of systematic warfare during the 
conflict, 
Article 3 
Crimes against Humanity 
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons 
responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or 









h) Persecution on political, racial and religious grounds; 
i) Other inhuman acts; 30 
In the statute's Article 4 it specifies rape as a punishable violation of Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims: 
Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault; 31 
Similar to the Bosnia tribunal, the ICTR was ordered to provide annual progress 
reports to the U.N.'s Secretary-General. These reports over time have become testimonies 
of the Tribunal's gradual realization of the immensity and systematic utilization of rape 
during the genocide. Different to the Bosnia conflict, accounts about mass rapes and the 
30 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 1996,4. 
31 Ibid., 5. 
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systematic rape of Tutsi women during the 1994 Rwandan genocide only surfaced 
gradually. 
While many non-governmental organizations such as the Human Rights Watch, 
due to their consistent presence on the ground from the onset were able to report the 
ghastly details of the rampant rapes, international institutions were slow in grasping the 
immensity of sexual violence during the genocide. In July 1994 a cable by the U.S. State 
Department is summarizing a report by UN Commission on Human Rights UN Special 
Rapporteur Rene Degni-Segui to other U.S. governmental agencies, asserting only about 
"horrible atrocities, massacres, torture, political assassinations, war crimes and mass 
exodus."32 The cable does not reference rape or its systematic nature at all. It was not 
until two years later in 1996 when Degni-Segui in his annual UN Commission on Human 
Rights Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda began to address the massive 
scale of rape during the conflict. In the report he estimated that between 250,000 to 
500,000 Rwandan women and girls were raped. "Rape was the rule and its absence the 
exception," he writes.33 Degni-Segui further, for the first time, elaborated on the 
coordinated and organized function and utilization of rape during the genocide. "Rape 
was systematic and was used as a weapon" by the Hutu perpetrators.34 
In March of 1994, in the wake of the mass rapes in Bosnia and ironically on the 
advent of the looming Rwandan massacres, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human 
Rights appointed a special rapporteur on violence against women. In 1997, this very first 
Rapporteur, Radhika Coomaraswamy, visited Rwanda from Sept. 27 to Nov. 1 as part of 
a fact finding field research commission, investigating the systematic rape of women 
32 U.N.Special Rapporteur on Rwanda Rene Degni-Segui 1994. 
33 Brouwer, de Anne-Marie 2005, 11. 
34 Ibid., 11. 
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during the genocide. Coomaraswamy interviewed rape survivors and witnesses, visited 
the local U.N. Human Rights field operation and attended court sessions of the 
International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda from Sept. 23 to 25,1997, including the 
infamous watershed trial of Mayor Akayesu. 
UNICEF reported in its "The State of the World's Children 1996 "Children in 
War" publication details about rape during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda "has been 
systematically used as a weapon of ethnic cleansing to destroy community ties." The 
report continued to shock the international community, reporting that every surviving 
teenage girl has been raped; many of those left pregnant, which later caused them to be 
shunned and excluded by their families and or community.35 
A 1998 report to the General Assembly about the Tribunal mentioned the 
investigations of sex crimes and the collection of 85 witness statements. The report, 
however, is very careful to point out that this number "does not exclude the probability of 
a larger number of victims."36 The 1998 report to the U.N. alludes to a restructuring of 
the Office of the Prosecutor and the establishment of two particular investigative teams, 
solely focusing on sexual violence and the role of the media as a tool to instigate mass 
rapes.37 The 1999 and Fourth Annual report already found - after an investigation in 
December 1998 into 360 rape cases in seven Rwandan prefectures - that sex crimes were 
perpetrated on a large-scale solely against Tutsi women. This report also, for the first 
time, asserts that these crimes were "planned, systematic and generalized" 38 and actively 
orchestrated by the Rwandan local and national leadership, see below: 
35 UNICEF 1996. 
36 International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda 1998, 9. 
37 Ibid., 8. 
38 Ibid., 3. 
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During the survey conducted in seven prefectures of Rwanda, the team on sexual 
assaults interviewed 360 women on complaints of rape. Based on information 
gathered, the Prosecutor believes that sexual crimes were planned, systematic and 
generalized and that they were committed with the active participation of the 
soldiers, the Interahamwe and government and administrative authorities at both 
local and national levels. 
The 1999 report also states that the perpetrators that committed sex crimes came 
from nearly all socio-economic backgrounds, including "the army, the government, the 
clergy and the media."39 In 2000, the number of witness statements only increased from 
the initial 85 to 113.40 In 2002, the annual report refers to more than 800 potential 
witnesses and 625 witness statements, with particular attentions given to rape and sexual 
violence. The report also points to the decentralization of the investigative sexual assault 
team "but a central core of investigators continues to ensure the coordination and the 
supervision of operations in this very sensitive and complex domain." 41 The 2003 report 
stands out as it increasingly refers to people in leadership and authority, who have 
committed "in particularly grave crimes, including rape and other sexual assault."42 
2. THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA 
Differently from the excessive international media coverage of the Balkan 
conflict, the lack of advanced television technology in central Africa stifled efforts to 
internationally disseminate the unfolding daily horrors of the Rwandan genocide. 
Because of the lack of satellite dishes in the Great Lakes region, for example, real-time 
television images and information about the escalating events - differently from the 
Bosnian conflict - only in fragments emerged. Information and images surfaced at a 
39 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 1999, 13. 
40 International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda Annual Report 2000, 19. 
41 International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda 2002, 12. 
42 Ibid., 14. 
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much slower pace and "not night after night, relentlessly, Sarajevo style." 43 U.S. leading 
newspapers such as the Washington Post and The New York Times, often in very graphic 
details, did report about the atrocities in Rwanda, but the news coverage of the fastest 
genocide of the 20th century was rather moderate and sporadic compared, for example, 
with the coverage of the 1994 election South African President Nelson Mandela. While in 
May 1994 nearly 2,500 journalists ascended on South Africa to report about Mandela's 
historic election and its political implications, in Rwanda during the height of the killings 
April to June 1994 the number of reporters on the ground "never exceeded 15."44 In the 
first UN report of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 1996 the report 
points to the sensitivity of sexual violence and sex crimes during the genocide. According 
to this very first report, the secretariat of the tribunal (a four-person entity) was created in 
particular to advise the prosecution "in such specialized fields as gender-related crimes 
relations with the media"45 
However, regardless of technical and cultural obstacles, journalists similar to 
international institutions only slowly grasped the gravity and extend of mass rapes in 
Rwanda. In 1996 a New York Times article quoted the Human Rights Watch report about 
the mass rapes of "hundreds of thousands of women were also being raped or forced into 
sexual servitude."46 International news coverage from 1994 through 1997 did not mention 
mass rapes or its systematic nature. CNN and Reuters in their July 18, 1997 coverage of 
43 Paterson, James Gow & Preston, Alison, ed. 1996, 82. 
44 Power, Samantha 2002, 375. 
45 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 1996, 8. 
46 The New York Times 1996. 
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the arrests of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko and nine other Rwandan officials in Kenya did not 
mention the charge of rape at all.47 
Increasingly, however, the international news media understood the gravity and 
far-reaching consequences of rape utilized during the genocide as a systematic tool of 
war. For example, The Guardian article of Dec. 4, 2001 by Reporter Chris McGreal is 
just one example of many that increasingly reported about the mass rapes and their 
aftermaths. Calling rape "a weapon of genocide as brutal as the machete," and pointing to 
"tens of thousands of women were gang-raped" and many left behind with "a hidden 
killer"48 - namely HIV and AIDS, international news coverage connected sexual 
violence to regional security concerns. 
However, it was not until investigative reporter Peter Landesman, a contributing 
writer for The New York Times Magazine, emerged as one of the few journalists, who 
provided a comprehensive and in-depth analysis about systematic rape as a weapon of 
war during the Rwandan genocide. His 2002 New York Times Magazine article "A 
Woman's Work" of Sept. 15 and the follow-up article of September 21, 2002 published 
in the Toronto Star "The Minister of Rape" about former Rwandan Minister for Women 
Development Pauline Nyiramasuhuko touches not only on the systematic methods of 
sexual violence during the genocide, but also its historical dimensions and security 
implications. The article, its horrific details and eye witness accounts, sent shockwaves 
through the world. It still today remains the only detailed account of Nyiramasuhuko's 
professional and personal background. It was not only the horrific details of the genocide 
itself and Nyiramasuhuko instrumental role in it that captivated readers worldwide, but 
47 CNN 1997. 
48 McGreal, Chris 2001. 
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the concept of women in power initiating rape as a tool of war seemed incomprehensible. 
Landesman had unique access not only to Nyiramasuhuko's family members, but also 
tribunal judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys. 
According to Landesman, former Prime Minister Jean Kambanda in his 
confession names Nyiramasuhuko as one of five government members instrumental in 
creating "the blueprint of the genocide," establishing clearly to the link between 
Nyiramasuhuko and strategic implementation of the genocide. The Landesman's Sept. 
15 article specifically addresses the systematic nature of rape, initiated and executed 
through Nyiramasuhuko. The news article describes for the reader in detail how then 48-
year-old Nyiramasuhuko lured hundreds of Tutsis into the Butare stadium with her 
announcement that the Red Cross would have food available. The article also points to 
eyewitness accounts, who recall Nyiramasuhuko telling the Interahamwe men that the 
women in the stadium need to be raped first before being killed.49 The news article 
further describes the systematic procedures, initiated and/or supervised by 
Nyiramasuhuko of the rapes of Tutsi women. The graphic depictions ("women being 
dragged into the forests") and then the mass killings with Nyiramasuhuko watching on 
"in silence" made the article a unique testimony of the unique horror of systematic rape 
during war. 
The article also points to one of the first United Nations reports that indicate at 
least 250,000 rape victims during the genocide and details the horrific methods including 
the public humiliation and effect on communities. It's also a comprehensive account of 
the societal ramifications of rape as a weapon war. In Rwandan society, for example, a 
woman who has been raped will be chastised and consequently isolated by her family and 
49 Landesman, Peter 2002, 1. 
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community. "One of the most insidious legacies of rapes is the stigma - and the 
inevitable isolation." The news article reports of about 5,000 children born of these 
systematic rapes. These children are now often referred to as "Children of Shame" "gifts 
of the Enemy" or "Little Interahamwe." 
The report also points to the increasing AIDS crisis in Rwandan aggravated by the 
1994 mass rapes. The news article reports about an interview in 2002 with Paul Kagame, 
quoting him saying "We knew that the government was bringing AIDS patients out of the 
hospitals specifically to form battalions of rapists." 
Landesman quotes Silvana Arbia, the ICTR's acting chief of prosecutions 
confirming the utilizing of AIDS as a tool of warfare against Tutsi women. "H.I.V. 
infection is murder. Sexual aggression is as much an act of genocide as murder is." 
Landesman also quoted a tribunal prosecutor to recite the accounts that led by mere 
accident to the discovered that rape was used during the Rwandan genocide as a 
systematic weapon of war. Former Rwandan mayor Akayesu became the first official 
charged and eventually convicted of initiating these mass rapes. The news article and the 
interview with Arbia, a tribunal prosecutor, connects these mass rapes to security. "The 
offense against an individual woman becomes an offense against the family, which 
becomes an offense against the country, and so, by deduction, against humanity." 
3. NON-GO VERNMENTAL ORGANIZA TIONS AND TRANSNA TIONAL 
ACTION NETWORKS (TANS) 
Non-governmental organizations and Transnational Networks emerged as first 
account witnesses and on-the-ground news sources, reporting of the unfolding terror. An 
Amnesty International report in 1995, while concise and eliminating many details, reports 
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first about "thousands of women who were reaped by the former government's militia 
and soldiers"50 and other potential rape survivors being too embarrassed to "describe their 
ordeals."51 
It was, however, the African division of the Human Rights Watch, an 
international non-profit organization that reports frequently on global human rights 
violations, which emerged as the first international organization that provided a first in-
depth account about sexual violence during the Rwandan genocide. Workers of The 
Human Rights Watch were also one of the few eyewitnesses of the ghastly exodus 
unraveling in April 1994. 
The report, published in September 1996 by the group's Women's Rights Project 
and titled "Shattered Lives, Sexual Violence During the Rwandan Genocide''' became a 
unique testimony of the victims of the Rwandan mass rapes, sexual violence and sex 
slavery. Up until then mass rapes in Rwanda were not mentioned at all or rape only 
described as insular incidents and as a typical side product of war. The report also 
addressed the initial judicial and law enforcement shortcomings in regard to sexual 
violence. For example, the report asserts that police inspectors in Rwanda initially did 
not investigate accounts of alleged rapes.52 An array of interviews with rape survivors 
was conducted by the organization March and April 1996, affirming the pervasive extent 
and strategic nature of sexual violence and rape during the genocide. The report stated 
that, according to some observers, "almost every women and adolescent girl who 
survived the genocide was raped."53 The report quoted staff at local clinics such as Dr. 
50 Amnesty International 1995, 11. 
51 Ibid., 9. 
52 Human Rights Watch/Africa and Women's Rights Project 1996,4. 
53 Ibid., 7. 
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Odette Nyiramilimo in the LeBon Samaritian Clinic in Kigali "following the genocide 
two rape cases a day were coming into the clinic."54 
Rwandan women were "subjected to sexual violence on a massive scale, 
perpetrated by members of the infamous Hutu militia groups known as the Interahamwe, 
by other civilians, and by soldiers of the Rwandan Armed Forces (Forces Armees 
Rwandaises, FAR), including the Presidential Guard,"55 the report reads. Further the 
report addresses how a top-down authoritarian structure in place underscored the 
systematic function of sexual violence during the conflict, directing or encouraging "both 
the killings and sexual violence to further their political goal: the destruction of the Tutsi 
as a group."56 The report specifically defines rape during the Rwandan genocide as a 
weapon of war that saw in the nexus of gender and "ethnicity, religion, social class or 
political affiliation"57 an effective tool to eradicate Tutsi women specifically and the 
Tutsi community and ethnic group in general. The rape of Tutsi women amass not only 
became an effective form of brutal individual torture, but a method, similar to during the 
Bosnian conflict as "an assault upon the community"58 and mechanism to dehumanize 
and degrade a community as a whole. Propaganda, disseminated through radio and 
newspapers, already in the early 1990s, targeted Tutsi women's sexuality specifically and 
often depicted Tutsi women as a threat to national security e.g. as spies of the enemy. 
The report for the first time not only detailed the horrific assaults raped and 
tortured Tutsi women endured, but also pointed to the wide-reaching socio-economic 
consequences of systematic sexual violence during the genocide. The report, for example, 
54 Human Rights Watch/Africa and Women's Rights Project 1996, 7. 
55 Ibid., 1. 
56 Human Rights Watch/Africa and Women's Rights Project 1996, 1. 
57 Ibid., 2. 
58 Ibid., 2. 
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points to the social isolation of rape victims since Rwandan culture ostracizes rape 
victims. Such social isolation often leads to economic difficulties since rape victims have 
usually trouble finding men to marry and in Rwandan culture marriage remains 
inherently linked to economic survival of women. 
The report also addresses the health consequences such as HIV infections and 
health issues that would hinder the reproductive ability of the victims. It also addresses 
the issues of pregnancies resulting from these massive rapes and the consequences from 
what in Rwandan culture is often referred to as "pregnancies of the war," "children of 
hate" or "enfants mauvais souvenir" (Children of bad memories)."59 It is estimated that 
between 2,000 and 5,000 children have been born out of the 1994 rapes.60 Sometimes 
these children are being either abandoned or some mothers even committed "infanticide." 
The report concludes with the overarching assertions with more than 70 percent of 
Rwandans today being women, these women need to gain equal rights and "without 
empowering Rwandan women, the overwhelming majority of the population, to rebuild 
their lives, the political and social transformation necessary to rebuild the country cannot 
succeed."61 
The organization also criticized the Tribunal for doing little in regard to gender-
based violence during the conflict and also the international community to rather spend 
billions on refugees than money for Rwanda in general. 
One of the board members of Human Rights Watch was Alison Des Forges, a 
Yale-educated professor of history and an African history scholar, who spent most of her 
life in Rwanda. Almost immediately after the shot down of the president's airplane April 
59 Human Rights Watch/Africa and Women's Rights Project 1996, 3. 
60 Ibid., 3. 
61 Ibid., 4. 
172 
6, Alison Des Forges was contacted by human rights friends from Kigali. Her writing and 
reports would soon become one of the most detailed and in-depth accounts of the 
atrocities. 
Her 1999 Human Rights Watch account of the genocide "Leave None to Tell the 
Story" reports in horrific details about the rapes and sexual violence against Tutsi 
women. Des Forges described, for example, how Hutu military officials and presidential 
guards used barriers erected around key cities and towns as temporary detention center to 
select, pick and choose in particular women for rape or future services. These 
checkpoints often became crossroads between life and death. Soldiers on patrol or at 
these barriers checked people's ethnicity. They weighed how valuable a woman was and 
how she could pay for her life. Then "the guards as a group or the leader among them 
decided whether the person was to be killed on the spot, raped, kept for service or future 
execution, or perhaps released."62 
DesForges reported with ghastly details the horror and barbaric brutality of sexual 
violence against women. Militia and the military raped indiscriminately, DesForges 
writes, including a two-year-old child.63 The rapes were fueled by local and national 
media propaganda and underwritten by local authority. In Taba, for example, women and 
girls were "raped at the communal office with the knowledge of the burgomaster."64 The 
burgomaster of the town, Jean-Paul Akayesu, was later charged and in 1998 convicted 
with genocide and rape. The verdict was the first international court ruling that 
acknowledged and classified rape as a form of genocide. 
62 Des Forges, Alison 1999, 163. 
63 Ibid., 163. 
64 Ibid., 163. 
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Women were often forced to bury their husbands before being raped and 
mutilated, then ordered to "walk naked like a group of cattle some then miles to 
Kabgayi."65 DesForges writes about a nun "battered to death with a hammer,"66 militia 
soldiers ravaging through hospitals and universities. She reports about the discovery of a 
mass grave found with about 600 bodies, "most of these victims were students, a 
significant part of the national intellectual elite in training at the university." 67 
4. THE STATE: AFRICA 
One of the first and only reports by an African state or regional entity that 
addressed systematic rape during the Rwandan genocide was a report issued by the 
African Union and the Organization of African Unity's International Panel of Eminent 
Personalities in 2000. The report asserted that the mass rapes of Tutsi women and 
iro 
children "was part of their [Hutu's] carefully organized programme" and that Tutsi 
women were specifically raped, sexually mutilated and tortured as a mean to hurt and 
eventually eliminate their reproductive abilities. "Tutsi women had to be eradicated to 
prevent the birth of a new generation of children."69 This conclusion ties into the notion 
of using rape as an effective tool to perpetrate genocide. In regard to the number rapes, 
the report notes that "we can be certain that almost all females who survived the genocide 
were direct victims of rape or other sexual violence, or were profoundly affected by it."70 
The report continuous on with depicting the systematic nature of how rape was utilized 
65 Des Forges, Alison 1999, 164. 
56 Ibid., 190. 
67 Ibid., 373. 
68 Africa Union 2000, 145. 
69 Ibid., 145. 
70 Ibid., 149. 
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"as an instrument of war by the genocidaires to destroy women's psyches, isolate them 
from their family or community ties."71 
The report, however, not only drew attention to the scope of mass rapes during the 
genocide, but also elaborated on the far reaching post-genocide consequences of sexual 
violence as a tool of war. By connecting mass rapes to the future economic and social 
development of the country, the report establishes clear parallels between rape as a tool 
of war and its cost for the Rwandan society - and the international community as a 
whole. After the genocide, about 70 percent of all Rwandans were women and half of all 
households after the genocide were headed by widowed women.72 The report asserts that 
the future of Rwandan women - which includes the recovery of war rape survivors -
were critical and key to the country's prosperity and reconstruction. According to 
71 domestic Rwandan law, a widow was not permitted to inherit her husband's properties. 
Consequently this put additional economic strain on women - and the female-dominated 
society and economy as a whole. In 2000, the law changed and allowed the inheritance of 
property by women. 
African Rights, a human rights organization based on the African continent, in a 
1995 study called "Not so Innocent: When Women become Killers" asserted about the 
influx of female perpetrators - teachers, nuns, peasants, mothers - in particular also guilty 
of perpetrating gender-based violence. The report continues that "what some Hutu 
women did to some Tutsi women" remains a human puzzle that "seems not to have been 
common in other comparable situations."74 At the time of the publication of the report, 
71 Africa Union 2000, 148. 
72 Africa Union 2000, 146. 
73 Ibid., 147. 
74 Ibid., 151. 
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1,200 women were in prison - representing about three percent of the total prisoners - for 
charges of genocide.75 
5. THE ST A TE: THE UNITED ST A TES 
According to a cable message from May 199, the U.S. State Department was 
concerned about the regional security as the Rwandan conflict unfolded. According to 
this excerpt, the department worried about the spreading of the violence to neighboring 
states: 
5 . AS VICE PRESIDENT GORE HAS INDICATED, WE ARg 
INTERESTED IN EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OK USINfl AM 
FYP^Hngn """f" Trt f.PgATH r>ww <->P qwTTcrgr-rmvttHS • TM 
RWflNfffT ftT.ftNfi THff BORDER FOR THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEES AND 
DISPT.ACKQ BWRSONS IN MOST IMMfiP I AYE bAHflgft AMP FOR THfe 
DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF TO THEM. SUCH A MISSION 
COULD NOT ONLY PROVIDE SECURITY FOR SUCH SAFE ZONES AND 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE BUT C.OtlLD ALSO 
PROVTl-lR ATI RHVTBOKMPHT l-OMrnir^T VP- Tr> nglTITCTT? DirP».raT|1|TIp(l •> 
AND COULD SERVE IN A PREVENTtvit ruptrr-rv t-/-» THE 
nr^rnr* or YTPTinnrn -rn fiy-TnnnnntTiTr? r-r«TyiTPXEB. 
Figure 1. Cable Message U.S. Department of State - Under Secretary of State for Political 
Affairs Peter Tarnoff 1994. 
In general, the United States took great pains to bypass declaring what happened 
in Rwanda as genocide. As this memorandum showed, officials laid out the legal 
ramifications for the U.S. to call the events "genocide." Here is an excerpt drafted by 
officials such as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George E. Moose 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher May 21, 1994, 
75 Africa Union 2000, 151. 
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Although lacking In legal consequences, a clear statement 
that the USG believes that acts o£ genocide have occurred could 
increase pressure Cor USG activism in response to the crisis in 
Rwanda. Me believe, however, that we should send a clear 
signal that the United States believes that acts of genocide 
have occurred in Rwanda. If we do not seise the opportunity 
presented by fora such as the UHHRC to use the genocide label 
to condemn events in Rwanda, our credibility will be undermined 
with human rights groups and the general public, who may 
question how much evidence we can legitimately require before 
coming to a policy conclusion. 
Figure 2. Action Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George 
E. Moose 1994. 
The 1994 U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practice in 
Rwandan mentions "innumerable related human rights abuses, including torture, 
mutilation, and rape."76 Under "C. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment" only with one sentences about rapes. "FAR soldiers and 
militiamen frequently raped women; there are reports of rape by RPF soldiers as well."77 
Under Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, the report asserts that militia groups 
and soldiers "engaged in rape on a massive scale from April through July. They targeted 
women, especially Tutsi women, for indiscriminate violence."78 Rape and its systematic 
nature during the conflict, however, was not addressed in any of the documents or records 
within the U.S. government. 
The Clinton administration after the 1994 genocide faced an onslaught of 
criticism for not only for not sending U.S. troops to avoid the massacre, but "demanded 
the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers from Rwanda and then refused to authorize the 
76 U.S. Department of State 1994,2. 
77 Ibid., 3. 
78 Ibid., 9. 
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deployment of UN reinforcements."79 Different from Bosnia, Rwanda was also 
abandoned by congressional leadership. U.S. Senator and then republican minority leader 
Bob Dole was quoted April 10,1994 after all U.S. citizens were evacuated, "I don't think 
we have any national interest there. The Americans are out, and as far as I am concerned, 
in Rwanda, that ought to be the end of it."80 
The U.S. reaction and inaction does not explain itself accurately without Somalia. 
During his first months in office, Bill Clinton spoke publically about the notion of 
"assertive administration and the need to come to the assistance of people in need."81 
Then came Somalia. In October 1993, U.S. troops were deployed to back UN forces 
against Somali militia fighters. During the operation, two U.S. Black Hawk helicopters 
were shot down, eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed and 73 wounded. Bodies of some of 
the dead U.S. soldiers were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu and mutilated. 
Madeline Albright wrote in her memories Somalia was a test for the UN to "carry out a 
peace operation involving the use of force against an adversary determined to sabotage 
that operation."82 The U.N. failed this test, according to Albright. 
The emerging so-called "Somalia "syndrome" is critical in analyzing the 
complacent behavior of the U.S. and the U.N./ International community in regard to 
Rwanda. The Somalia experience marred and thrust a pro-humanitarian and pro-UN 
peacekeeping Clinton's foreign policy into reverse. Clinton issued Presidential 
Decision Directive - 25 that made it nearly impossible for U.S. forces to ever again 
effectively and rapidly get involved - or entangled - in a humanitarian crisis. "We were 
79 Power, Samantha 2002, 335. 
80 CBS 1994. 
81 Adelman, Howard and Suhrke, Astri 1999, 224 
82 Albright, Madeline. 2003, 146. 
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determined not have another Somalia," Albright wrote.83 According to the directive, a 
crisis needed, among other objectives, a clear statement of U.S. interests, the go-ahead 
from Congress, a specific date of withdrawal of U.S. troops before the U.S would yet 
again get involved in a humanitarian crisis.84 Similar, the UN Security Council issued 
new guidelines in spring of 1994 that "before starting a mission the council should 
consider "whether reasonable guarantees can be obtained from the principal parties or 
factions regarding the safety and security of UN personnel" to avoid conflicts "like 
those in Rwanda where there were no security guarantees no cooperation between the 
parties and no readily achievable mandates."85 The International community stood 
firmly against yet another Somalia. 
In 1998 when President Clinton visited Rwanda, expressing his regret when he 
addressed Rwandan leadership: "All over the world there were people like me sitting in 
offices, day after day after day, who did not fully appreciate the depth and the speed with 
which you were being engulfed by this unimaginable terror."86 Hillary Clinton visited the 
87 Tribunal in early 1997, according to Tribunal documents and talked in her 2003 
memories briefly about the rape as a weapon of war during the genocide. Otherwise the 
U.S. government remained rather mute on the subject of systematic rape as a weapon of 
war. 
6. INTERNAL ACTORS - THE STATE: RWANDA 
Prior to the 1994 genocide, Hutu Rwandans were indoctrinated with anti-Tutsi 
propaganda through local newspapers. In particular the newspaper Kangura (translated 
83 Albright, Madeline. 2003, 147. 
84 Adelman, Howard and Suhrke, Astri 1999, 224. 
85 Albright, Madeline. 2003, 152. 
86 Bennet, James 1998. 
87 International Criminal Tribunal Rwanda 1997, 3. 
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"Wake-up) contrary to its mere 10,000 circulation was able to spread anti-Tutsi 
propaganda, in particular targeting Tutsi women as enemies of the Hutu-led state. The 
nexus of Tutsi femininity and national security of the Hutu Rwandans introduces - in its 
perversity - the elevation of Tutsi women as a security issue. Propaganda through the 
media including newspapers and radio promoted sexual violence against Tutsi women. 
The Anti-Tutsi propaganda dates back to 1990 when, for example, the paper published 
the "The Ten Commandments of the Hutu." Four of these commandments are portraying 
Tutsi women as traitors or concubines. "Every Hutu should know that a Tutsi woman, 
wherever she is, works for the interest of her Tutsi ethnic group" and "only when no 
Tutsi women were left could Hutu men be safe from their wicked wiles."89 According to 
these commandments, Tutsi women represented a "secret, sexual weapon that Tutsi 
leaders used cynically to seduce and weaken Hutu men."90 In another issue, the paper 
accused Tutsi women for contributing to the unemployment of Hutu women as Tutsi 
women dominate employment in Rwandan's public and private sector.91 
According to Rwandan law, rape perpetrated during the genocide "were the 
highest category of crime" punished by a death sentence. The Peter Landesman The New 
York Times Magazine article of September 2002 quoted Rwandan prosecutor general 
Gerald Gahima saying that rape in Rwandan society was "worse than death" because it 
not only affects the rape victim but stigmatized her entire family and immediate 
community. 
88 Human Rights Watch/Africa and Women's Rights Project 1996, 5. 
89 Africa Union 2000, 145. 
90 Ibid., 145. 
91 Human Rights Watch/Africa and Women's Rights Project 1996, 6. 
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In August 1996, the Rwandan government passed a law that established specific 
local courts to prosecute and try cases of genocide. However, Rwandan prosecutors, who 
were usually young and inexperienced, hesitated to bring rape and sexual violence 
charges before these local courts. By end of Nov. 1997, there was not a single sexual 
violence case brought before local judges, according to the special Rapporteur Radhika 
Coomaraswamy, who visited Rwanda end of 1997.92 
By midl998 more than 135,000 people were imprisoned for charges of genocide 
or related crimes.93While local judicial authorities in Rwanda had aimed to try 5,000 
people during 199894, for example, these goals were never accomplished. In 1998 later 
the courts announced that it had tried 86495, which is a fraction of its earlier objective. 
To alleviate the tremendous amount of case loads, Rwanda in 2001 began to 
establish local community courts, called Gacaca tribunals to expedite the court 
procedures. By 2001, nearly 120,000 prisoners96 filled local jails and overwhelmed the 
local judicial system, which had completely collapsed after the genocide. The objectives 
of the Gacaca local community court system was not to establish guilt or innocence, but 
"to sanction the violation of rules that are shared by the community with the sole 
objective of reconciliation."97 Originating from the Kinyarwanda word "grass," meaning 
a meeting place for the community, the idea of the Gacaca courts stem from what 
QO 
Rwandan President Paul Kagame terms an "African solution to African problems." The 
first Gacaca court trials began in 2005, but most of the concerns of legal scholars and 
92 Coomaraswamy, Radhika., Special Rapporteur Violence against Women 1998, 15. 
93 Des Forges, Alison 1999, 578. 
94 Des Forges, Alison 1999, 580. 
95 Ibid., 580. 
96 Gendercide Watch.org 2001. 
97 Africa Union 2000, 184. 
98 Human Rights Watch 2011, 8. 
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other judicial experts such as the risk of bias, local corruption and inaccurate application 
of the law, "turned out to be well-founded."99 
In 2011, the Human Rights Watch reported that the gacaca court system, also 
referred to as mass community-based justice100 failed to provide "fair trial rights of the 
accused"101 and "to provide equal justice to all victims of serious crimes" during the 1994 
genocide.102 In May 2008, genocide-related rape cases were also transferred to the 
Gacaca court system. But rape survivors feared the exposure to the community and the 
Human Rights Watch asserts that the transfer of rape case to the Gacaca system help the 
government to control the narrative of the mass rapes during the genocide. It forcefully 
pushed "to end this chapter of its history."103 
7. INTERNAL A CTORS: THE NA TIONAL/LOCAL MEDIA 
In Rwanda, media propaganda in particular, through radio and newspaper 
publications, was instrumental in fueling the genocidal rape campaign against Tutsi 
women. The newspaper Kangara, for example, targeted the sexuality of Tutsi women, 
portraying them as "sexual weapons that would be used by the Tutsi to weaken and 
ultimately destroy the Hutu men." 104 The newspapers were distributed throughout the 
countryside, read to illiterate Hutus, and the messages underscored with sexually explicit 
cartoons.105 Examples of such cartoons includes a December 1993 depiction of Tutsi 
99 Human Rights Watch 2011, 10. 
100 Ibid., 10. 
101 Ibid., 11. 
102 Ibid., 12. 
103 Ibid., 12. 
104 Brouwer, de Anne-Marie 2005, 12. 
105 Brouwer, de Anne-Marie 2005, 12. 
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women having sex with Belgian UN peacekeepers of the UN Assistance Mission for 
Rwanda (UNAMIR), which at the time were considered RPF supporters.106 
E. SECURITIZATION THROUGH AUDIENCE DEPLOYMENT OF 
EXTRAORDINARY MEASURERS 
Deployed measurers during, after or intrinsically triggered by the Rwanda 
conflict, can be divided into legal actions, resources and commitments. 
1. LEGAL ACTIONS: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR 
RWANDA (ICTR) 
Similar to the tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the prosecution and judges of 
the ICTR assumed an authoritative legal function that focused almost immediately on the 
"highest ringleaders and organizers of the atrocities"107 rather than the thousands of 
perpetrators. By doing so, it was able to establish many historical firsts within the field of 
sexual and gender-based violence within the overarching framework of international law. 
The ICTR, for one, became the first international law entity that had successfully 
convicted a head of state of genocide. The Tribunal in 1998 found former Rwandan 
prime minister of the 1994 interim government (after the airplane crash of President 
Habyarimana), Jean Kambanda, "guilty of genocide, and public and direct incitement to 
commit genocide." 108 The tribunal charged and found Kambanda guilty of six counts of 
genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit 
106 Brouwer, de Anne-Marie 2005, 13. 
107 Helena Cobban 2007,47. 
108 International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda 1998, 3. 
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genocide, complicity in genocide and crimes against humanity.109 Kambanda is currently 
imprisoned in Mali, serving a life sentence.110 
While Kambanda judgment created a legal baseline of establishing accountability 
under International Law for genocide during the conflict, the case against Jean-Paul 
Akayesu, a former mayor, set yet another historical precedence. Initially, the case against 
Akayesu in January 1997 consisted of 12 charges including genocide, crimes against 
humanity and violations of the Geneva Conventions article three.111 Later in June 1997, 
the prosecution, in an unorthodox move, however, added to the initial indictments the 
charge of rape "as a constituent element of the crimes of genocide." 112 Allison Des 
Forges, board member of Human Rights Watch, commented in 1999 that "a coalition of 
non-governmental organizations drew the attention of the tribunal staff to the importance 
of prosecuting these crimes as a category of genocide." 113 And "only after the judges 
invited the prosecution to consider investigating gender crimes"114 were these charged 
amended. 
With this extraordinary inclusion, an international war crime tribunal for the first 
time disengaged rape and sexual violence from the conventional legal terminology of 
Crimes against Humanity. It considered it separately punishable within the parameters of 
International Law. Further, with this inclusion the Tribunal specified that sexual violence 
was utilized as a mechanism of genocide during the Rwandan conflict. It acknowledged 
109 United Nations/Michael P. Scharf 1994. 
110 The Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda Judgment of the Trial Chamber 1998. 
1,1 International Criminal Tribunal Rwanda 1997, 8. 
112 International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda 1998, 9. 
113 Des Forges, Alison 1999, 573. 
114 Nowrojee, Binaifer 2003, 6. 
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rape as a key component of the genocide. Acts of sexual violence "were consistent with 
the specific intent of destroying that groups [Tutsi],"115 the Tribunal found. 
During the 1994 genocide, Akayesu was mayor of the town of Taba and became 
instrumental in ordering and supervising the systematic rape and slaughter of Tutsi 
women. With the Akayesu case, the tribunal ruled that rape constituted "genocide in the 
same way as any other act as long as [it was] committed with the specific intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group"116 Akayesu was found guilty of 
instigating genocide and rape through public speeches, for example.117 The Tribunal 
established this link between rape and genocide since rape, in most cases, was 
specifically targeting Tutsi women and utilized as "an integral part of the physical and 
psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their families and communities."118 
The Tribunal established a correlation between rape and genocide and also set a 
precedent in acknowledging the systematic nature of rape perpetrated during the 
Rwandan genocide, 
The Trial Chamber held that rape, which it defined as "a physical invasion of a 
sexual nature committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive," 
and sexual assault constitute acts of genocide insofar as they were committed with 
the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a targeted group, as such. It found that 
sexual assault formed an integral part of the process of destroying the Tutsi ethnic 
group and that the rape was systematic and had been perpetrated against Tusi 
women only, manifesting the specific intent required for those acts to constitute 
genocide.119 
115 International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda 1998, 5. 
116 United Nations/Michael P. Scharf 1994. 
117 Coomaraswamy, Radhika., Special Rapporteur Violence against Women 2000, 15. 
118 Ibid., 16. 
119 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 1999, 6. 
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On Sept. 2, 1998, Akayesu was found guilty of nine counts, including rape and 
other inhumane acts. 120 Currently, Akayesu is serving a life prison sentence in Mali.121 
The ICTR continued with its unique focus on high-ranking Rwandan political 
officials, business and community leaders, charging Laurent Semanza, Alfred Musema 
(director of a tea factory), Omar Serushago with crimes against humanity - and also later 
rape.122 The Tribunal also uniquely indicted for the first time journalists, for example, 
radio broadcaster Georges Ruggiu, who worked for Radio et Television Libre des Mille 
Collines (RTLM) in Kigali "for using propaganda to perpetuate ethnic and gender 
stereotypes"123 to commit genocide. The owners of RTLM Ferdinand Nahimana and 
Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza also were both convicted in 2003 genocide, conspiracy to 
commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, and crimes against 
humanity. Also the founder and director of the Rwandan newspaper Kangura, Hassan 
Ngeze, was likewise convicted of similar charges. 124 
The 1996 indictment of Mayor Ntaganzwa also includes also charges against 
Rwandan officials and authorities such as Ladislas Ntaganzwa, Pauline Nyiramusuhuko 
(minister), Andre Rwamakuba (minister), Prefect representatives Sylvain Kanyabashi, 
and mayors Elie Ndayambaje and the son of minister Nyiramusuhuko Arsene Shalom 
Ntahobali as authorities that "organized, ordered and participated" in the genocidal plan 
of the interim Rwandan government in April 1994.125 The same indictment also, in its 
introductory chapter, cites in paragraph 5.18 the sexual assaults and rapes again Tutsi 
120 International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda 1998, 9. 
121 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu Judgment of the Trial Chamber 1998. 
122 (Coomaraswamy, Radhika., Special Rapporteur Violence against Women 2000, 15. 
123 Ibid., 15. 
124 The Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze - Judgment of the 
Trial Chamber 2003. 
125 Ntaganzwa Indictment 1998. 
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women and girls."126 The killings included in early April the former Queen of Rwanda, 
an important historical figure of the Tutsi community.127 In the same indictment Arsene 
Shalom Ntahobali was named for using roadblocks as mechanisms to systematically 
identify Tutsis. He was also specifically named in the indictment as participating "in the 
kidnapping and raping of Tutsi women." 128 Paragraph 6.54 of the indictment refers to 
rapes and sexual assaults as "widely and notoriously committed throughout Rwanda."129 
The capture and indictment of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko in 1997 turned into yet 
another international law cornerstone. In Sept. 1997, the former Rwandan Minister for 
Women Development Pauline Nyiramasuhuko pleaded not guilty on charges including 
genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide and crime against humanity. Some refer to 
Nyiramasuhuko as "the star of genocide narratives"130 of the Rwandan conflict mainly 
because she was the first and only women charged with aiding the systematic rape of 
women during the conflict. 
According to the 1999 amendment of the initial indictment, the minister and her 
son Shalom personally erected and manned roadblocks at their home in Butare to find, 
identify and capture Tutsis. Nyiramasuhuko was named in the indictment to have 
abducted Tutsi refugees with the help of militia men to be later executed.131 During these 
abductions, the victims were often sexually assaulted before being forced "into vehicles 
and taking them to their deaths." 132 The roadblocks were specifically utilized by her son 
and with the Interahamwe soldiers "to abduct, rape and kill members of the Tutsi 
126 Ntaganzwa Indictment 1998. 
127 Ntaganzwa Indictment 1998. 
128 Ibid., 1998. 
129 Ibid., 1998. 
130 Laura Sjoberg & Caron E. Gentry 2007, 160. 
131 Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko & Shalom Ntahobali 1999, 32. 
132 Ibid., 33. 
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population."133 The Butare province alone later on accounted for "more than 90,000 rape 
survivors."134 Nyiramasuhuko was also charged in her position of authority as a minister 
with not taking measures to stop the various massacres. She was accused of refusing to 
intervene, but actually being instrumental in planning, preparing and executing "a 
common scheme strategy or plan" to commit these atrocities. 135 The indictment 
continuous on with specifically pointing to her involvement in committing these 
atrocities "personally, by persons they assisted or by their subordinates and with their 
knowledge or consent."136 The judgment alleges that Nyiramasuhuko has agreed to the 
government's plan to eradicate Tutsis and attended meeting during which the systematic 
killing of Tutsis was discussed. 
Nyiramasuhuko and her son Shalom Ntahobali were indicted on charges of using 
137 
specifically rape as "a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population" 
Both were additionally charged with being responsible "for outrages upon personal 
dignity in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape and indecent assault." 138 
On June 24,2011 - fourteen years after her first capture and indictment the 
judges found Nyiramasuhuko along with her son and four other former state officials (a 
prefecture official; a lieutenant colonel, and two mayors) guilty. This made 
Nyiramasuhuko the first woman (and minister of department tasked to aid the 
development of women) to be convicted of assisting the systematic rape of women. The 
2011 judgment pointed to rape and "the outrages upon personal dignity" charges "each 
133 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 2011,6. 
134 Weitsman, Patricia A. 2008, 573. 
135 Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko & Shalom Ntahobali 1999, 38. 
136 Ibid., 38. 
137 Ibid., 43. 
138 Ibid., 46. 
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accused is charged with both direct and superior responsibility."139 The prosecution of 
this particular case was the longest case for the Tribunal, producing "more than 125,000 
transcript pages."140 
The 2011 judgment reads that many of the crimes committed, including rapes and 
murder often in churches, hospitals, and government offices were "among the worst 
encountered by this Chamber; it paints a clear picture of unfathomable depravity and 
sadism."141 Differently, however, from the Akayesu case, the prosecution in its final 2011 
judgment, however, asserted that it "has not taken the rapes into account when assessing 
genocide and has not entered a conviction for genocide142 based on its link to rape." In 
paragraph 26 of the judgment, however, the prosecution accounts rape as "a crime against 
humanity and outrages upon personal dignity as a war crime."143 The tribunal establishes 
further Nyiramasuhuko's "superior responsibility over Interahamwe who committed 
rapes" in Butare.144 The tribunal found that between the end of April and mid June 1994 
that Nyiramasuhuko and her son along with soldiers abducted hundreds of Tutsis, which 
"were physically assaulted, raped, abducted, and taken away to various places in Butare, 
where they were killed."145 The prosecution clearly found that Nyiramasuhuko "ordered 
the killings" and the rapes and that Nyiramasuhuko "aided and abetted rapes and is 
responsible as a superior for rapes committed."146 In the final verdict, Nyiramasuhuko 
139 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 2011,2. 
140 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 2011,2. 
141 Ibid., 7. 
142 Ibid., 8. 
143 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 2011, 8. 
144 Ibid., 8. 
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was found guilty of seven of 11 counts, including of rape as a Crime against Humanity147 
and convicted to life in prison. As of January 2012, the case was still on appeal. 
In April 2005, tribunal convicted Mikaeli Muhimana of rape, among other 
charges, and sentences to prison for life. The Tribunal's 2005 report asserts that this 
conviction "made a significant contribution to the Tribunal's jurisprudence on rape."148 
Emmanuel Rukundo, military chaplain and a priest in the community, was also found 
guilty of genocide, murder, extermination and rape of a young Tutsi women on February 
27,2009.149 
The case database 1998 to 2010 of the ICTR lists 16 perpetrator charged and/or 
convicted of rape during the genocide. The list includes Akayesu, but does not include 
the 2011 judgment of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko. These are the names: 
AKAYESU. JEAN PAUL (21 
BAGOSORA. THEONESTE (41 
BIKINDI. SIMON (21 
BISENGIMANA. PAUL (21 
GACUMB1TSI. SYLVESTRE (31 
KABILIGI. GRATIEN (41 
KAJELDEU. JUVENAL (41 
K A M U H A N D A .  J E A N  D E  D I E U  ( 2 )  
MUHIMANA. MIKAELI (31 
MUSEMA. ALFRED (41 
MUVUNYI. THARCISSE (11 
N I Y I T E G E K A .  E L I E Z E R  ( 2 )  
NSENGIYUMVA. ANATOLE (4) 
NTABAKUZE. ALOYS(41 
RENZAHO. THARCISSE (21 
SEMANZA.LAURENT (41 
Figure 3. ICTR case database 1998 to 2010, listing 16 perpetrators charged 
and/or convicted of rape during the genocide. Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Renzaho 
2009, 202. 
147 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 2011, 11. 
148 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 2005, 7. 
149 International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda 2009, 9. 
150 International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda 1998-2010. 
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In the case The Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Renzaho, Case No. ICTR-97-3 1-T, for 
example, Renzaho, the prefect of Kigali, was charged with several counts of genocide 
including murder and rape.151 In the case the prosecution asserted that rapes of Tutsi 
women and girls took place by police, soldiers, administrative officials, all "under 
Renzaho's control."152 Renzaho was also cited of calling Tutsi women "food for the 
militiamen."153 The 255-page judgment and sentence document of the Renzaho case in 
2000 uniquely contained a separate 84-page section solely focusing on "rape and sexual 
violence, April - July 1994."154 
According to this part of the judgment, the prosecutors found that most rapes 
followed a distinct pattern, which including abducting women, holding them captive and 
abusing them for days, weeks or even months.155 The tribunal concluded that "these 
rapes were committed with genocidal intent" because they targeting specifically Tutsi 
women.156 In August 2009 Renzaho was found guilty of "encouraging the sexual abuse of 
| en 
women." He was found guilty of genocide and rape as a crime against humanity. He 
was also found guilty of crimes against humanity in connection with the rapes. The 
tribunal further explained its reasoning, asserting that the tribunal had to prove that these 
1 SR 
crimes were of "a widespread or systematic attack" nature. 
During the Renzah case the tribunal judges concluded that Renzaho's radio 
messages on May 10, 1994 for example 
151 Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Renzaho 2009, 177. 
152 Ibid., 177 
153 Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Renzaho 2009, 178. 
154 Ibid., 177-91. 
155 Ibid., 188. 
156 Ibid., 202. 
157 Ibid., 2009. 
158 Ibid., 203. 
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"It is therefore necessary that directives adopted in this regard are 
complied with. It is for this reason that we have decided to arrest 
all those who rape and want to commit criminal acts so as to 
punish them."159 
were, in fact, propaganda or statements made under false pretenses. Since Rwanda was 
"under intense international security" 160 by May 1994, the tribunal saw these messages 
not of evidence of Renzaho innocence or attempts to provoke peace, but rather 
"motivated by a need to restore the government's public image."161 
2. OTHER MEASURES: 
In 1996, the Rwandan Ministry of Health together with international organization 
such as the UN's World Health Organization and $295,000 from the Italian government 
initiated a study about the effect of rape during the genocide. 
The project aimed to: 
a) To improve the access of women victims to medical services; 
b) To create national networks of women victims of violence; 
c) To increase the technical capacity of the health personnel; 
d) To encourage women to make use of the health services available to them; 
e) To raise funds in support of women victims of violence; 
f) To increase the availability of medical equipment and medication, especially for 
women victims of violence. 163 
The tribunal increasingly made efforts to educate its staff about sexual violence. 
It, for example, held a special workshop about sexual violence march 23 - 26,1996 and 
after the workshop established a special team on sexual violence.164 In October 1997 the 
tribunal organized a special workshop about sexual aggression in Arusha in conjunction 
l59Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Renzaho 2009.. 
160 Ibid., 52-3. 
161 Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Renzaho 2009, 52-3. 
162 Coomaraswamy, Radhika., Special Rapporteur Violence against Women 1998, 18. 
163 Coomaraswamy, Radhika., Special Rapporteur Violence against Women 1998, 8. 
164 International Criminal Tribunal Rwanda 1997, 14. 
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with the tribunal of the former Yugoslavia.165 A Group on Gender Issues was created in 
1997 to "provide advisory services in questions related to gender issues" including sexual 
violence to the Tribunal.166 The tribunal implemented a special independent monitor on 
Gender-related crimes. A newly appointed deputy prosecutor in 1997 held two 
workshops "with international experts to sensitize the OTP [office of the Tribunal 
Prosecution] staff on the issue of sexual violence."167 The prosecutor also initiated the 
establishment of a special "Sexual Assault Team" to prepare rape victims for testimony. 
Since the genocide left many Rwandan women widowed and as the head of the 
household, the Rwandan government with assistance from the UN Development Project 
built 100 new homes for genocide survivors. 
Because of the excessive trauma rape survivors were exposed, the Special 
Rapporteur Radhika Coomaraswamy in 1998 initiated UN programs to help the 
"psychological and social rehabilitation" of these victims.169 The Special Rapporteur also 
announced that the WHO along with Rwanda's Ministry of Health would run a National 
Trauma Centre in Kigali, which was initially established in 1995. The trauma center 
would be staffed with national and international personnel.170 After the visit of the 
Rapporteur in 1997, Coomaraswamy, engage in discussion to force activities of UNDP 
and HRFOR (Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda) in Rwanda including the UN 
Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) in cooperation of the Rwandan Ministry of 
gender, Women and Social Affairs. 171 Coomaraswamy also initiated a gender perspective 
165 International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda 1998, 10. 
166 Ibid., 13. 
167 Coomaraswamy, Radhika., Special Rapporteur Violence against Women 1998, 11. 
168 Ibid., 17. 
169Ibid., 18. 
170 Ibid., 18. 
171 Ibid., 22. 
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of the UN Development Program (UNDP) and the establishment of a UNDP justice 
program including providing free legal aid for victims and perpetrators, to "train 
prosecutors and sensitize judges on the human rights of women."172 
Likewise, she supported a newly appointed Regional Adviser for Refugee 
Women at the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).173 
Additionally, the utilization of rape as a systematic weapon during the Rwanda 
genocide triggered an increased interest in the issue of reparations, including the 
compensation for victims according to humanitarian international law. These reparation 
mechanisms have been revised in light of the influx of systematic rape during conflict 
and the horrific scope of its brutality such as in Rwanda. According to a 2000 U.N. 
Commission of Human Rights report, revised principles and guidelines in 1998 and 1999 
have brought "much - needed clarity and consistency to the issue of the rights of victims 
to reparation, including for sexual violence committed during armed conflict."174 These 
revisions for the first time took in consideration how gender affects specific violations 
and its consequences that are then subject to reparations including "the gender-related 
obstacles that women and girls face in seeking redress."175 A 2000 UN report asserted 
that these revisions included language of experts about the right to reparations for victims 
of gross human rights violations and humanitarian law, of fundamental freedoms and the 
question of impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations.176 
172 Coomaraswamy, Radhika., Special Rapporteur Violence against Women 1998, 24. 
173 Ibid., 24. 
174 McDougall, Gay J., Special Rapporteur 2000, 17. 
175 Ibid., 17. 
176 Ibid., 33. 
194 
The 1999 U.N. report of the Tribunal for the first mentioned the establishment of 
one particular investigative team that is exclusively in charge of sexual offences.177 The 
report also points for the first time to the establishment of a "Unit for gender issues and 
Assistance to Victims" to protect and support victims and witnesses of sexual violence 
offences during the genocide.178 In 1999 and 2000, the Tribunal's Victims and Witnesses 
Support Unit recommended the establishment of counseling to ensure physical and in 
particular psychological rehabilitation of rape victims. 179 In 2000, the tribunal's Victims 
and Gender Support Unit also started to provide services to victims of sexual violence. 
The unit provides services by counselors not only to witnesses, but primarily victims of 
the widespread sexual attacks. Also a legal guidebook, according to the report, published 
1 80 
would help victims and witnesses to learn about their rights during court procedures. 
The booklet was eventually published in 2001 in the languages of Kinyarwanda, French 
and English. 
The 2000 U.N. Human Rights Commission report pointed to the ongoing sexual 
violence during war and asked for "a more concerted action by the international 
community in general, and particular the United Nations, governments and non­
governmental actors. 
The commission made the following recommendations: 
• For states to enact specific national legislation to provide universal jurisdiction for 
violations of systematic rape. 
177 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 1999, 12. 
178 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 1999, 19. 
179 Ibid., 17. 
180 International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda Annual Report 2000, 14-5. 
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• Regulations and training materials that explain the explicit prohibition of sexual 
violence during conflict 
• Steps to ensure that humanitarian law violations are being prosecuted through the 
local and municipal legal system 
• Elimination of gender bias in legal law 
• Protections and support for victims and witnesses of sexual violence 
• Integration of gender perspective in the investigations and prosecutions of the 
International Criminal Court 
• U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights through its field missions needs to 
document and report on sexual violence during conflict. This includes the 
cooperation with non-governmental agencies to dispel anti-women propaganda 
campaigns and to provide post-trauma services. 
• The prosecution of perpetrators and compensation for victims of sexual violence 
need to be part of peace treaties, conflict resolution and reconciliation efforts. 
• The international community including the United Nations need to prosecute 
perpetrators of sexual violence 
• Involvement of women in the peace negotiations and peace-building process181 
Further, in 2001, five Rwandan NGOs were selected to provide counseling and 
other services for victims of sexual violence during the genocide. In 2001, a sexual 
assault investigator was added to each investigative team of the tribunal.182 The 2001 
U.N. report asserts that since the Akayesu conviction, "investigations of sexual violence 
have been expanded." The paragraph that followed this assertion, however, hints on the 
181 McDougall, Gay J., Special Rapporteur 2000, 19-22. 
182 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 2001, 17. 
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fragility and limitations of such an expansion. It reads that the Sexual Assault Team "was 
decentralized. However, a core unit is still in place to provide coordination and 
supervision, as this is a highly sensitive and complex domain." 183 
In June of 2003 the Tribunal's Registrar's Office hired a Gender Adviser to 
provide more physical and psychological helps for rape and sexual violence victims.184 
However, the 2003 report also alludes to problems that required to "improve access to 
medical care as well as psychological and legal counseling for victims."185 In 2002 the 
UN Tribunal annual report asserts that "following the advice of the Office of Legal 
Affairs in New York" the Support Programme for Witnesses which is led by the 
Tribunal's Gender Issues and Assistance to Victims Unit "has been refined." The 
program now, according to the 2002 report, provides now "legal, psychological and 
medical" help to witnesses. 186 
In June 2003, the hiring of a Gender Adviser at the Tribunal's Office of the 
Registrar should help to create policy guidelines that provide "a more conducive 
environment for the effective participation of victims and witnesses" 187sexual violence. 
The same report, published in 2004, also mentions for the first time HIV/AIDS when is 
reports about the hiring of three medical experts including a gynecologist, a psychologist 
"to improve access to and monitoring of medical support for victims and witnesses, 
including in relations to the management of HIV/AIDS." 188 The following report 
published, in 2005, states for the first time an actual number of HIV/AIDS infected 
183 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 2001, 17. 
184 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 2003,15. 
185 (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 2003, 16. 
186 (International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda 2002, 14. 
187 (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 2004, 15. 
188 Ibid., 15-6. 
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patients have only reported as being 39. The report also mentions nutritional supplements 
for HIV/AIDS patients.189 The 2007 annual report points to the continued support to help 
rape victims with their physical and psychological rehabilitation.190 
3. RESOURCES AND COMMITMENTS: 
The following other resources were also initiated because of the reported systematic 
nature of rape during the conflict: 
• Clinic of Hope in Kigali, a medical centre for counseling and medical care for 
female victims of violence. One stop-shop including legal advice and help. 
• AVEGA supporting women survivors of the genocide including health services 
and trauma counseling 191 A myriad of other non-governmental organization after 
the genocide help rape survivors to create self-help groups. Non-governmental 
organizations and international donors have recognized the potential of such 
groups. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Rwandan Women's Initiative 
has started to cooperate with these groups "empowering women politically and 
economically and reconstructing Rwandan society."192 
• SEVOTA organization that helps widows and orphans of the genocide193 ad 
Women's Network for Rural Development and PROFEMMES, an overarching 
organization of 35 Rwandan women's associations to create among all ethnicities 
a "culture of peace." 194 
189 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 2001, 15. 
190 (International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda 2007, 17. 
191 Coomaraswamy, Radhika., Special Rapporteur Violence against Women 1998, 25. 
192 Africa Union 2000, 152 
193 Coomaraswamy, Radhika., Special Rapporteur Violence against Women 1998, 25. 
194 Ibid., 26. 
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The Rapporteur asked after her 1997 Rwanda visit the UN and international 
community "to take some radical measures to ensure the effective functions of the 
ICTR"195 including special training of lawyers and Rwandan inter-ministerial task force 
about sexual violence.196 
F. CONCLUSION 
According to these findings, the actor and audience matrix concludes as follows: 
Table 4. ACTOR AND AUDIENCE MATRIX RWANDA II 
Actors 
Audience 
The State incl. 
Political 
Opposition 
Intl. Institutions NGOs / TANs / 
Civil Society 
National and Intl. 
Media 







195 Coomaraswamy, Radhika., Special Rapporteur Violence against Women 1998, 27. 




If one compares Rwanda with the war in Bosnia, both conflicts are similar in their 
horrific utilization of rape as a systematic tool of warfare, yet different in its ultimate 
execution. Rwanda was the fastest genocide in recorded recent human history while 
Bosnia was describes by some as "the slaughter took place as if in slow motion" and with 
the United Nations looking on. 197 Likewise, the parallels are significant, yet different. 
The International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia became the first internationally 
recognized entity to charge officials with rape as a crime against humanity. Rwanda and 
its tribunal, however, continued where the Yugoslavian Tribunal had left off in making 
its initial mark. In its unprecedented Akayesu ruling, it connected rape to genocide and 
therefore, even further securitized the systematic utilization of rape during conflict. 
As this case study showed, international institutions primarily through legal 
rulings by the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda were instrumental in 
securitizing rape as a systematic weapon of war. Also other measures initiated or 
enforced by the newly appointed Special Rapporteur of Violence Against Women, for 
example, have underscored the securitization of rape in the 1990s. Additionally, the 
197 Rieff 1995, 120. 
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consistent presence of human rights advocacy groups such as the Human Rights Watch 
and in particular the late board member Allison DeForges have immensely contributed to 
the securitization of rape. Yet, how successful in their effectiveness these measurers, 
resources and commitments were remains questionable. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ANALYSIS/CONCLUSION: RAPE - A MATTER OF HUMANITY 
Bosnia gave the world the imagery of rape camps in the heart of Europe; Rwanda 
the imagery of machetes and banana stems transformed into instruments of rape, sexual 
torture and genocide in the heart of Africa. The imagery of massacred rape victims piled 
up, the corpses of dead young women and young girls "laid out with their dresses over 
their heads, the legs spread and bent. You could see what seemed to be semen drying or 
dried," according to former UN commander Romeo Dallaire's testimony.1 
Both conflicts provided atrocious accounts unseen and unheard - unread and 
"unlistened" to before. Narratives about the most brutal and most primitive weaponry of 
terror, rape as an ancient method of war re-discovered and re-utilized anew at the advent 
of the 21st century. Yet, amid the most unimaginable, the anguish and the suffering of 
hundreds of thousands of women, girls and children during both conflicts, something else 
happened. The suffering mattered. It was a shift, an un-licensing, an undoing of a status 
quo, endorsed for centuries. An unraveling of the unspoken; a new look at the customs, 
rules and the once so well-established narrative of war. This shift began to reevaluate the 
intersection of women and war, rape and security. It reexamined how the global 
community saw, valued, judged, upheld, safeguarded and protected human life and 
human dignity - and fundamental human rights. It sparked a shift that regarded a new 
subset of war and a new generation of human terror intolerable. 
During both conflicts rape as a weapon of war became more than an inconvenient 
and unfortunate incident, more than an opportunistic byproduct of conflict, a silent and 
' Nowrojee, Binaifer 2003,4 
202 
accepted systematic tool of warfare, more than a violation of international law. It became 
a violation of a collective global conscience, a shock to a set of values and to a political 
consciousness, which could no longer accept the unacceptable. 
According to the prescribed processes of Buzan and Waever's Securitization 
Theory, as these two case studies indicate, rape was effectively securitized during both 
conflicts. Bosnia and Rwanda represent effective markers and pivotal turning points, 
which not only caused securitization - but initiated, aggravated and even demanded 
continuous securitization afterward. Both conflicts have left their marks. They tested a 
legal status quo and challenging a well-established institutionalized complacency in 
regard to wartime rape. They questioned set and accepted assumptions and norms about 
wartime rape, expanded international legal parameters - and pushed against a hitherto 
permissible and complacent security environment that had previously surrounded the 
subject of rape. Both conflicts established precedents unseen before about the intersection 
of sexual violence and conflict. 
Securitization in the case studies Bosnia and Rwanda was primarily established 
through the speech act, by rhetorically connecting rape to security, through "speaking" of 
rape as a security matter - and/or as a matter that had or established specific security 
implications. Through speaking of rape as a concept within the realm of security, rape 
adopted specific threat components. Rape was made visible as a threat to not only a 
community as an insular entity, but to a regional and global environment. It attached 
itself rhetorically to strategic objectives of war: to the survival and the extermination of a 
specific ethnical group, to the systematic tainting of identity, the political and social 
dismantling and destruction of a community, the forced expulsion of a population for the 
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specific strategic objective to gain territory and political power. Rape developed a very 
specific security character with real implications and consequences. It became 
successfully securitized. 
This chapter elaborates and underscores this successful securitization and its 
ramifications. It also explores why and how Securitization Theory and its application to 
rape as a weapon of war need to adjust some of its prescribed processes to accommodate 
the specific security character of rape. This chapter examines why, for example, de-
securitization or the return of rape to the political realm or sphere ("it again can be dealt 
with the regular way") is not a desirable or even a viable option in case of wartime rape. 
It explores why an issue such as rape needs to remain securitized and how international 
institutions - and the continuing rise of norms - are instrumental and critical in this 
process. This section underscores the argument for permanent securitization through 
articulating the problems and setbacks that still today taint, haunt and thwart the 
prosecution of wartime rape. Such examples include the lack of data, the lack of adequate 
data collection and an increasingly apparent explicit or implicit judicial reluctance 
(politically or socially underwritten) of key actors to prosecute wartime rape. It also takes 
a look at future and lasting security implications and repercussions, resulting from rape 
utilized during war. Such security-specific consequences include children born out of 
wartime rape, HIV/AIDS infections and a look at the rise of a new generation of war, 
which has increasingly licensed wartime rape as a convenient, effective and cheap new 
weaponry of choice. 
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A. SUCCESSFUL SECURITIZATION 
During and after the conflicts of Bosnia and Rwanda, rape adopted specific 
security dynamics. Reports about the systematic utilization of rape as a strategic weapon 
of war in Bosnia and Rwanda - with specific strategic objectives - thrust rape into the 
forefront of foreign policy and security discourse. News reports about rape camps in the 
former Yugoslavia and later the subtle emergence of reports about mass rapes in Rwanda 
not only triggered a global emotional outrage, but it institutionalized a response to rape 
during war. Non-governmental organizations such as the Human Rights Watch, women's 
groups and transnational networks such as Amnesty International began to push United 
Nations to act. The institutionalized response attached security implications to mass rape. 
Rape was no longer seen as an unfettered by-product of war, but a method of warfare, an 
intolerable violation of international law. And by doing so, it developed a specific 
security character. It took on a nature that diverged and transcended beyond the 
conventional and the previously established - the political. It became securitized. The 
application of Securitization Theory can explain this process - how wartime rape began 
to matter so differently compared to decades and centuries before. 
As indicated in the case studies of Bosnia and Rwanda, rape was successfully 
securitized throughout both conflicts because a) rape was presented by various actors 
such as international institutions, governments and the international media as an 
existential threat; b) an audience (such as international institutions and its international 
court systems e.g. criminal tribunals) deemed such threat as credible and c) the audience 
deployed extraordinary measures to address and curb these threats. 
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Different from decades and centuries ago, the increasingly globalized media and 
virtually communicating, networking and organizing non-governmental groups on the 
ground in Bosnia and Rwanda were critical for presenting rape to a securitization 
audience such as international institutions and foreign governments as a credible threat. 
Securitization theorists such as Bany Buzan call such security endorsement and 
underwriting a securitization move. 
The speech act, a specific rhetorical make-up of the narrative surrounding mass 
rape and the articulation of the urgency of action, became the underpinning of the 
securitization move. The speech act is facilitating of the securitization move. In both case 
studies the speech act becomes the rhetorical vessel that "speaks" of mass rapes as a 
security issue. It becomes the actual articulation of a security concern, the redefining of a 
political issue. It evolved into a security issue, a supra-apolitical concept that surpasses 
the conventional political. It becomes a matter of security. The security move becomes 
the representation of an issue as a security concern to a credible securitization audience 
(e.g. the United Nations). For example, in April 1993, during the Bosnian conflict the 
U.N. Security Council with resolution 820 for the first time referred to "the massive, 
organized and systematic detention and rape of women"2 and linked mass rapes to the 
violations of international human rights violations and the violation of humanitarian law. 
3 Terminology such as "massive," "organized' and "systematic" created a sense of 
urgency. In 1993, the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal of the Former 
Yugoslavia included rape as a crime against humanity and called these human rights 
2 ICTY, http://www.icty.Org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_re808_1993_en.pdf 1993,4. 
3 Ibid., 4. 
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violations in Bosnia "a threat to international peace and security." 4 Mahmoud Cherif 
Bassiouni, chairman of the UN Commission for Human Rights and the Commission's 
Special Rapporteur, in a final report in 1994 linked mass rape to ethnic cleansing and to 
specific war objectives such as gaining and controlling territory.5 Connecting specific 
terminology and selective language such as "detention sites" and "camps" to sexual 
violence emerge as pivotal rhetorical pointers, which underwrite this sense of urgency, 
outrage and threat. Similar in Rwanda, U.N. Security Council Resolution 955 created the 
ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda. The Tribunal's statute, similar to the 
ICTY, also immediately established that the atrocities committed during the conflict 
represented a threat to international peace and security.6 
As pointed out in the case studies, rape was elevated - through the securitization 
move - from a regular occurrence to a security issue. The discourse about wartime rape -
because of the systematic nature and strategic utilization of mass rapes in Bosnia and then 
in Rwanda - created a crisis environment and a sense of existential urgency. The speech 
act as a tool and identifying instrument was critical in recognizing these various 
rhetorical markers, which provided the underpinning for Securitization Theory. The 
speech act indicated a crisis mode. By rhetorically connecting these mass rapes 
specifically to security, by "uttering" the word security - or something that similarly 
resembles the notion of security - actors such as international institutions, the media, 
non-governmental organizations and governments articulated the need for action. A sense 
of urgency was created. Rape became a security threat. And something needed to be done 
to curtail this brewing and growing security crisis. 
4 ICTY, http://www.icty.Org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute re808_1993_en.pdf 1993,4. 
5 United Nations Security Council Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni 1994, 73. 
6 United Nations Security Council 1994, 1. 
207 
The speech act not only remained a rhetorical, passive mechanism, but had very 
real, tangible and active implications. The securitization move underwritten by the speech 
act moved rape from the political to the security sphere. The speech act, as indicated in 
both case studies, was functional, effective - and as such consequential. International key 
actors such as international institutions and governments "spoke" of rape - and linked 
rape to security - and brought it to the attention of an audience. As a result of the speech 
act, for example, the U.N. Security Council acted and passed consequential resolutions. 
The sheer fact for the U.N. Security Council to establish in 1993 the Yugoslavian and 
then in 1994 the Rwandan criminal tribunals, and to immediately incorporate rape and 
sexual violence as an intricate part of both tribunal's statutes, is significant and 
fundamentally telling. It represents securitization. The U.N. Security Council through the 
establishment of the international tribunals of Bosnia and Rwanda and their statutes has 
specifically acknowledged that the atrocities during both conflicts, including mass rapes, 
have presented "a threat to national and international peace and security."7 Rape as a 
weapon of war was securitized. This moved the traditional view and interpretation of war 
rape immediately to a different level - and into the realm of securitization. 
The move from the political to the domain of security, then endorsed the third 
stage and the most effective and active level of securitization: the deployment of 
extraordinary measures. Buzan describes these measures as so severe and so different 
from anything previously deployed; a sheer violations of established rules, norms and 
ordinary regulations. They become the driving force of securitizations. In the cases of 
Bosnia and Rwanda, these measures included an array of extraordinary, unique and 
7 United Nations Security Council 1994, 1 and United Nations Security Council Resolution 752 
United Nations Security Council 1992,1. 
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consequential actions. Most significantly, however, they included very specific legal 
measurers deployed through international law. The International Criminal Tribunals of 
the former Yugoslavia and then Rwanda - the first international war crime courts 
established since the Nurnberg trials after World War II - expanded the existing judicial 
parameters of international law. They deployed extraordinary measurers unseen and 
unheard before. 
The judges of the International Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia, for example, 
for the first time in the history of war crime tribunals, charged and convicted war rapists 
for crimes against humanity - and issued long prison sentences. For the first time in 
history, wartime rape did not just receive meaningless lip service, but it was treated as a 
war crime. It became a human rights violation, which was prosecuted and did no longer 
enjoy impunity. Rape became a violation of international law with severe legal 
ramifications in the international court of law. 
While the judges of the Yugoslavian tribunal convicted officials and soldiers for 
the first time of rape, the judges of the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda 
expanded the newly carved out international legal terrain even further. They issued the 
first convictions of rape as a distinct feature and mechanism of genocide. Former 
Rwandan officials, ministers and town mayors were not only convicted of rape, but held 
accountable in an international court of law for utilizing rape as a weapon of genocide. 
The Rwandan International Criminal Tribunal deemed incidents of the systematic mass 
rapes during the 1994 conflict as a systematic tool and weapon of genocide, setting a 
legal precedent, up until then unparalleled in international law. Mass rape was for the first 
time in history linked to genocide, the systematic mass extinction of one group of people. 
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Mass rape was recognized as an instrument of systematic mass murder - and legally 
articulated and penalized as such. 
However, the conflicts of Bosnia and Rwanda not only as insular events caused 
this shift of recognizing mass rape as a war crime - but both conflicts became distinct 
markers that moved international institutions forward toward a consistent securitization 
of rape. Institutions such as the U.N. Security Council invoked specific measures that 
continued to securitize mass wartime rape beyond these two specific conflicts. For 
example, in 1998, the Rome Statute, which was signed by 120 states, not only established 
the International Criminal Court (ICC), but continued to securitize wartime rape. 
Mirroring the Bosnian and Rwandan examples, the Statute's section 3 defines rape and 
sexual violence specifically as a war crime and crime against humanity that could 
resemble acts of genocide. Additionally, the United Nations took on additional measurers 
to advance the securitization of rape. In 2000, the U.N. Security Council passed with 
resolution 1325 for the first time in its history an U.N. document that articulated the link 
between systematic sexual violence and war and addressed the inherent international 
responsibility to protect women and children from systematic rape during warfare. "It 
was a demand for establishing women as equal voices in making decisions pertaining to 
peace, security, and ultimately power."8 It also emphasized the implementation of critical 
mechanisms to increase women's "role in decision-making with regard to conflict 
prevention and resolution."9 
The Bosnian and Rwandan convictions also set a precedent for the international 
legal system to bring war rapists of other conflicts to justice. International indictments 
8 Kuehnast, Kathleen, de Jonge Oudraat, Chantal, and Helga Hemes, ed. 2011, 21. 
9 United Nations Security Council 2000, 1. 
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and arrest warrants gained traction. The International Criminal Court, for example, 
investigated the 2002-2003 armed conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR) and 
issued an arrest warrant for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, former Congolese vice-president. 
Gombo, who was known to utilize sexual violence as a method to terrorize local 
population, was charged with numerous counts of murder and rape. In early 2012 this 
trial, which is curiously watched by the international activists and organizations, was still 
ongoing at the ICC. 
Another high profile ICC action included the indictment and issuance of the arrest 
warrant for Sudan President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir. AI-Bashir has become the 
first sitting head-of-state, indicted by an international criminal court. According to the 
arrest warrant, the ICC charged Al-Bashir with several counts of crimes against 
humanity, including the rape of "thousands of civilian women."10 In a historical move in 
2010, additional counts of genocide - in connection with rape - were added. Similar to 
the Rwanda ruling, the ICC linked rape to genocide. ICC judges not only specifically 
defined genocide as the killing or causing serious bodily or mental harm, but also found 
evidence in Darfur for genocide to function "by deliberately inflicting on each target 
group conditions of life calculated to bring about the group's physical destruction." 
Citing various witness accounts, the ICC concluded that rape was mechanism of 
genocide, attained through the systematic intent to taint identity and erase a specific 
ethnicity. "After they abused us, they told us now we would have Arab babies and if they 
could find any Fur woman, they would rape them again to change the colour of their 
children"11 one ICC witness statement read. 
10 International Criminal Court 2009, 6. 
11 International Criminal Court 2010, 10. 
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The prosecutor's application for the arrest warrant for Al-Bashir details the notion 
of genocidal intent by utilizing mass rape in Sudan. The application calls the mass rapes 
of women and young children in Darfur as "an integral part of the pattern of destruction 
1 9 that the Government of the Sudan is inflicting upon the target groups in Darfur." The 
ICC in particular built on the legal legacy of the previous ad hoc tribunals of the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. It specifically, for example, cited the International Criminal 
Tribunal of Rwanda and the historic 1998 Akayesu verdict, which for the first time 
connected genocide to mass rape. "As described by the ICTR in the Akayesu, they use 
rape to kill the will, the spirit, and life itself,"13 the application reads. 
Additionally to a growing institutionalized international legal footprint, the United 
Nations similarly made progress toward a more rigorous and defined structural 
framework for wartime rape. This again represents a move toward securitization of rape. 
In 2009, the U.N. Security Council passed resolution 1820 with which it tried to flesh out 
the rather timid parameters of resolution 1325 and to remove some of 1325's limitations 
and weaknesses. Some of these limitations included the Security Council's rather 
ambivalent commitment to a more pointedly articulation of the link between mass rape 
and security. For example, resolution 1820 specifically points to the notion that the 
systematic nature of rape "may impede the restoration of international peace and 
security" 14 and suggests that measurers against systematic sexual violence will aid 
international peace and security. The resolution expands the character of resolution 1325, 
pointing to a more forceful role and a more active involvement of the Security Council in 
regard to wartime rape. It, for example, uniquely emphasizes a growing sense of 
12 International Criminal Court 2010, 5. 
13 Ibid., 5. 
14 United Nations Security Council 2009, 2. 
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international responsibility. Differently from 1325, it specifically asks for the "the 
Council's readiness when considering situations on its agenda to, where necessary, adopt 
appropriate steps to address widespread or systematic sexual violence."15 
Institutions began to increasingly cooperate with women's group, non­
governmental organizations and local non-profit groups on the ground to integrate a 
gender perspective into peace and conflict resolution processes. In Rwanda since the 
1994 genocide, for example, an array of women-specific non-profit groups and non­
governmental organizations such as AVEGA and the Rwanda Women's Network became 
a driving force in the effort to rebuild the country. AVEGA, which was founded in 
January 1995 by 50 genocide widows, has emerged in the meantime as the country's 
largest non-governmental organization for genocide victims including thousands of 
children and orphans, aiding thousands of child-headed households.16 The organization is 
focusing on the psychological and social rebuilding of women and their communities, to 
provide legal aid and assistance for female genocide survivors, in particular rape 
survivors. AVEGA also still today is providing housing and maintaining an array of 
economic programs for genocide widows to provide an economic base and generate 
income. These programs, for example, include myriad livestock and other agricultural 
and initiatives.17 
In other countries that have suffered and are still suffering from systematically 
instituted mass rapes such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and East Timor, 
local women's groups also cooperate very closely with "the UN gender Advisor and 
15 1820 Strategy Session International Women's Tribune Centre 2009. 
16 AVEGA 2007. 
17 Ibid. 
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Gender Affairs units within UN peacekeeping missions" 18 to promote the inclusion of 
women into the daily decision making processes, for women's voices to be heard and to 
for gender perspectives to be addressed. 
International institutions such as the United Nations and a growing international 
judicial framework including the International Criminal Court, the European Court of 
Justice and European Court of Human Rights and have become instrumental in the 
securitization of wartime rape - and in the process to keep rape securitized. In particular 
in a post-Cold War environment, in which ideological fault lines have eroded and 
paralyzed the effectiveness of the United Nations, these institutions have seen a renewed 
impetus and political legitimacy. An array of critical non-state actors - non-governmental 
organizations such as Human Rights Watch and transnational networks such as Amnesty 
International - has pushed the United Nations to reclaim its global authority. The 
presence of non-governmental and transnational organizations, an increasingly globalized 
media and digital social networking have made rape visible - and forced the continued 
recognition of rape as a war crime and a severe violation of humanitarian law. 
International institutions such as the United Nations, an expanding international court 
system and the consistent rise of norms - and subsequently its increasing global 
recognition as such - has become critical cornerstone in the process of keeping rape as a 
weapon of war securitized. 
B. WHAT LIES AHEAD: DE-SECURITIZATION AND THE FUTURE OF 
THE SECURITIZATION OF RAPE 
The application of Securitization Theory - while successful in its execution in the 
case studies of Bosnia and Rwanda - needs to adapt to the unique security character of 
18 Tickner, J. Ann and Sjoberg, Laura ed. al. 2011, 84. 
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rape. Otherwise the successful securitization of rape will regress into the political realm. 
Such reversal and de-securitizations will have significant detrimental effects. For 
example, the prosecution of wartime tape will lose its capacity as a deterrence 
mechanism. Mass rape will once again become an unfortunate, yet permissible, common 
and opportunistic part of war - without consequences. Rape as a war crime will lose its 
judicial and institutionalized traction, its effect as a deterrence - and become once again 
mute. Securitization Theory, therefore, needs to adjust some of its prescribed processes to 
accommodate and adapt the specific security character of rape. In particular, the aspect of 
de-securitization needs to be revisited, revised and adjusted. De-securitization - reverting 
a threat or a security issue to the political realm - is not a viable option for wartime rape. 
The consequences of the failure of not keeping rape securitized are already visible and 
evident, for example, in the growing reluctance of the Rwandan tribunal and local judges 
to prosecute rape cases. 
A constant ambiguity, hesitance and caution within international institutions such 
as the United Nations remained evident in the 1990s. For example, the fact that the U.N. 
Population Fund instead of the U.N. Security Council was tasked to investigate in 1999 
the reported mass rapes in Kosovo underscores the persistent ambiguity with which 
international institutions struggled. De-securitization would once again remove rape from 
the aspect of security19 and only perpetuate such consistent struggle. The Kosovo case 
underscored the initially conflicting attitude and ambiguous relationship of international 
institutions and sexual violence and the nexus of rape as a domestic/individual concern or 
national/collective security issue. 
19 Coomaraswamy, Radhika, Special Rapporteur 1999. 
20 Hansen, Lene 2001,56. 
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According to Buzan, after extraordinary measures have been successfully 
deployed (targeting and curtailing the threat), de-securitization takes place. Such de-
securitization, according to Buzan, would return rape to the political realm or sphere of 
regular politics ("it again can be dealt with the regular way"). De-securitization would 
reverse securitization. It would revert an issue to its previous state because the threat has 
been successfully curtailed or even eradicated. This concluding step and circular process 
of securitization, however, is not a desirable option in the case of wartime rape. De-
securitization, according to Buzan, is the removal of an issue from the security agenda. 
The threat has been defused, an issue appropriately - and successfully - addressed. Such 
diffusion, however, is not a viable option when it comes to wartime rape. The de-
securitization of rape would diminish the strides and progress accomplished in the 
process of securitizing mass rape. Rape as a weapon of war has adopted a specific 
security character because of its simplistic and yet very effective nature. With the rise of 
a new generation of war - conflict fought across tribal and ethnical fault lines fueled by 
warlord rivalry over resources and regional dominance - rape has displayed a unique 
security character. Rape cannot be de-securitized - reverted into the political realm -
because of its persistent "attractiveness" as a cheap and effective weapon. Even an 
inadvertent de-securitization of rape - the "falling-off" of the global radar - will have 
devastating consequences. Even today, for example, the persistent lack of data, 
inadequate data collection and an increasing explicit and/or implicit judicial fatigue and 
reluctance of key actors - politically and socially/culturally underwritten - to prosecute 
wartime rape are indicators of why rape needs to remain securitized. And international 
216 
institutions - and the continuing rise of norms - are and will remain critical components 
in this securitization process. 
C. WHAT LIES AHEAD: THE NUMBER PROBLEM 
The prosecution of wartime rape even today is significantly hampered, for 
example, by the lack of data, the lack of inadequate methods to collect data and its 
insufficient analysis. Consequently, the ramifications of such lack of data or the lack of 
reliable data and inadequate data analyses have still today remained under-researched and 
under-documented. 
The contradiction between "a strikingly low conviction rate for rape or sexual 
violence offences, but relatively strong and repeated recognition of rape as a widespread 
and instrumental component of the genocide" (Buss 147) in Rwanda underscores this 
predicament. A European Commission working paper published in December 2011 in 
regard to Bosnia's application for EU membership, mentions that "the prosecution of war 
crime cases involving sexual violence remains low."21 
While in the 1990s, international media exhaustively delved into the coverage of 
rape camps and sexual violence during the Bosnia conflict, news reports of systematic 
sexual violence as a form of ethnic cleansing during the 1994 Rwandan genocide 
surfaced only gradually, if not reluctantly. Likewise, the initial lack of academic research 
and the sporadic anecdotal accounts and narratives of mass rapes in Rwanda were 
reflective of this rather timid public awakening to the scope and scale of sexual violence 
in Rwanda. Some scholars have only marginally addressed, if not completely bypassed, 
the argument of rape as a systematic tool of war. Scott Straus, for example, in his 2006 
survey admits that he did not focus on sexual violence during his interviews with 
21 European Commission Staff 2011, 14. 
217 
Rwandan genocide perpetrators. In fact, he concludes in his research that "very few 
Rwandan men in fact confessed to raping women - an offense that, under Rwandan law, 
could carry the death penalty."22 While the U.N., non-governmental organizations and 
international judicial bodies acknowledged sexual violence as a critical component of the 
Rwandan genocide machinery, Scott's survey disregards it. "Almost all said that they did 
not witness rapes; they mostly said that the rule was to kill women, not rape them. A few 
said that they had heard that women were raped."23 
The burgeoning field of conflict and sexual violence struggles with the consistent 
lack of quantitative research. Robust and reliable data is critical in this effort since, for 
example, some of the challenges with tracing sexual violence during the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide centered specifically on the non-existence or the unreliability of data. As 
recently as 2009, scholars have discovered only one extensive victim survey as an 
attempt to estimate the extent of sexual violence and rape during that time. This survey 
was spearheaded by the Rwandan Ministry for the Family and the Promotion of Women 
and published in 1995. The report found "only" 15,700 rape victims. Scholars, however, 
almost immediately challenged these assumptions since the data was extrapolated and 
based on estimated reports of 5,000 "war babies" born out of genocide-related rape. "A 
much higher number of raped women were killed after being raped and so never 
delivered a child,"24argued scholars afterward. Further, to infer the number of rape 
victims from census numbers of the Tutsi population was also fundamentally flawed 
22 Straus, Scott 2006, 162. 
23 Ibid., 162) 
14 Bijleveld, Catrien. Morssinkhof, Aafke and Smeuler, Alette. 2009,215. 
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since in general "the (Hutu-led) - government systematically tried to underestimate the 
number of Tutsis."25 
In 2002, the Rwandan Ministry for Local Government reported that nearly 1.1 
million people died as a result of the genocide. Initially, scholars and experts estimated 
about 250,000 rapes during the Rwandan genocide. This number is also based on so-
called "rape babies," but according to the Human Rights Watch, was inferred from 2,000 
to 5,000 pregnancies caused by rape during the genocide. The non-profit group estimated 
"yfs 100 rapes per pregnancy and it concluded that approximately 250,000 rapes occurred 
during the conflict. However, by referring to the 1991 Rwandan census, Straus in his 
2006 survey insists that only 163,738 Tutsi women over the age of 14 lived in Rwanda 
during the genocide. Straus further argues that women under the age of 14 were raped 
and others multiple times, but since women were killed just as quickly as men, Straus 
states that the rape estimate of 250,000 rapes was probably too high. "The extent of this 
sexual violence is unclear and may never be fully revealed" but "what can be said with 
certainty is that sexual violence was common and was an important dimension of the 
genocide."27 
A 2009 statistical analysis concluded that, in all surviving women, "between 
12,625 and 166,660 women have been raped at least once."28 Most recently, new efforts 
to collect and infer from more reliable and accurate data have estimated 360,000 rape 
victims, who survived or were killed during the Rwandan genocide.29 The "dearth of 
information" and lack of data during the chaos contributed to the ambiguous and 
25 Bijleveld, Catrien. Morssinkhof, Aafke and Smeuler, Alette. 2009,217. 
26 Straus, Scott 2006, 52. 
27 Ibid., 52. 
28 Bijleveld, Catrien. Morssinkhof, Aafke and Smeuler, Alette. 2009,218. 
29 Ibid., 219. 
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fragmented data collection. "Attention was directed more at the number of deaths than at 
surviving victims of rape. Registration of the number of rape victims probably had no 
• «30 priority. 
During a June 2009 colloquium in The Hague about sexual violence, scholars and 
experts addressed how best to develop methods to better quantify and evidentiary 
underscore wartime rape as a crime against humanity. The underreporting of rape and 
sexual violence needs to be addresses through a variety of measures on the evidence 
collection level and analysis, they concluded. For example, evidence needs to be 
interpreted and analyzed in an unbiased and impartial way.31 Xabier Agirre Aranburu 
found that in order for institutions and international legal systems to recognize sexual 
violence a such, judges, investigators and professionals in the field need to be trained 
how to identify appropriate evidence. Operational adjustments need to be implemented 
including guidance "how to look actively for the relevant evidence and interact 
emphatically with victims and witnesses."32 
D. WHAT LIES AHEAD: A MATTER OF JUSTICE 
Not all justice is equal. Nor is it fair. And justice surrounding the nexus of sexual 
violence and war unfortunately has seen both, the absence of fairness and equality, 
underwritten by a judicial reluctance and the lack of political will to continue to prosecute 
wartime rape. The prosecution of rape and sexual violence often faces a higher bar of 
evidentiary standards during national and international prosecution. For example, the lax 
prosecution of wartime rape by the Rwandan Tribunal has been called by some experts 
"shameful" and grossly inadequate. The Tribunal's prosecutor's office was also very 
30 Straus, Scott 2006, 220. 
31 Aranburu, Xabier Agirre 2010,627. 
32 Ibid.,, 627. 
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heavily criticized because often times rape cases were measured by a different set of 
standards. Often these cases, for example, had to meet "a higher evidentiary standard."33 
Evidence of such judicial inequality comes, for example, from numerous anecdotes 
experienced firsthand by tribunal judges, expert witnesses and officials such as Xabier 
Agirre Aranburu. Aranburu was an analyst of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
from 1997 to 2004 and today is a senior analyst at the International Criminal Court. 
Aranburu recalled witnessing during the 1990s how other judges and prosecutors refused 
"to deal with allegations of sexual violence, neglecting the relevant evidence, or setting 
higher standards of evidence."34 
Aranburu recalled being stopped from drafting an indictment that included a 
reference to sexual violence in the 1990s by senior attorneys because "there was not 
sufficient evidence" to do so.35 One of these attorneys then told Aranburu that rape and 
sexual violence cases were "very annoying and difficult to prove." Aranburu saw the 
problem about sexual violence prosecution hinging on a) the absence of sensitivity and 
awareness about the problem, usually at the part of senior male officers and b) sexual 
'Xl 
violence and rape is still considered in many countries a taboo topic. 
Likewise, Kenyan Binaifer Nowrojee, a lifelong Human Rights advocate who 
authored the 1996 Human Rights Watch report "Shattered Lives" about mass rapes 
during the Rwandan genocide and expert witness for the ICTR, consistently criticized the 
Rwandan Tribunal for unduly delaying justice for mass rape survivors. In a 2003 working 
paper, which was later published for the UN Research Institute for Social Development, 
33 Aranburu, Xabier Agirre 2010, 611. 
34 Ibid., 611. 
35 Ibid., 611. 
36 Ibid., 611. 
37 Ibid., 612. 
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Nowrojee refers to rape cases tried by the Rwandan Tribunal as "squandered 
opportunities" and called the prosecution of rape cases by the Tribunal as "dismal."38 
Nowrojee cites a lack of political will at the Tribunal's prosecutor's office.39 As of May 
2004, the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, the ICTR accounted for only 1B 
convictions.40 While during the Rwandan genocide an estimated 250,000 to 500,000 
women were raped, only a small portion of those convictions included rape. Nowrojee 
questioned specifically a disproportioned number of defendants, who were acquitted 
because the prosecution was not able to provide evidence and prove rape beyond 
reasonable doubt. Additionally, according to Nowrojee's findings, the prosecution never 
appealed any of the rape case acquittals. "How can this be?"41 Nowrojee asked. 
While 2000 Human Rights Commission report cites numerous narratives of rape 
cases, the report also reads that the first indictment of sexual violence at the ICTR did not 
come until 1997 "only after heavy international pressure from women's groups."42 The 
Special Rappoteur Radhika Coomaraswamy in 2000 raised concerns about the lack of 
cases that underscored the "discrepancy between the reality that women faced during the 
genocide and the present lack of prominence - some might say invisibility of sexual 
violence cases before both the international and national courts."43 The Special 
Rapporteur also questioned that only very few individuals by 1997 had been charged of 
sexual violence despite of all the legal mechanisms put in place earlier through the 
38 Nowrojee, Binaifer 2003,2. 
39 Ibid., 2. 
^Ibid., 5. 
41 Ibid., 6. 
42 Coomaraswamy, Radhika., Special Rapporteur Violence against Women 1998, 9. 
43 Ibid., 9. 
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Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia."Why had the creative jurisprudence developed at the 
ICTY in The Hague not left its mark at the ICTR?"44 
Other critics warn not to see the unique and unprecedented rulings of both ad hoc 
tribunals - the rape convictions and the legal expansion of rape as a tool of genocide - as 
watershed convictions, which spur other such rulings, but to contrary: as an initial 
appeasement of women's groups and human rights organization, which brought on 
judicial complacency. Nowrojee called the groundbreaking Akayesu conviction of the 
Rwandan tribunal, for example, "an exception, an anomaly."45 Quoting Rwandan rape 
survivors, Nowrojee not only cited the failure of the Rwandan tribunal to bring justice, 
but also how it actually aggravates the "tendency to exacerbate"46 the suffering of rape 
survivors. Such prolonged and continued suffering originates from a two-fold failure of 
the tribunal, according to Nowrojee. The tribunal a) did not create a body of record 
(through convictions) that reflected the actual scope and scale of rape as a weapon of 
genocide during the conflict and b) it did not ensure the proper and appropriate treatment 
of rape survivors and witnesses, including protecting these survivors from the societal 
stigma 47 To have one's voice heard, to matter and to create meaning from horror is a 
longing often displayed by survivors of genocide, most prominently by Holocaust and 
Nazi concentration camp survivors.48 
Other aspects also play into how survivors as the individual and a nation as a 
collective body are able to heal and rebuild after genocide and mass rape. Historical 
accuracy - the truthful interpretation of historical events such as the systematic rape of 
44 Coomaraswamy, Radhika., Special Rapporteur Violence against Women 1998, 11. 
45 Nowrojee, Binaifer 2003, 6. 
46 Ibid., 7. 
47 Ibid., 7. 
48 Ibid., 8. 
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women and children during the Rwandan genocide - is a mechanism for rape survivors to 
create meaning. Nowrojee concludes, however, that the accurate narrative of the genocide 
and mass rape and its record are at risk to be compromised. "If the current trend 
continues, when the doors of the ICTAR close, the judgments from this court will not tell 
the full story of what happened."49 To elaborate on such prospect of failure further, 
Nowrojee additionally argues that the absence of rape convictions will not only downplay 
the effect of mass rape during the conflict, but, in fact, "will deny that these crimes 
occurred" and full and fair justice "remains unattainable."50 
To date, the Tribunal has produced 900,000 pages of transcripts, audio and video 
recordings of more than 6,000 trial days and more than 10,000 decisions. It also, 
according to the current ICTR president, Judge Khalida Rachid Khan, has heard "more 
than 26,000 hours of testimony from more than 3,200 witnesses."51 Throughout the 
tribunal struggled almost from the beginning with structural and operational problems 
and challenges. 
The tribunal had almost immediately difficulty to staff its prosecutor office. By 
August 1996, staff members only accounted for only half a dozen people.52 The Special 
Rapporteur of Violence Against Women Radhika Coomaraswamy in 1998 reported that 
many of the prosecutors were young and inexperienced, in particular regarding sexual 
violence cases.53 The trials were held in Arusha, Tanzania, but the prosecution's office 
49 Nowrojee, Binaifer 2003, 9. 
50Ibid., 9. 
51 Khan 2011 
52 International Criminal Tribunal Rwanda 1994, 6. 
53 Coomaraswamy, Radhika., Special Rapporteur Violence against Women 1998, 11. 
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was in Kigali. Security concerns were also cited as key reasons why so few women 
testified in rape cases.54 
The ICTR already in its early stages had to fend off a "serious leadership crisis, low 
morale and marked ineffectiveness," according to report by the United Nations Office of 
Internal Oversight Services in February 1997.55 Human Rights Watch board member and 
Rwanda expert Allison DesForges wrote in 1999 that "when the office of the Prosecutor 
began its work in Rwanda, its staff encountered an atmosphere of general hostility to the 
U.N."56 Likewise, the original plan for more transparency of the trial procedures e.g. "to 
bring televised [tribunal] hearing to local communities"57 has never been materialized. 
Already in 1998, for example, the Tribunal only had direct access to two telephone 
lines and email.58 In her 1998 report special UN rapporteur Radhika Coomaraswamy 
pointed to the shortfall of resources at the UN Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights for Rwandan staff.59 In the early days of the Tribunal, additionally not 
only the sheer lack of resources, but the lack of well-trained staff contributed to the 
"spotty investigations"60 of sexual violence cases. Some also called attention to potential 
misappropriation of funds and resources. Already in fall 1996, the tribunal was 
investigated because of allegations of "serious operational and financial deficiencies." 61 
During her 1998 visit, the rapporteur also mentioned her disappointment about 
"the lack of a concerted United nations strategy and/or program to deal with violence 
against women in Rwanda," noting the absence of any program by any UN agency or 
54 Coomaraswamy, Radhika., Special Rapporteur Violence against Women 1998, 11-3. 
55 Ibid., 14. 
56 Des Forges, Alison 1999, 573. 
57 Ibid., 574. 
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operation active in Rwanda.62 The lack of leadership coupled with personal bias and 
judicial reluctance to take rape seriously strained the efforts and effectiveness of the 
Rwandan tribunal. Nowrojee asserts in her 2003 paper, for example, that mostly during 
the four-year term of prosecutor Carla Del Ponte most "damage to gender justice was 
done."63 According to Nowrojee, the number of sexual violence charges dropped during 
this period significantly, for example, in 1999-2000 from 100 percent to 35 percent in 
2001/2002. 64 Also during Del Ponte's term, the Tribunal's sexual violence investigative 
team was dismantled. 
These numbers, for example, compare glaringly different to the 2002 tribunal held 
in Sierra Leona. There most indictments include sexual violence charges.65 However, not 
only political will but also the lack of consistent and accurate crime investigation 
hampered efforts of the Tribunal to charge and convict rape perpetrators.66 The tribunal 
procedures were marred by "prioritizing scheduling over justice," Nowrojee wrote. The 
Tribunal perpetuated an environment conducive to and supportive of an attitude that 
"continued silence and impunity surrounding these rapes." 
The distant location of the Tribunal in neighboring Tanzania added to the 
silencing of the narrative of the Rwandan genocide and mass rape. It portrayed a "sense 
of alienation from the ICT and its irrelevance to the ordinary Rwandan."68 Additionally, 
the usually male defense attorneys and prosecutors perpetuated a condescending and 
disrespectful environment during the rape trials. Many rape victims have been 
62 Coomaraswamy, Radhika., Special Rapporteur Violence against Women 1998, 22. 
63 Nowrojee, Binaifer 2003, 11. 
64 Ibid., 12. 
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"harangued and harassed on the stand by defense counsel without intervention by the 
prosecution."69 In October 2001, for example, judges reportedly "burst out laughing" 
while a rape survivor was cross-examined. 70Nowrojee asked in her 2003 conclusion 
whether these initial and watershed rulings are just "for some more lofty, albeit 
important, cause of "international justice" rather than for the survivors of war and 
genocide."71 
The Rwandan tribunal also struggled with capturing fugitives due to lacking 
T) 
cooperation of "third party states to help apprehend these men." Prosecutors in 
particular blamed Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo to have done little to 
apprehend fugitives known to be within their territory. They concluded that these 
countries need to "intensify cooperation and render all necessary assistance to the ICTR 
in connection with efforts to bring" all indicted perpetrators to justice.73 Also the sheer 
volume of case and a general case overload added to the reluctance of other states to 
accept cases referred by the Tribunal. No other country but the national courts of Rwanda 
has indicated a desire to receive more of these cases."74 
Rape or sexual violence seem to have disappeared from the tribunal's agenda in later 
Tribunal reports to the U.N. References to rape were completely missing in the annual 
Tribunal UN reports of 2006,2008 or 2009. The tribunal's support programs, which were 
originally designed to help rape victims, also appear to have suffered financial 
challenges. In 2010 and 2011, the report mentioned the depletion of the Trust Fund for 
69 Nowrojee, Binaifer 2003, 23. 
70 Ibid., 24. 
71 Ibid., 25. 
72 United Nations/Michael P. Scharf 1994. 
73 United Nations Security Council 2008, 10. 
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the Support Programme for Witnesses. Another problem still today includes providing 
safe conditions for people who have been eventually by the Tribunal acquitted as they 
have to remain in safe houses in Tanzania due to security concern. 
Also, Khan criticized the UNICTR Clinic for Victims and Witnesses for the Rwandan 
genocide. Khan said the clinic did not provide sufficient help, medication and other 
resources for genocide victims and witnesses who suffer from HIV/AIDS.75 The clinic 
grew from its first year with 200 patients to more than 1,000 in 2011. A contribution in 
2011 from Spain at the time helped to continue with the programs including a clinic for 
the witnesses to help with the physical and psychological problems of rape victims, "in 
particular for those living with HIV/AIDS."77 Without immediate funds, the 2011 report 
78 
reads "the clinic will be forced to halt the provision of its services." 
Most recently in a Dec. 2011 report to the U.N. Security Council, Judge Khan asked 
for an extension of the appointments of the tribunal's judges, which would normally end 
June 2012. Some of the problems Khan elaborated included even today the retention of 
experience staff since many have left their posts for "more stable employment."79 
Also the implementation in Rwanda of the Gacaca court system, genocide trials held 
in the community to ease the caseload for national and international courts, continuous to 
receive stiff criticism from international organizations. Human Rights Watch reported in 
2011 that the gacaca court system failed to provide "fair trial rights of the accused."80 In 
particular the referral of rape cases to these community courts remains questionable and 
75 Khan 2011. 
76 Ibid. 
77 International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda 2010, 16. 
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counterproductive.81 The genocide widow organization A VEGA, for example, provided 
most recently in 2009 legal aide services to genocide survivors in 37 Gacaca cases. It 
included aide for 13 rape survivors during the genocide.82 
Similar to the Rwandan tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal of the former 
Yugoslavia also had to cope with the lack of resources, including dwindling financial 
support needed to continue with bringing war criminal and war rapists to justice. In the 
2008 report to the Security Council, Judge Fausto Pocar, president of the ICTY, saw the 
Q-J 
effects once "political and financial support from international actors dries up," for 
example, in the diverting of court cases to national court systems. By 2008, for example, 
the ICTY began to funnel war crimes prosecution to national courts in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. How these national courts conduct and how effectively they manage these 
cases is still questionable. According to a 2008 report, an assessment about the "quality 
and effectiveness" of these local proceedings was still outstanding. 
Additionally, regional cooperation to apprehend fugitive war criminals remains an 
almost unsurpassable challenge. For example, Radovan Stankovic, who was convicted in 
2007 by a Bosnian court and sentenced to 20 years in prison for rape, torture and 
enslavement of women and underage girls, escaped the Foca prison a few months after 
sentencing. Still today, in 2012, Radovan remains at large and Judge Pocar had already in 
2008 questioned "the lack of progress made by the relevant authorities in apprehending 
Stankovic and in prosecuting those who assisted in his escape at all levels."84Judge Pocar 
also pointed to the still at-large war criminals Karadzic, Mladic, Zupljanin and Hadzic 
81 Human Rights Watch 2011, 12. 
82 AVEGA 2009. 
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and accused Serbia of not giving "adequate and diligent assistance in serving a summons 
for a key witness"85 for an ongoing trial in 2008. 
The large number of cases still to be tried creates an immense burden on local 
courts. During the 2008 meeting, Judge Pocar asserted that national courts in Bosnia face 
"thousands of war crime cases."86 In 2008, Chief Prosecutor of ICTY Serge Brammertz 
also articulated his concern regarding the protection and intimidation of witnesses, the 
lack of international funding for the ICTY, the lack of regional support to gain access to 
archives and documents and the overall waning international support to capture and 
transfer war crime fugitives.87 In December 2011, Brammertz asked neighboring 
countries to accelerate efforts to apprehend war criminals such as Stankovic and 
criticized the war crime prosecution on state level such as in Bosnia was being "too 
slow."88 
Additionally, often other obstacles surface in addition to the lack of resources and 
training and the reluctance of regional and international cooperation. For example with 
the Rwandan Tribunal, a differing and often conflicting definitions and interpretations of 
what justice really means created unexpected tensions. The International community, for 
example, often saw justice for rape survivors through the conviction of the perpetrators, 
while often for rape survivors the meaning of justice often extended beyond the 
apprehension and conviction of the perpetrator. Often justice includes the life and 
85 United Nations Security Council 2008, 5. 
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87 United Nations Security Council 2008, 8. 
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survival long after the rape. It includes real and tangible goals and objectives such as 
health concerns, housing and school fees for their children.89 
Other obstacles for foil justice often include an ethical dilemma to decipher who 
is the victim and the perpetrator after genocide and mass rape and how to reconcile both 
in an effort to rebuild society and heal. Many humanitarian groups are struggling with 
their humanitarian mission and the political reality surrounding them in the field. For 
example, shortly after the genocide in Rwanda Medecins Sans Frontieres found itself 
aiding former Hutu rebel leaders and members in refugee camps in eastern Congo with 
food. MSF's withdrawal from the eastern part of the Congo in fact was driven by the 
notion that its humanitarian help actually could turn into "a technical function in the 
service of evil."90 
E. WHAT LIES AHEAD: CHILDREN OF BAD MEMORIES AND HIV/AIDS 
The damage and the implications of mass rapes for a community and a country as 
a whole go beyond the obvious and the tangible. They go beyond the immediate 
psychological and physical effects on women. They run deep, not only affecting the very 
fabric of a society and community, but suggest a profound fragmentation of the nation 
state. A society, whose population consists of a majority of people having survived mass 
torture through sexual violence, will struggle with recovery, rebuilding and healing-
Such fragmentation has security implications. Mass rape and its lingering societal 
implications carries specific social and political consequences that inflict and affect a 
country and its society for generations. For example, the effects and lasting security 
implications of forced impregnations as practiced during the Bosnian war and HIV/AIDS 
89 Dax, Sabrina 2008. 
90 Terry, Fiona 2002, 2. 
231 
infections most prominently evident as a result of the mass rapes in Rwanda remain 
dramatically under-researched and under-documented. 
Scholars and sexual violence experts see a multitude of challenges laying ahead 
for the effort to a) interpreting rape as a security issue and b) reducing and curtailing 
sexual violence and rape as a systematic weapon of war. This includes the still widely 
neglected and under-researched studies of the "plight and status of war children,"91 
including its wide-ranging societal implications - and security dimension. And Bosnia 
and Rwanda are prime examples of this struggle and the political and social legacy of 
mass rape. 
In Rwanda, an estimated 10,000 children were born out of the 1994 mass rapes.92 
These children were often derogatorily referred to as "Little Interahamwes" or "children 
of bad memories" and consequently marginalized not only by their communities, but also 
their immediate families. In 2010, however, the Rwandan government initiated a critical 
step forward toward full integration of these children, who are now young adults. As 
recently as in 2010, the government made allocations from its genocide victim's fund 
available for these war children.93 This government action is significant because it 
expands the definition of genocide victims to these children bom out of rape. By doing 
so, it publically not only acknowledges them, but also recognizes them as victims of the 
genocide. It expands the eligibility for government funding to help these now young 
adults with paying for school fees, for example. This recognition and classicization is 
also significant because it underscores the overarching argument that a society cannot 
recover, heal and rebuild unless all of its citizens are provided with equal rights. And it 
91 International Peace Research Institute Oslo 2010,4. 
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cannot grow and mature as a society and become a stable, fully-functioning government 
unless all of its citizenry have access to equal rights and opportunities. 
Rape and in particular forced impregnation as utilized during the Bosnian war 
were linked to the construction of identity through government policies and/or explicit or 
implicitly articulated by the society as a whole. In her 2008 article, Patricia A. Weitsman 
places the intersection of identity and rape at the heart of her discussion of how 
"governments construct and manipulate identity"94 through policies about rape and sexual 
violence during war. To expand on this argument, such identity construction through 
policy has security implication. According to Weitsman, aspects such as ethnical purity 
and the spoilage of identity are pivotal when centering on children born as a result of 
rape. These imposed policies - these identity assumptions-95 then have disenfranchised 
these children. The images that have been attached to the "children of war" resembled 
inherent violations of their human rights, according to Weitsman. 
To expand on this argument then, such human rights violations and the 
marginalization of thousands of children bom out of mass rape carries specific security 
implications. It affects and fractures a country's ability to rebuild from genocide and 
ethnical conflict. It hinders a nation state to recover from genocide if a portion of its 
population is forced to disproportionally carrying the burden of a previous conflict. It 
affects a society's ability to rebuild if a portion of its population continues to be 
marginalized. Weitsman's argument of these children's disenfranchisement affects not 
only villages and communities as the most immediate and intimate security nucleus, but 
94 Weitsman, Patricia A. 2008, 562 
95 Ibid., 563. 
233 
the country's security capacity in general. It makes a country vulnerable to new ethnic 
conflicts, ethnic tensions and rivalries. 
While the social implications and consequences of forced pregnancies are evident, 
its illogical underpinning and rational unveils further complexity. It indicates women's 
two-fold marginalization as survivors of mass rape. Women are not only faced with being 
stigmatized by their family and community as tainted and impure women, but further 
marginalized and rendered invisible as the mother of a child born from mass rape. The 
logic of utilizing forced impregnation as a tool of ethnic cleansing is intrinsically flawed 
because the child would carry the ethnic gen of both - the Bosnian mother and the 
Serbian father. Forced impregnation though, most prominently implemented through 
Bosnian rape camps, was seen by many scholars as a key mechanism of ethnic cleansing. 
Women were raped by Serbian soldiers "to give birth to little Chetniks/Serb soldiers.96 
Terminology such as "Genocidal rape," "ethnorape" or "femicide" in connection with the 
central objective of forced impregnation/eradication of the victim's ethnic identity 
surfaced. 
Weitsman argued that in order for rape to function as an effective weapon of 
ethnic cleansing, forced impregnation was seen as exclusively "paternally derived."97 
This means, for example, the Bosnian mother, the rape survivor, was rendered invisible. 
Her genetic contribution to the child was considered insignificant. If forced impregnation 
and forced maternity, according to the Serbian rational, was implemented to create 
Serbian offspring, such notion eliminated the Bosnian mother and made her absent. It 
would make her, the woman, nonexistent or existent only as a vessel to produce Serbian 
96 Allen, Beverly 1996,96. 
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children. The society's sole focus and the exclusive connection to the Serbian father, 
additionally marginalizes the mothers (the rape survivors). It renders the mother again 
invisible. The mother's biological significance and genetic influence - on the child's 
ethnic footprint - becomes irrelevant. Its identity is solely connected to the Serbian father. 
It de-humanizes the Bosnian mother and rape survivor and reduces her to a mechanical 
instrument of war. 
Additionally, in Rwanda the socio-political underpinning of mass rapes during the 
genocide originated from two structural prerequisites: a) the depiction of Tutsi women as 
sexual objects "requiring subjugation" and b) Rwandan patriarchal society.98 Rape in 
Rwanda more so than in Bosnia elevated itself to an effective mechanism and weapon of 
war because "patriarchal societies in which a woman's standing derives from her 
relationship to the men in her family, her brothers, father, husband, and sons."99 In 
countries such as Rwanda, according to Weitsman, a woman's security and survival as a 
fully recognized member of this society depends on her purity, of her being spared of 
rape. Rape survivors are often shamed into the periphery of society. They are being 
marginalized and become societal outcasts. Expanding on this argument, a society in 
which rape survivors - similar to the children born out of mass rape - are being 
marginalized remains politically fragile and vulnerable to conflict. 
Another challenge arises from the similarly under-researched and under-
documented security implications of HIV/AIDS infection of rape survivors and its ties to 
social stigmatization as a security factor. Often HIV/AIDS infected rape survivors 
become social outcasts in their community not only because of experienced sexual 
98 Weitsman, Patricia A. 2008, 576. 
99 Ibid., 564. 
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violence and the "impurity" aspect attached to it, but also due to the stigma surrounding 
HIV/AIDS. According to Rwandan President Paul Kagame, during the 1994 genocide 
people infected with AIDS were discharged from hospitals "specifically to form 
battalions of rapists."100 The AIDS death rate according to low estimates by the World 
Health Organization 1990 to 2007 data peaked drastically from about 6,000 Aids deaths 
in 1990 to about a post-genocide 22,000 in 1997. Only in 2007 did the number of death 
again regain pre-genocide/1990 levels.101 Already in 1998, Special Rapporteur 
Commaraswamy raised her concerns about data available about HIV infected rape 
1 
survivors and the lack of funding to treat women with HIV symptoms. The Rapporteur 
reported about the lack of statistics existing "on the medical conditions of women victims 
of violence after the genocide."103 According to the most recent (2009) report by the 
World Health Organization and UNAIDS, the estimated number of adults and children 
living with HIV dropped from an average of 190,000 people in 2001 to 150,000 in 
2007.104 
In Rwanda the Kigali-based non-governmental organization AVEGA has 
emerged as the country's leading women's organization still today in 2012 providing key 
services to genocide survivors. Founded in 1995, the organization continues to offer vital 
mental health screening and aid, trauma counseling, HIV/AIDS health services, testing, 
care and education for genocide survivors including war children. Additionally, AVEGA 
continues to offer legal support for genocide rape victims and consistently implements 
project financed through the FARG, Rwanda's Assistance Fund for Genocide Survivors. 
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Most recently this fund was extended to assist children born out of the mass rapes during 
the genocide. 
According to the in 2011 most recently made available report, A VEGA provided 
2,726 trauma counseling sessions to 4,382 individuals in 2009. Such trauma counseling is 
consistent with AVEGA's objective to "improve the social integration of genocide 
survivors affected by trauma into society." 105 This also includes 128 people who 
voluntarily were screened for HIV/AIDS. This 2009 report cites testimonies of genocide 
rape victims, who have, for example, gained access to antiretroviral (ARV) drugs to 
contain the HIV infection, 
Without the psychological services from which I regularly benefited, I am certain 
that the ARVS which I took could not have had a positive effect on my life. The 
counselling showed me that I am still alive and that I am capable of confronting 
my problems rather than being ruled by them. 
The rape which I suffered during the genocide resulted in me being very 
traumatised; I was almost dead; I was living in fear of being HIV positive and 
with the guilt of betraying my husband.. .However after some counselling 
sessions, I took the initiative to get tested for HIV and the results were negative. 
After this I was born again and once again felt happy to be alive; I felt strong 
enough to work again and gained a sense of inner peace.106 
The importance of trauma counseling is also articulated in the report as "one of 
the leading ways in which victims of the genocide can reintegrate into society."107 In 
2009 AVEGA also reported 49 group sessions with a total of 286 HIV positive clients 
supported. The stigma attached to HIV/AIDS remains a severe obstacle for people to 
agree to get tested - and to eventually halt the high number of HIV/AIDS infections. 
According to the 2008 AVEGA report 4,274 "members and beneficiaries [genocide 




survivors] were encouraged to voluntarily get tested for HIV."108 A VEGA supports the 
WHO endorsed concept of Voluntary Counseling and Testing (VCT) for HIV/AIDS, also 
by offering access to HIV/AIDS testing to people in rural communities through visits of 
a mobile testing unit. In 2009, five trips testing 83 people, of which three tested HIV 
positive. According to the report, they received "follow up medical and psychological 
treatment." HIV infected women also received ARV drugs and were "able to return to 
work and are able to function like any other."109 A VEGA also provided follow-up tests to 
gauge the effectiveness of ARV treatments. 
F. WHAT LIES AHEAD: MAIN STREAMING GENDER 
During and after the conflicts of Bosnia and Rwanda, rape as a systematic 
dynamic of war was successfully securitized. However, such successful securitization 
also introduces various dualities that require and demand further attention and discourse. 
For example, not every conflict is riddled with mass rapes. Not every conflict utilizes and 
displays sexual violence as a staple of war. Rape not always becomes a systematic 
institutionalized strategy to de-humanize, terrorize and eradicate one's enemy. Rape is 
not always the (convenient and cheap) weapon of choice. The conflicts in Palestine, El 
Salvador and Sri Lanka110 exemplify such lack of sexual violence. For example, by 
examining the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and citing the absence of 
sexual violence during the Israel and Palestinian conflict, Elisabeth Jean Wood argued in 
2009 that rape and sexual violence is not inevitably linked to conflict. In fact, if, for 
example, rape would be effectively discouraged - and consequently punished - by 
authorities and deemed and tangibly rationalized as counter-productive, sexual violence 
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would remain a rarity rather than common practice.111 The conflicts of Palestine, El 
Salvador and Sri Lank attest for the absence of rape during war. Military hierarchy and 
established rules - and the adherence to both during these conflicts - rendered the 
utilization of sexual violence ineffective.112 
Likewise, the focus on the mainstreaming of gender in international relations - if 
not directed and applied appropriately - allows for ambiguities and implies rather 
unintended and negative ramifications. The concept of gender equality within the 
overarching framework of international relations and global peace and conflict resolution, 
also referred to as gender mainstreaming, has most prominently after the conflicts in 
Bosnia and Rwanda in the mid 1990s gained global traction. The U.N. sponsored Fourth 
World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 was the first official international body, 
which introduced the term "mainstreaming gender" to a larger global audience. It 
appeared in conference's Declaration and Platform for Action in paragraph 79: 
In addressing unequal access to and inadequate educational opportunities, 
Governments and other actors should promote an active and visible policy of 
mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies and programmes, so that, 
before decisions are taken, an analysis is made of the effects on women and men, 
respectively.113 
Following the conference, the United Nations embarked in 1997 very specifically 
on an inter-departmental policy overhaul. More broadly, however, it sparked a 
philosophical re-thinking within the vast apparatus of the U. N. to include gender equality 
and to consistently implement "a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns 
and experiences an integral dimension of design, implementation, monitoring and 
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evaluation of all policies and programs."114 The mainstreaming of gender equates to the 
introduction of gender and gender equality as a consistent and permanent component of, 
for example, global peace making and keeping efforts and conflict resolutions. According 
to a 2001 U.N. report, the U.N. Department for Disarmament Affairs, for example, 
began to explore the "linkages and synergies between gender and disarmament""5 in 
regard to small arms, landmines and weapons of mass destruction. It began to include 
specific job descriptions for gender units within peacekeeping missions such as in 
Kosovo and East Timor.116 
Throughout the 2000s, U.N. entities including, for example, Trade and 
Development, International Labour Organizations (ILO), the U.N. Environmental 
Programme, World Bank and the Department of Political Affairs employed various 
gender action plans and "gender-sensitive guidelines"117 to emphasize its gender focus. In 
December 2009, the U.N.'s Department of Political Affairs and the UNIFEM agreed to a 
118 
united effort "to mainstream a gender perspective into peace negations." The U.N. 
Development Group's strategic plans for 2010 through 2014 include "gender responsive 
budgeting."119 The U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations calls specifically for a 
gender focus in policies applied to conflict and post-conflict zones and an increased 
number of women in peacekeeping missions.120 The U.N. requires quarterly reports "on 
progress and challenges to the implementation of mandates on women, peace and 
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security"121 and various U.N. country teams and U.N. entities such as the UNFPA, 
UNICEF and UNDP along with national women's groups and non-governmental 
organizations cooperate to "ensure prevention and response to gender-based violence in 
humanitarian contexts."122 Most significantly for the nexus of global security and gender, 
however, the U.N. Security Council resolutions 1325 and 1820 have established the most 
far-reaching and critical milestones. Both resolutions have provided the intersection of 
gender, women, conflict and security with visibility and connected sexual violence and 
rape to a new set of international norms. 
The concept of mainstreaming gender - the act of introducing gender as an 
inherent part of everyday policy making, international institution building, conflict 
resolution, human rights implementations and other actions and issues - has increasingly 
been endorsed not only by international institutions, but translated into action on the 
1 ground by non-governmental organizations and transnational networks. However, 
rigorous gender inclusion such as demanded during the 1995 Beijing World Conference 
on Women and later implemented by the United Nations to reflect "a gender perspective 
reflected in all our policies and programs," 124 also introduces a complexity - and carries 
its own set of unintended repercussions. Such complexity stems, for example, from the 
inherent obscurity that surrounds gender and equality in the first place. The term gender 
norms and its implication, for example, as they represent a set of behaviors and rules 
about gender, remains questionable because "they consist of two parts, 'gender' and 
121 United Nations Economic and Social Council 2010,9. 
122 Ibid., 14. 
123 Ibid., 13. 
124 United Nations 1995,4. 
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'equality,' that are each highly contested"125 in itself. Such complexity also originates 
from the interpretation of mainstreaming gender itself as the "dominant language of 
bureaucratic politics through which policymakers worldwide understand women and men 
and engage with the politics of the global."126 Some feminist scholars, for example, argue 
that mainstreaming gender within international politics and global security studies can be 
counterproductive. It "may end up reinforcing dominant gender identities and 
international power relations."127 
U.N. Security Council resolutions 1325 and 1820, which have successfully 
securitized rape as a systematic tool of war, have been, for example, heavily criticized by 
some feminist scholars for merely attaching the word women to issues without providing 
concrete mechanisms to measure impact and effectiveness. Many pushed for the reality 
of war and peace - and rape as a systematic weapon of war - to move beyond the adopted 
"adding women and stirring"128 concept. The inclusion of more women to peacekeeping 
missions, for examples, bypasses the integration of more women when it comes to "the 
disproportionate impact of peacekeeping and peace building operations." Women are 
"expected to civilize peacekeeping missions and operations through their mere 
presence."129 Feminist scholars also warn that these resolutions achieve quite the 
opposite: they bypass women's rights and women-specific projects and "re-invite 
masculine prominence."130 These scholars contend that mainstreaming gender realizes 
just the opposite: it underscores gender inequality and endorses a pervasive gender bias. 
125 Tickner, J. Ann and Sjoberg, Laura ed. al. 2011, 77. 
126 Ibid., 16. 
127 Ibid., 16. 
128 Wibben, Annick T.R. 2011, 23. 
129 Tickner, J. Ann and Sjoberg, Laura ed. al. 2011, 83. 
130 Ibid., 80. 
242 
Specifically linked to wartime rape, it supports a masculine agenda and the perspective of 
those who see wartime rape as an inherently gender-centered issue. It pushes the issue of 
sexual violence and rape during conflict into the public arena, but, by doing so, it actually 
underscores the male dominated structures it tries to dismantle. "Women and girls remain 
passive victims protected by male soldiers, militarized states, or their male 
representatives on the U.N. Security Council."131 To expand and elaborate on this 
argument, mainstreaming gender then within the context of the securitization of rape 
likewise introduces and perpetuates such gendered complexity. It propagates the socially 
constructed argument of feminine vulnerability and victimhood. The causality of rape 
then reverts back to an inherent gender bias - to women as rape victims by default - due 
to a constructed or perceived inherent biological predisposition - due to one's gender. It 
becomes once again the "protection racket where the protected loses all autonomy and is 
dependent on the protector who defines the threat and response to it."132 Rape in war then 
transforms itself once again into an unsurpassable status quo and an innate given, a 
condition one - government, institutions, the global community - cannot overcome. 
The complexity not only comes from this inherent vulnerability - forcing and 
trapping women in this aura of insidious defenselessness - it also perpetuated a gendered 
hierarchy. It enables once again the perception of masculine dominance and underscores 
the male role of the protector. It perpetuated a gender bias that once again renders women 
helpless and inherently submissive to a gendered power structure. Such structure 
privileges masculinity. It views women as "objects of protection and men as the power 
131 Tickner, J. Ann and Sjoberg, Laura ed. al. 2011, 84. 
132 Wibben, Annick T.R. 2011, 22. 
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holders."133 It displays an inferior versus superior undercurrent and an innate hierarchy 
that sees women once again mute, weak and powerless - unless safeguarded by men. It 
aggravates once again the intersection of power and men, the sole provider of security for 
women. It accentuates the argument of gendered inequality and in an almost perverted 
reversal justifies the disproportioned exposure of women to rape in war - due to gender. It 
becomes an irreconcilable position for the advocates of gender or power neutrality and 
gender equality. These complexities then render mainstreaming gender ineffective 
because it only becomes universal lip service to appease women's advocacy for equality. 
It becomes an accepted, conventional part of policymaking and "within bureaucracies 
without challenging political and economic structures."134 Mainstreaming gender then 
runs afoul with its initial objective. It empowers one while it marginalizes another.135 It 
endorses a gendered power structure while relegating and abandoning its original intent 
for equality. 
Only if rape and sexual violence remains securitized, if "all acts of sexual 
violence are investigated and redressed effectively. Only then can the world hope for a 
future in which sexual violence is not used as a weapon of war," 136 said Special Women 
Violence UN rapporteur Gay McDougall in 2000. However, the increased involvement of 
the U.N. Security Council securitizing sexual violence as seen in 2009 remains a hopeful 
sign for de-gendering rape as a weapon of war. 
133 Tickner, J. Ann and Sjoberg, Laura ed. al. 2011, 86. 
134 Ibid., 87. 
135 Ibid., 90-1. 
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G. CONCLUSION: ALL IS FAIR IN WAR? 
Throughout history rape has been utilized as a systematic weapon of war, but was 
never recognized as such. By applying and expanding on the theoretical parameters of the 
Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory with the case studies of the Bosnian war 
(1992-1995) and the Rwandan genocide (1994), this dissertation indicated that rape was 
successfully securitized in the 1990s during both conflicts - and afterward. Securitization 
Theory as a model and indicator of an effective shifting of rape from an apolitical or 
political perspective into the security realm was appropriate. Bosnia initiated the first 
convictions of rape as a crime against humanity. Bosnia and Rwanda became effective 
markers and pivotal watershed moments for the continued securitization of rape. It 
moved the assumptions of wartime rape from the natural to the strategic, from the 
individual to the collective, the insular/singular and incidental to the national, regional 
and international. This dissertation discussed the wide-ranging implications of such 
successful theory application, but also how securitization needed to adjust its prescribed 
processes to adapt to the specific security character of wartime rape. It effectively 
articulated why the intersection of rape and security must remain visible in light of the 
emergence of a new generation of wars and why international institutions - and the 
continuing rise of norms - are instrumental and critical in this process. 
As this dissertation has set out to explore the legacies of institutionalized sexual 
violence during the Bosnians and Rwandan conflicts transformed wartime rape - and its 
global recognition. It turned rape into a matter of security - it securitized it. By applying 
Barry Buzan and Ole Waever's Securitization Theory to the case studies of Bosnia and 
Rwanda, this dissertation finds that the Securitization Theory as a model and indicator 
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effectively shifted rape from an apolitical or political perspective into the security realm. 
For example, the tribunal of the former Yugoslavia became the first international court, 
convicting war criminals for rape. The Tribunal of Rwanda for the first time interpreted 
rape as a weapon of genocide and convicted war criminals accordingly. By identifying 
specific rhetorical key markers utilized by specific actors such as institutions; non­
governmental organizations; states; and the international media, this dissertation 
systematically analyzed the narrative of rape and found evidence of successful 
securitization during both conflicts - and beyond. Through the speech act, the theory's 
key identifying mechanism, this dissertation traces these markers throughout the interplay 
of this multitude of actors (institutions; non-governmental organizations; states; media). 
In 1998, the Rome Statute defined rape as a war crime that could be interpreted as 
genocide. In 2000 and in 2009 the U.N. Security Council passed the watershed 
resolutions 1325 and 1820, respectively, for the first time underscoring the inherent link 
between systematic rape, war and global security. 
With the successful securitization of rape, however, certain inconsistencies and 
caveats arise - because of the distinct and unique security character of rape. Successful 
securitization does not imply social change. Securitization of rape and the global 
recognition of rape as a security issue do not entail the eradication of sexual violence 
during conflict. The inconsistencies and caveats of such successful securitization, the 
incentives and disincentives for the continued securitization of rape - and the criticism of 
the Securitization model and its application to rape - come from a rather subtle and 
complex place. These inconsistencies - persistent shades of grey - include the gradual 
reluctance to prosecute rapes as currently seen in Rwanda and the growing criticism of 
246 
feminist scholars, who question the power structures and application surrounding 
mainstreaming of gender. 
This dissertation confirms Securitization Theory as a successful and effective 
model. But it cannot leave such successful securitization without criticism. And such 
criticism and shortcomings, as previously elaborated, are specifically targeting the unique 
security character of rape. Rape needs to remain securitized due to its specific security 
character. The permanent securitization of rape is imperative because the consequences 
of not keeping rape securitized are already evident. The increasingly judicial reluctance 
in Rwanda to continue to prosecute rape cases underscores the fragility of rape as a 
security issue. International institutions such as the United Nations and powerful in-
country non-governmental organization such as Human Rights Watch, women advocacy 
groups such as Rwanda's AVEGA and transnational networks such as Amnesty 
International and global media, for example, are critical building blocks in the processes 
to keep wartime rape securitized. 
Likewise, if mainstreaming gender continues to leave existing power structures in 
place and rather underscores than abolishes gender stereotypes and biases, the process 
itself is flawed and must be re-examined. Mainstreaming gender cannot remain an 
appeasing and complacent mechanism implemented by international institutions to 
emphasize and safeguard a status quo. Mainstreaming gender needs to question and 
challenge existing power structures. The concept of "adding women and stirring" in the 
21st century is outdated. Mainstreaming gender needs to develop the tenacity to 
breakdown conventional masculine constructs and replace them with power equality and 
gender impartiality. 
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The long arc of humanity has seen tremendous inroads in terms of the 
securitization of rape. It has made wartime rape effectively visible and created a 
framework of universal judicial accountability. However, it also has seen and already 
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